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Chapter 1 
Managerial Perception, Diversification, and Corporate Transformation 
"As time passes, the sand piles up even thicker,                                                                            
and occasionally it's blown away and what's below is revealed."  
Haruki Murakami, Colorless Tsukuru Tazaki and His Years of Pilgrimage 
 
I. Divergence in Corporate Performance amongst Large U.S. Firms 
This chapter provides the thesis research question, approach, and structure. 
It is said that the 20th century was the American Century, a period which saw the U.S. 
rise to economic supremacy but also conversely descend to significant fiscal and trade uncer-
tainty1. Large U.S. enterprises have played a central role in the development of the economy by 
establishing the modern, integrated, multiunit business structure in advance of any other coun-
try. Among them, it is the modern industrial enterprise that played a key role in transforming 
the U.S. economy into a modern industrial economy during a period when the U.S. economy 
was growing significantly through development of the industrial sector2. By the end of World 
War II, the enterprises established competitive advantages and increased their strength, even in 
international industrial markets3. After the war, the foundation set for U.S. industry to benefit 
from an extraordinary surge of growth during the postwar boom of the 1950s and 1960s4. 
While Europe and Japan had to focus immediate postwar efforts on extensive reconstruction, to 
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recover from the massive destruction caused by the war, U.S. enterprises assumed international 
leadership positions in many industries5. They subsequently dominated world trade under these 
rather unique circumstances6. U.S. enterprises were able to maintain business competitiveness, 
even after the economic recovery of other countries, because they had already established com-
petitive advantages as first mover7. 
As the world economy gradually and fully recovered from the effects of the war, how-
ever, U.S. enterprises declined its dominance, not only internationally but also in domestic mar-
kets8. Although large U.S. enterprises accounted for 78 out of the top 100 firms in 1956, by 
1990 the number was reduced to 33 of the top 100 global mining and manufacturing firms9. 
American management, previously admired for its strikingly effective post-World War II per-
formance, was now being regarded as the chief contributor to the American economic de-
cline10. However, by the end of the twentieth century, there was uneven performance amongst 
U.S. enterprises. For example, while a number of large U.S. enterprises had dropped from the 
top 200 list by 1997, 28 enterprises with histories going back to 1880 remained in the ranking 
from 1917 to 199711. Some of them continued to grow with a focus on generating new prod-
ucts, either developed internally or through acquisition, and others attempted to chart an evolu-
tionary path to growth by combining their traditional and new businesses12. These develop-
ments raise the question of why some of the larger U.S. industrial enterprises continued to grow 
in an environment of change while others declined. In other words, why could some firms 
eliminate Leibenstein’s X-inefficiency through innovation, in the entrepreneurial sense of Israel 
Kirzner, while others could not13.  
With this question in mind, this thesis takes two large U.S. industrial enterprises to ex-
plore the historical corporate transformations of large industrial enterprises from 1946 to 2000. 
The next section begins with a review of Chandler’s logic of corporate growth, sometimes 
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called Chandler's Model, and reactions from his critics. This confirms that neither side of the 
debate focused much on managerial capabilities, which is essential to understanding the diver-
gence of large U.S. industrial firms by the end of twentieth century. Section III looks closely at 
perspectives related to the concept of managerial capabilities, in order to examine an approach 
for investigating managerial capabilities. The last section sets out the research approach used in 
this thesis to examine the divergence of large U.S. firms. 
 
II. The Logic of the Competitive Advantage of Large U.S. Industrial Enterprises 
To examine the divergence of growth amongst large U.S. enterprises, Alfred D. Chan-
dler, Jr. provides a starting point with his well-known logic of the large enterprise’s growth and 
advantages, with Chandler being one of the world’s most frequently cited social scientists from 
1957 to 2007, ranking with Douglass C. North14.  
1. The ‘Early’ Chandler’s Model and the ‘Later’ Chandler’s Model 
Chandler regarded large industrial enterprises to be the central institutions of capitalism 
and the key to explaining the growth of the advanced economy in the U.S., and examined how 
management transformed purchased inputs into sold outputs in order to generate high levels of 
productivity15. Through massive works over the years, he demonstrated the powerful logic that 
applies to growth and advantages of large enterprises, later known as Chandler’s Model or the 
Chandlerian Model. Although the word of ‘model’ is used, his model has evolved and changed 
over the years16. In following his major works, the logic model can be generally divided into 
two distinct models. While the first model is drawn from Strategy and Structure in 1962, The 
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Visible Hand in 1977, and Scale and Scope in 1990, the second model is demonstrated in In-
venting the Electronic Century in 2001 and Shaping the Industrial Century in 200517. For con-
venience, the former model will be called the “early Chandler’s Model” and the latter, the “later 
Chandler’s Model”. Of course both models are completely related, but the focus shifts from the 
role of management in utilizing productive resources to the role of management in developing 
productive resources18. 
(1) The Early Chandler’s Model 
The early model is widely known as the logic of large enterprise advantages. Since there 
are a number of works that analyze his logic in detail, this describes his basic logic for the pe-
riod of Scale and Scope, which covers the same time-frame (the 1880s-1930s) as the manage-
rial revolution in American business in The Visible Hand, and the creation of the multidivi-
sional structure in Strategy and Structure19. Before the 1990s, his main focus had been to ex-
plain the rise of the modern managerial enterprise or large industrial enterprise, which played a 
key role in the transformation of American and other country economies from one that was ru-
ral, agrarian and commercial into one that is modern, industrial and urban20. The reason major 
industries were dominated by large managerial enterprises in the industrial economy is that 
they could realize new greater productivity and not have to entirely rely on the market. Alt-
hough the market remained the generator of the demand for goods and services, such enter-
prises took on the function of coordinating the flow of goods though existing processes of pro-
duction and distribution, and of allocating funds and personnel for future production and distri-
bution21.  
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The enterprises could achieve efficiencies when administrative coordination allowed for 
greater productivity, lower costs and higher profits and coordination through market mecha-
nisms by adopting new strategies (i.e. related diversification) and new organizational structures 
(i.e. multidivisional structure), and only when salaried managers administrated these enterprises 
through the creation of a managerial hierarchy of lower, middle, and top managers22. Thus be-
cause salaried managers could now adopt the right strategy and right structure for corporate 
growth through a managerial hierarchy, this led large industrial enterprises to take a lead role in 
the development of the industrial economy and to dominate many sectors of the economy. In 
addition, they were able to maintain their dominance and competitive advantages over follow-
ers through their organizational capabilities, by being able to fully exploit economies of scale 
and scope and by being built through salaried manager decisions on long-term strategies of 
growth and three-pronged investments23. Such enterprises are called managerial enterprises, 
large industrial concerns in which operating and investment decisions are made by a hierarchy 
of salaried managers that are governed by a board of directors24. 
Although different from gaining an understanding of the distinction between the early 
and the late Chandler models, Etsuo Abe provides a full representation of the early Chandler’s 
Model, as shown in figure 1-1, which more concisely describes it.  
He concludes that Chandler’s argument is composed of four primary factors: market, 
strategy, management structure (e.g. organizational structure), and corporate structure (e.g. 
managerial firm)25. In response to developments in national markets, the enterprises adopted 
appropriate strategies to meet the needs of the evolving market26. With the strategies, they then 
developed a management structure that was aligned to the strategy27. In parallel to the develop-
ment of the management strategy and structure, the corporate structure was developed at the 
firm level. As a result of this interactive development of both the management and corporate 
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structures, the separation of ownership and management led to the development of a cadre of 
professional managers and a managerial hierarchy28. Through the interaction of these four fac-
tors, there emerged a transition from coordination by market to coordination by administra-
tion29. 
 
Figure 1- 1. The Early Chandler’s Model. 
Source: Etsuo Abe, “Alfred Chandler’s Model of Business Enterprise Structure and the Japanese-Style 
Enterprise System: Are They Compatible?,” Japanese Research in Business History 26, (2009b): figure 1, 
p.65. 
Note: The figure is based on Chandler’s works before Scale and Scope, because Etsuo Abe interprets 
that Chandler’s framework began changing with Scale and Scope, which added the new concept of or-
ganizational capabilities. 
 
Thus the early Chandler’s Model mainly provides the logic for large industrial enterprise 
efficiencies, with less direct attention paid to the market, and does not fully describe how they 
could develop such advantages. In his logic, they built advantages because they were first-mov-
ers and were first to invest in the industries30. In this explanation, it is not clearly indicated why 
and how first-movers established these advantages. This element became the main theme of 
Chandler’s next research project31. 
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(2) The Later Chandler’s Model 
After finished the Scale and Scope project, Chandler began working on a new project 
that focuses on American competitive capabilities under the question of “why have some 
American companies and some American industries been able to maintain their industrial herit-
age and competitive strength and others have not?32” Inventing the Electronic Century in 2001 
and Shaping the Industrial Century in 2005 are the chief research results of this project. Alt-
hough the set of works tried to introduce another logic for managerial enterprises, it has not 
been as widely referred to when compared to the earlier model. Given the detail provided in 
previous researches, the logic of his later model is examined33. He has described the success 
and failure of leading competitors in terms of technological achievement and financial success, 
by examining international competition in the high technology industries of consumer electron-
ics, computers, chemicals and pharmaceuticals34. Figure 1-2 briefly summarizes his theoretical 
explanation. In Scale and Scope he developed his early logic based on an integrated learning 
base, which deepened the concept of organizational capabilities as a source of competitive ad-
vantage. Enterprises obtained first-mover advantage, which then created an integrated learning 
base by combining a number of learned capabilities. Once an integrated learning base is estab-
lished, it can direct, but also somewhat limit, the evolution of the industry.  
This is because an integrated learning base determines the barriers to entry, strategic 
boundaries, and limits to growth. Since the follower enterprises require a set of integrated capa-
bilities to be able to compete with the first-movers in the industry, it is the integrated learning 
base that determines who are the players in the industry. The barriers to entry prevent startups 
from creating an effective integrated learning base, deemed to be essential to compete in the in-
dustry35. Thus first-movers that have become large industrial enterprises are able to maintain 
competitiveness in the long term. The barriers to entry now determined the strategic boundaries 
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that rule competition or competitive strategy, because the same players continuously compete 
with each other like a repeated game36. Under these conditions, the grouping of enterprises can 
limit growth of the industry as long as they can acquire new learning37. In other words, the inte-
grated learning base indirectly determined the potential size of the market. Thus, as long as 
first-movers keep acquiring new knowledge and creating innovation through continuous in-
vestments, their advantages are maintained. If they do not take the right strategy, called virtuous 
strategy (i.e. related diversification), they can lose their first-mover advantage and open the 
door to increased competition. 
 
Figure 1- 2. The Later Chandler’s Model. 
Source: Compiled from Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Inventing the Electronic Century: The Epic Story of the 
Consumer Electronics and Computer Industries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.): xii-xvii, 
pp.2-6; Shaping the Industrial Century: The Remarkable Story of the Modern Chemical and Pharmaceu-
tical Industries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.): pp.6-12. 
 
This is his other logic of large enterprise’s advantages. There are some similarities to the 
concept of integrated learning base found in Utterback and Abernathy’s concept of dominant 
design38. Dominant design is defined as the development of a new product (or set of features) 
synthesized from individual technological innovations introduced independently in prior varia-
tions of the product39. If dominant design indicates a dominant design of product, integrated 
learning base can be said to be a dominant design of industry or a competitive advantage in the 
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industry. Enterprises that created an integrated learning base can survive as long as they acquire 
new learning and continuously improve their integrated learning base, while individual prod-
ucts disappear over the long term even though product categories are maintained. 
The later Chandler’s Model emphasizes the role of management in developing produc-
tive resources40. Through an historical examination of international competition between first-
movers and successful challengers, it provides the logic for the preservation of large industrial 
enterprise advantages. As long as managerial enterprises keep investing in related technology 
and markets with the right organizational structure (i.e. multidivisional structure), they can con-
tinue to be dominant in the industry. Although his early model has turned into a more dynamic 
model, it does not clearly indicate the logic of why some managers of managerial enterprises 
successfully continued to make the right investment and others did not, nor how first-movers 
converted each learned organizational capability into the creation of or improvement to the in-
tegrated learning base. This is because he has intentionally decided not to examine this point. 
Although a consideration of managerial capabilities is needed in order to further explore the 
logic, to which Chandler would likely agree, he avoided focusing on that due to the difficulties 
associated with the need to generalize 41. Thus, as Hikino points out, there remains the problem 
of knowing under what conditions salaried managers could apply their managerial knowledge 
to appropriate investments for corporate growth and profitability42. 
2. Subsequent Debate over Chandler’s Model 
Because of the significant influence of Chandler’s model it has been under criticism, be-
ginning around the 1970s and accelerating into the 1990s, this after not only U.S. managerial 
enterprises but also those of other countries began losing their dominance43. While the early 
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criticisms were based on external factors which the model did not consider, such as the exist-
ence of small firms and the influence of government or antitrust laws, the criticisms then tar-
geted the logic of large enterprise advantages or the early Chandler’s Model. Since these criti-
cisms have already been discussed in a number of informative papers44, focus is placed on re-
viewing recent major criticisms regarding the role of managers and managerial capabilities, 
which Chandler has not deeply examined.  
Although no consensus has emerged as on the post-Chandler’s model, there are two ma-
jor perspectives proposed so far by Richard N. Langlois and Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. 
G. Raff, and Peter Temin (hereafter LRT). Both proposals reflected on the decline of Chandler-
ian enterprises that followed his early model and the economic environmental changes in the 
late twentieth century, called the new economy. Yet they differ in what they emphasize. While 
Langlois emphasizes the change in the supply side and technology and the modularization of 
production while describing “in the end there are markets,” LRT pays more attention to the 
change in the demand side and markets and to long-term informal relations, based on Oliver E. 
Williamson’s theory of “in the beginning there were markets”, in order to understand the eco-
nomic and business changes45. 
Langlois sees Chandlerian managers as specialized in management but possessing gen-
eral management capabilities, since their function was to buffer uncertainty 46. Through the 
wave of conglomerate activity in the 1960s, managers learned that they could move divisions 
around like pieces on a chessboard, in the first instance this is due to the modular structure of 
the M-form47. Yet managers were generally insulated from the vagaries of the environment, es-
pecially those caused by financial and other markets48. As he describes, when modularity re-
duced the need for management and integration to buffer uncertainty and the development of 
markets were creating new tradable units by the late twentieth century49, managers, who were 
11 
 
in a mix of division-modules enterprises including non-conglomerated, extended the logic of 
the idea of corporate specialization and decided to hive off not only unrelated divisions but also 
vertically related divisions as well50. Thus Langlois’ view on managers is that managerial capa-
bilities can be seen as specific-general knowledge, and that managers flexibly respond to envi-
ronmental changes though either specializing or by integration of business for corporate 
growth. 
Although LTR has not much referred like Langlois and mainly mentioned to the fault of 
managerial hierarchies, they raise some aspects of the role of the manager and managerial capa-
bilities. After firms introduced the M-form, the role of top management was to focus on re-
source allocation and longer-term strategic concerns, while providing divisional managers the 
latitude to respond to changing conditions and opportunities in their area of responsibility51. 
However, when rising per-capita income shifted consumer preferences toward higher quality, 
more individualized goods, and markets became thicker and transaction-cost issues were 
greatly reduced by falling transportation and communication costs, this revealed different man-
agerial capabilities between enterprises52. Instead of responding to these changes, Chandlerian-
style top management that were leading mergers from central offices, especially in the case of 
conglomerates, rarely had much detailed knowledge of the businesses they acquired and, as a 
result, increasingly restricted themselves to assessing divisional manager’s performance53. 
They seemed unable or unwilling to reform themselves in response to changed economic con-
ditions, until shareholders forced top managers to take note of the financial sector’s evaluation 
of decisions taken54. On the other hand, the top management of new or foreign enterprises re-
sponded to the diverse preferences of customers by adopting innovation and another coordina-
tion mechanism (i.e. long-term relationships)55. According to their analysis, Chandlerian-style 
management largely did not have managerial capabilities to adopt changes because of the 
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highly developed hierarchies they were in, while others built the capabilities by relying on a 
different coordination mechanism. Thus they see managerial capabilities as the adaptability and 
resilience of the manager, which is a factor to explain the divergence in growth of successful 
and unsuccessful enterprises. 
Although there is some difference between Langlois and LTR in their perspectives of 
managerial capabilities in Chandlerian enterprises, both emphasize the influence of environ-
mental changes and adaptability of managerial capabilities on the divergence in Chandlerian 
enterprises. In this sense, their views are much simpler on managerial capabilities and manager 
than is Chandler’s Model. Hence they much less pay attention to individualized managerial ca-
pabilities. 
In considering Chandler’s models and the major challenges to Chandler’s model, it con-
firms there is a need to understand what, why, and how top management made decisions in or-
der to fully examine the divergence of growth among large U.S. enterprises in the late twentieth 
century. Because managerial motives within firms might not be so much based on economic 
efficiency, rather on political solutions,56 and corporate objectives are often diversified57, it is 
helpful to introduce the approach of the managerial capabilities perspective tin order to compre-
hend the divergence. Thus there is a need to look at the talents of managers, as Chandler de-
scribed in Strategy and Structure:  
“Although the enterprise undoubtedly had a life of its own above and beyond that of its 
individual executives, although technological and market requirements certainly set 
boundaries and limits to growth, nevertheless, its health and effectiveness in carrying 
out its basic economic functions depended almost entirely on the talents of its adminis-
trators.58” 
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III. Perspectives on Managerial Capabilities 
Although the talents of administrators range from top, middle to lower management, the 
top management capabilities (or managerial capabilities) are the most essential to successful 
maintenance of the long-term health and growth of the enterprise59. Managerial capabilities, 
which are based on management knowledge and experience, are learned in order to administer 
the activities of the functional operating units, to integrate their activities, and to coordinate the 
flow of goods from suppliers of raw materials through the processes of production and distribu-
tion to the retailers and final customers60. Among a number of functions of these capabilities, 
the core that determines the fate of the enterprise is decision-making on the allocation of busi-
ness resources61. Decisions by top management have been a classic topic for examination up to 
the present. 
1. Managerial Capabilities in Business History 
In business history, decisions or decision-making have been a central theme for study 
from the early days62 to the present63. More recent discussions have gradually recognized that 
business history should pay more attention to this aspect of management to avoid theological, 
deterministic or backward-looking history64. To examine the aspect of decisions, Arthur M. 
Johnson is considered an early scholar who has provided the framework65. He pointed out the 
importance of the perceptions of decision-makers, which influence and are influenced by the 
firm’s organizational structure66. Certain types of perception (e.g. “compulsory” and “permis-
sive”) are associated with certain organizational changes67. Taking from Johnson’s approach, 
Akio Okochi amplified the perceptional approach with thoughts of Japanese philosopher Miki 
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Kiyoshi, and developed a set of empirical studies that focus on perceptions and decision-mak-
ing within business enterprises, through his approach called as keiei-koso-ryoku or entrepre-
neurial perception68. Even though a number of business historians intentionally or unintention-
ally mention the role of perceptions in their studies, there are seemingly few business history 
studies beyond Okochi that deal mainly with perceptions.  
However, although the value of Okochi's studies has been greatly recognized, there are 
also limitations to his approach. Yonekawa, for instance, values his study as one that took a 
step forward in moving from abstract methodology of entrepreneurial history, but he raises that 
it does not cover the environmental factors of the firm’s organization in its analysis, as his dis-
cussion did not much consider this aspect of the historical background69. Yonekura further criti-
cized that Okochi’s analysis of perceptions is far less analytical or historical and much more 
subjective, although it should be recognized as a novel study of individual decision-making 
processes70. While understanding the importance of the perceptional approach as one of meth-
ods for gaining an “ex ante” perspective, Suzuki concludes that it is difficult to describe a set of 
historical causes and effects solely through an accumulation of numerous elucidations of the 
decision-making process71. Instead, decisions can be better situated within the vital process of 
historical case and effect if examined along with institutional changes72.  
While Jones and Wadhwani describe how the study of entrepreneurship has been con-
ducted with broad literature review and Miyamoto bridges the historical and to present entre-
preneurship study in Japan, entrepreneurial history, another prime research field in business his-
tory, has historically and more vigorously examined the cognitive actor73. To understand the 
entrepreneur as an agent of change in an economy, entrepreneurial history focuses not only on 
individuals and firms but also on temporal changes in the industries, markets, societies, econo-
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mies, and political systems74. Wadhwani and Jones classify various approaches into three per-
spectives, one of which is the cognitive perspective, to understand the choices and actions of 
social and economic actors75. For the study of entrepreneurial history, Sasaki proposes factors 
to which researchers should pay attention, such as the subjective conditions and objective con-
ditions of the entrepreneur76. While objective conditions are further distinguished as market 
conditions (i.e. demand and supply factors) and non-market condition (e.g. geographical, cul-
tural, and legal factors), subjective conditions are divided into (1) individual competencies that 
lead to keiei-koso-ryoku, (2) individual competencies for organizing, and (3) individual compe-
tencies for practicing77. Through examining the interaction between subjective and objective 
conditions, it reveals the entrepreneur as an innovator. Studies of entrepreneurial history have 
been developed with adherence to these factors. However, entrepreneurial history tends to look 
more at successful individual entrepreneurs78, and also has lost traction as attention is focused 
on the corporation79. Moreover, because it is fragmented and usually on the margins of main-
stream research agenda80, there does not appear to be an analytical framework although studies 
of entrepreneurial history provide great insights into decision-making. 
Thus, although the importance of both decision-making and cognitive / perceptional as-
pects is sometimes integrally and other times separately claimed in business history, it does not 
seem to be reflected in an integrated analytical framework. As a result, these important aspects 
have been relatively less discussed or unaddressed with regards to fully understanding the dis-
parity in Chandlerian firms in the second half of twentieth century. 
2. Managerial Capabilities in Other Disciplines 
(1) Economics 
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Managerial capabilities and the disparity between enterprises has been discussed at 
length in economics. In her early influential study, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Pen-
rose discussed managerial capabilities as managerial services. Although not clearly defined as 
such, the main function of managerial services is the creation and execution of plans for expan-
sion and related decision-making81. With regard to the construction of an analytical framework 
for managerial capabilities, her study indicates that managerial capabilities cannot be under-
stood at the level of the individual but rather as an aggregate of the management team82. In ad-
dition the study points out that the capacities of the existing available managerial personnel of 
the firm set a limit on any expansion of that firm83, in other words, the difference in the availa-
bility of managerial capabilities is a factor that can influence of the level of corporate growth. 
Thus it can be said that managerial capabilities, which the aggregate of management team, led 
to disparity in growth between enterprises. 
Regarding the theory of the firm, Shimizu reviewed neoclassical economics (with em-
phasis on new institutional economics) and evolutionary economics, the latter on which, as Abe 
points out, Chandler later had an attraction 84. In order to demonstrate the importance of taking 
an institutional political and economic approach to a firm, he indicates that evolutionary eco-
nomics needs to investigate business concepts to allow an adequate explanation of the disparity 
between firms85. Witt introduces the notion of business concepts into evolutionary economics 
as a means for examining the neglected dimension of the evolutionary theory of the firm, which 
brings in the role of substantive / cognitive aspects or conceptions to organize meaningless or 
ambiguous information into significant agendas and action plans86. Through the discussion of 
disparities between enterprises in terms of economics, it is suggested that the one of the keys to 
understanding such disparities is to study both the decision-making and the cognitive aspects of 
the firm. 
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This aspect has also been explored in other school of economics. G. L. S. Shackle is the 
one of the notable economists who studies the theme of choice, decision and imagination87. 
Shackle describes the essential nature of choice as man’s most direct, inescapable and imperi-
ous intuitions which reflect his own thought encompassing sense: perception, intellection, emo-
tion, imagination, decision88. Although the views of Shackle and evolutionary economics seem 
fundamentally incompatible89, his findings do have commonality in terms of Witt’s discussion.  
 (2) Management Studies 
Management studies have increasingly discussed and developed the concept of manage-
rial capabilities and differences between firms since its inception. Regarding managerial capa-
bilities and decision-making, Child’s “strategic choice” perspective is the one of early influen-
tial concepts90. Quoting Chandler’s analysis, Child argued that the ways in which organizations 
were structured was determined by strategic decision-making (i.e. strategic choice) of dominant 
coalition (e.g. top management) as a result of the political process which considered factors out-
side/inside the organization91. The work of Miles and Snow is regarded to be one of the 
achievements in this steam of study. While referring to Child’s strategic choice and other con-
cepts, such as Weick’s environmental enactment and other studies (e.g. James Thompson and 
Chandler etc), Miles and Snow took the interactions between strategy and organizational struc-
ture into account92. They argued that the process of organizational adaptation is neither an un-
controlled phenomenon nor a process involving perfectly rational and efficient choice93. Their 
study raises that top management attention and decisions affect organizational adaption and of-
fers four unique types of adaption: Defender, Prospector, Analyzer, and Reactor94. In other 
words, it supports that top management’s decision-making is one of main factors for differ-
ences in firms. 
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The studies of dynamic capabilities theoretically examine the inside of managerial capa-
bilities. Teece, Pisano and Shuen’s paper, which was distributed as a working paper in 1990 
and published in 1997, is the start to dynamic capabilities95. In his paper which discussed the 
relation between dynamic capabilities and Chandler’s (managerial) capabilities, Teece notes 
that the concept of dynamic capabilities can be the capabilities (i.e. managerial capabilities) for 
the three-pronged investment emphasized by Chandler96. To analyze the capabilities, Teece 
proposes that it can be examined in terms of three capacities: (1) to sense and shape opportuni-
ties and threats, (2) to seize opportunities, and (3) to maintain competitiveness through enhanc-
ing, combining, protecting, and when necessary, reconfiguring the business enterprise’s intan-
gible and tangible assets97. The capacity to sense involves an analytical system’s (and individ-
ual’s) capacity to learn and to sense, filter, shape, and calibrate opportunities98. The capacity to 
seize is based on the quality of the enterprise’s routines, decision rules, strategies, and leader-
ship around evaluating new investment opportunities99. The capacity to reconfigure is the abil-
ity to recombine and to reconfigure assets and organizational structures as the enterprise grows, 
and as markets and technologies change, as they surely will100. To maintain competitive ad-
vantage, a business enterprise needs to maintain these capacities. In addition because these ca-
pacities are unlikely to be found in individual managers, the principal executive office must 
succeed in getting top management to operate as a team to maintain these capacities within the 
top management team at large101. In other words, since top management team maintains the ca-
pacities and plays the role of seizing, seizing, reconfiguring the business enterprise, it useful to 
examine perceptions and decisions related to these points in order to better understand manage-
rial capabilities and disparities between enterprises. 
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Another perspective, which is different stream from dynamic capabilities, is the atten-
tion-based-view (hereafter ABV) proposed by William Ocasio102. Referring to cognitive sci-
ence, social psychology, organizational theory, and strategy process perspectives, Ocasio em-
phasizes the importance of the distribution of the decision-maker’s attention in order to under-
stand firm behavior103. ABV provided a metatheory of organizational action and adaption that 
focused on attention and explained how attention in organizations shapes organizational adap-
tion104. Among his arguments, it indicates how selective attention both facilitates and inhibits 
perceptions and actions on firm behavior105. Even though ABV does not refer to managerial ca-
pabilities, it provides some factors (i.e. attention, perception, and action) to examine decision-
makers such as top management. 
3. Analytical Framework for Managerial Capabilities in Business History 
Although it has, to degrees, been separately discussed in business and entrepreneurial 
history, different schools of economics and management studies, this provides similar and use-
ful points for the consideration of managerial capabilities. From the discussion above, at least 
three basic actions can be derived for managerial capabilities. That is what top management 
perceives from the external environment, what they see as prospects for the future, and what 
they take in terms of actual actions. Managerial visaction (the combination of vision and action) 
represents the set of the three top management actions, and is hereafter used to facilitate expla-
nation. To empirically examine the disparity between business enterprises from a managerial 
capabilities perspective, the framework of visaction is one way to consolidate a variety of his-
torical documents and materials for this purpose. Although some theoretical discussions pro-
vide more detail on analytical frameworks, difficulties can arise in an empirical examination 
with historical documents. Moreover, a looser framework can sometimes help to draw more 
historical dynamics in a long-term scope. 
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IV. Corporate Transformation on Chandlerian Firms 
1. Research Approach and Research Question 
To empirically examine the disparity of Chanderian firms through business history rela-
tionships, decision-making and perceptional aspects of business enterprises, the methodology 
should consider research methods regarding decision-making and the selection of case study as 
follows.  
 To examine decision-making, not only the decision itself should be considered but also 
other factors related to the decision, such as perceptions and actual behaviors / actions. Thus the 
process that advanced perceptions into actions (i.e. managerial visaction) should be analyzed. 
To verify these actions of top management, one pays attention to the “language of business106,” 
namely how managers discuss and process signals that are emerging in their environment. The 
order in which they deconstruct the environment and address challenges allows for an investi-
gation into disparities from the ex-ante perspective. 
To adequately investigate disparity in business enterprises requires the study of at least 
more than one firm. However, there are practical difficulties involved in qualitatively examin-
ing numerous firms through research of historical materials. Hence the subject of research 
should allow for a representative case that can be conducted with quantitative research. In addi-
tion the object of the case should be significantly broad to allow an overall comparison of suc-
cessful growth enterprises to failures, to avoid the trap of relying on a rational narrative107. 
2. General Electric Company and Westinghouse Electric Corporation 
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Following the above methodology, GE and WH are selected as the objects for this study. 
Both enterprises were considered to be Chanderian firms. They were rivals and both were cen-
tered in the electric / electronics industry in the twentieth century, this provides for similar busi-
ness structures to help reduce the bias of dissimilarity in the comparative research. In addition, 
these two enterprises took contrasting transformation paths toward the end of the century. Un-
der the leadership of CEO Jack Welch, GE operations were reformed in the 1980s, it remained 
as “GE” and enjoyed re-growth in the 1990's. Conversely, WH not only changed its business 
structure but also its name, to “CBS108,” and CBS ultimately met its demise as an independent 
firm when it entered the new century. Even though some scholars cast doubt on whether the 
comparison should simply consider GE as a success and WH as a failure109, the comparison 
still provides clues to understanding the disparity between the firms by studying why and how 
this contrasting corporate transformation occurred. 
Previous studies on GE and WH and the second half of twentieth century indicate that 
the firms had, in the background, grown quite different in terms of management practices, fi-
nancial aspects, and corporate growth. In analyzing the transformation of U.S. industrial enter-
prises listed as Fortune 100 companies in 1974, Nohria, Dyer and Dalzell describe the diver-
gence that emerged between GE and WH as a very symbolic case, while the U.S. was moving 
away from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. More specifically, they contend that GE 
was more than a step ahead of WH in terms of organizational control and with the introduction 
of strategic management processes during the period110. Sakamoto and Rothschild studies of 
GE provide more detailed descriptions111. To extricate itself from profitless growth in the late 
1960s, GE drove to institutionalize advanced strategic management and planning112. For in-
stance, each of the SBU strategies within GE was subject to a personal review and evaluation 
by the CEO himself113. GE recognized its own strategic management system to be distinct 
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when compared to other companies114. In this sense, GE and WH were diverging in terms of 
their respective approaches to organizational systems and strategic management.  
With regard to financial aspects, O’Sullivan’s analysis provides some indication. Using 
both companies to explore the relationship between their financial systems and corporate 
growth, she reveals that the financial behavior of the two companies, beginning in the mid-
1970s, strikingly diverged115. One of her findings is that GE, toward the end of twentieth cen-
tury, was more successful than WH at achieving efficiencies in the use of its working capital 
while WH continued with a higher financial dependence on working capital116. GE’s relative 
financial dependence declined, even in periods of economic decline, suggesting that GE could 
manage financial aspects better than WH. Miyata’s study supports her findings. His study con-
firms that GE and WH started diverging in their respective financial standings in the 1970s 
while their investment patterns were similar throughout the decade117.  
An obvious fact is that GE outperformed WH in the 1970s. Regarding sustained corpo-
rate growth, Fleck’s quantitative and descriptive examinations of GE and WH, from their foun-
dations to the end of the 1990s, demonstrates that the already existing pre-1970s gap in growth 
gradually expanded during the 1970s118. She emphasizes top management coordination as a 
key factor, not to mention very distinct approaches to expansion and a dissimilar management 
of risk119.  
However, these previous researches are less successful in explaining the relationship be-
tween top management and corporate transformation that is specific to either GE or WH. As an 
introductory story of the transformation of American enterprises after 1974, Nohria, Dyer and 
Dalzell’s study is limited to describing an overview and does not provide analytical insight. 
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Although O’Sullivan conducted an in-depth study on GE and WH, her main concern is the re-
lation between the U.S. financial system and corporate finance over a period covering almost 
100 years. Her study does not specifically consider the dynamic of top management. On the 
other hand, although Miyata’s study attempts to grasp top management decision-making in 
terms of investment, it is less successful in investigating the historical context of decisions. 
Fleck provides the most comprehensive understanding of the managerial capabilities on GE 
and WH, but her study lacks analytical detail on the process of visaction: how top management 
perceives, anticipates, and behaves. 
3. Research Materials 
The reason top management perceptions and behaviors have not been explored suffi-
ciently is mainly due to a limitation of historical sources. This presentation uses a set of histori-
cal documents to overcome this limitation, as follows. For perceptions and conceptions of GE’s 
top management in the 1950-70s, this is examined through Executive Speeches and Reports to 
Share Owners and the speech manuscript collection of GE’s executives. For WH, an examina-
tion of the speeches collection is also pursued, found in the Records of the Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corporation and which consists of speeches given mostly by members of senior manage-
ment from 1968 to 1980. In addition, Corporate Annual Reports, newspaper and magazine arti-
cles are used for other areas not covered by the speech collections. Even though the speech 
manuscripts and articles are public record, and do not provide an exact reflection of each exec-
utive’s perception and conception, it can be considered as the consensus of GE’s and WH’s top 
management thinking at the time and allows a proxy for an analysis of changes in a company’s 
perceptions and conceptions120.  
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Also used are strategic and R&D planning documents, M&A&D data, and financial 
data, to examine how top management’s perceptions and conceptions reflect on corporate be-
havior. For instance, for GE, Moody’s Industrial Manual, Corporate Annual Reports, the 
Downs Collection and R&D Planning Series are accessed, whereas for WH, Moody’s Indus-
trial Manual, Corporate Annual Reports and Series XIII. Research and Development/Science 
and Technology Center 1919-1998, the Records of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation are 
used. Most of the historical documents were collected by the author at the miSci Archives, 
Schenectady, NY, and the Library and Archives of the Heinz History Center, Pittsburgh, PA. 
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Chapter 2 
Managing Expansion in the Wave of the “Golden Age”, from 1946 to 1970 
"As we go through life we gradually discover who we are,                                                          
but the more we discover, the more we lose ourselves."  
Haruki Murakami, Colorless Tsukuru Tazaki and His Years of Pilgrimage 
 
I. Unrelated Diversification and Corporate Competitiveness 
This chapter explores the development of a wider gap between GE and WH in corporate 
performance and business competitiveness in the domestic conventional steam turbine business 
during the 1950s and 1960s, and explores top management thinking and contextual variables121 
as contributors to this gap. 
Since their establishment, GE and WH were first movers and lead firms in the field of 
modern American electrical-equipment122. Globally, they built dominant positions and, along 
with German first movers AEG and Siemens & Halske, formed the Big Four that dominated 
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until well after World War II123. Both American firms were powerfully competitive in the do-
mestic and international markets for electrical equipment but their positions were not satisfacto-
rily maintained in the post-war market. For example, even in the production of heavy genera-
tors, a capital and technologically intense business line that presents significant barriers to new 
entries, both firms were significantly challenged, losing approximately 30% of total domestic 
market shares to intensified competition. 
The primary factor for the loss in market share during this period can be captured within 
the context of cause-and-effect, specifically the impact that overdiversification and the Ameri-
can antitrust policy had in the poor performance that ensued124.  However, the firms did not 
lose their market shares strictly as a result of higher diversification. WH lost market share while 
GE, in the end, was able to maintain its share by 1970, this after implementing a similar diversi-
fication strategy and experiencing comparable fluctuations in its share of conventional steam 
turbines. Why do similar corporate strategies lead to the different consequences in traditional 
business lines for two of America’s leading electrical manufacturers? 
The U.S. conventional steam turbine business experienced two phases of competition 
during the same period. The first phase, lasting until the early 1960s, consisted of oligopolistic 
competition amongst domestic firms. This lasted until the 3rd ranked, Allis-Chalmers, exited 
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the business125. The second phase is characterized by international competition, which emerged 
when foreign firms accelerated their penetration into the U.S. market in the late 1960s. During 
each phase both firms pursued similar corporate strategies, namely expansion and diversifica-
tion of business. In the two decades that followed, however, their respective corporate strategies 
wandered onto different paths. With symbolic phrases capturing their strategies, the two entities 
forged ahead with ambitious plans with titles such as the Expansion Program in the 1950s, and 
the total electrification and new venture programs during 1960s. The term “strategy” was not 
commonly used in business society at that time, however both firms expanded and diversified 
their businesses under the direction of their respective corporate programs. It is therefore essen-
tial to explore how and why they changed corporate strategies if we are to understand the strik-
ing differences that surfaced between firms as they moved away from their traditional business 
lines. 
Although numerous researches reveal much about both firms for the period (notably 
GE), not much focus is placed on the influence corporate strategies had on business competi-
tiveness and on the expanding gap that arose between these two first movers of the U.S. electric 
manufacturing industry. 
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Seminal work by Denise L. Fleck provides a holistic picture of the divergent develop-
ments of both firms, from foundation to the end of the twentieth century126. In terms of top 
management’s link to sustainable growth, her quantitative and descriptive study of both firms 
does inform on contributors to divergent performance. That is, GE understood entrepreneurial 
behavior and consistently developed strong coordinating capabilities, while pursuing a system-
atic expansion to more high-tech diversification and hedging its risk under an integrated corpo-
rate strategy. Meanwhile, WH’s initial piecemeal expansion went from mainly a non high-tech 
base (outside of electrical) to a strategy of low risk hedging, following a micro-based strategic 
plan that rewarded results and swung back and forth between tight and loose coordination. 
Fleck evaluates the impact of divergent corporate growth between the firms by exploring or-
ganizational coordinating capabilities, leaving room to examine how corporate strategies actu-
ally affected the business competitiveness of the two. Although GE possessed high-tech busi-
ness lines and maintained strong coordinating capabilities, more than that of WH, GE also pur-
sued nearly the same level of non high-tech diversification as WH during the 1960s. It would 
be insightful to examine the detail of this diversification and business competition over the 
1950s-60s period in order to verify why similar corporate strategies led to different perfor-
mances. 
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In terms of organizational structure, WH was more progressive than GE. For example, 
GE only took its reorganization to a multidivisional structure after the Second World War 
whereas WH had already introduced this in 1931127. If Alfred Chandler’s thesis on strategy and 
structure is valid, that when a new organizational structure (multidivisional structure) follows a 
new strategy (diversification)128 then economic performance follows, WH would therefore be 
superior to GE in terms of performance. However, as Aupperle, Acar and Mukherjee find 
through their statistical study, GE demonstrated consistently better performance than WH even 
when GE’s structure was mismatched to the new strategy129. This suggests that fitting an or-
ganizational structure to a corporate strategy does not clearly link to performance130. At a cer-
tain level, this opens the possibility that the organizational structure did not much influence the 
different performances of GE and WH. 
Mary O’Sullivan examines both firms from a corporate finance perspective, to propose 
insight from a micro-level study that shed light on the financial development and economic 
performance at the national level131. In her studies, GE and WH were in similar financial posi-
tions until the early 1970s, although WH tended to be more reliant on the financial system and 
larger deficits. For instance, although GE was consistently more profitable than WH, the differ-
ence in the average retention levels between the two was much smaller until the late 1960s.  At 
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that time GE started distributing higher dividends, this was not only a reflection of GE generat-
ing higher profits because it was also distributing a relatively higher share of its profits to share-
holders132. This implies the need to factor in other considerations beyond corporate finance to 
explain the growing gap between the 1950s to the 1960s. 
Also during this period industrial relations issues, including outbreaks of strikes, arose as 
an additional concern to both firms. Soon after the end of the Second World War widespread 
strikes occurred, effectively shutting down every GE and WH plant in the U.S. and Canada133. 
It was the first great strike in the history of the industry and it prompted both top management 
teams to change their labor policies134. According to Ronald Schatz, when compared to GE, 
WH was already disadvantaged from the onset by its relatively higher labor costs 135. WH then 
went on to take a severe loss during the 1955-56 strike while GE avoided the strike altogether, 
even though both firms offered the same settlement136. Another difference is that GE further 
distinguished its labor policy by applying product marketing to employment, later termed 
“Boulwarism” after Lemuel R. Boulware, which opened two-way communications between 
top management and employees137. This difference in employee relations over the period raises 
an evidence gap with regard to the respective organizational coordinating capabilities, it was 
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basically outside of Fleck’s primary research to explore how differences in labor policy af-
fected performance and competitiveness. 
When compared to WH, there are numerous more researches on GE that cover this pe-
riod, such as George Downing, Kesaji Kobayashi, Ronald Greenwood, Mary O’Sullivan, 
Kazuichi Sakamoto, William Rothschild, and William Ocasio and John Joseph138. Although 
the main drivers for these other specific research objectives were different, they commonly re-
gard the organizational structure and new business ventures as vital factors that influenced GE 
over the period. In the process of converting to peacetime operations after the Second World 
War, under the helm of Ralf Cordiner  GE introduced the multidivisional structure139 and the 
new governance channel140 to respond to increasing demands for electricity, electrical products, 
and war supplies141. This new controlled but decentralized organization encouraged adaptation 
rather than innovation142, and did not contribute much to corporate growth and profitability143. 
To accelerate corporate growth, Fred Borach, the successor to Cordiner, expanded into new 
businesses during the 1960s, such as nuclear power, jet engines, computers and some service 
businesses144. By increasing sales with lower profitability, these new ventures led to “growth 
without profit” until the end of the 1960s.145 While it really depends on the individual re-
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searcher to determine the degree to which the new organization positively affected GE’s perfor-
mance in the 1950s, there is some consensus that the new ventures (e.g. computer business) 
brought negative consequences to profitability146. However, these researches tend to examine 
the corporate level of GE, and do not delve into how top management decisions influenced 
core business competitiveness, as the rationale for entering into one new business over another. 
Hence, although Fleck singles out organizational coordinating capabilities as a major 
contributor to the divergent corporate performance between the two giant electric firms over 
the two decades, these capabilities do not fully explain the wide gap that emerged. 
To examine this further, the current chapter employs a variety of historical sources and 
books, as follows. For the market situation in the U.S. conventional steam turbine industry, it 
mainly uses data on Ralph G. M. Sultan’s Pricing in the Electrical Oligopoly, Vol. I and Vol. II, 
which is based on a set of antitrust lawsuits against GE and WH: Ohio Valley Electric v. Gen-
eral Electric (SD.N.Y. 1965); City of San Antonio v. Westinghouse (W.E. Texas 1964); Phila-
delphia Electric v. Westinghouse (E.D. Pa. 1964)147, and legal data from LexisNexis Academic 
database and comparative analysis reports between GE and WH found in the Records of the 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation as its supplementations. For corporate strategy as a reflec-
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tion of the perceptions and conceptions of GE’s top management during the period, this is ex-
amined through Corporate Annual Reports for 1946-1970 and Executive Speeches and Reports 
to Share Owners, and the speech manuscript collection of GE’s executives covering 1955-
1970. For WH, an examination of corporate strategy and top management’s perspective is pur-
sued through Corporate Annual Reports for 1946-1970, newspaper and magazine articles, and 
some administrative meeting documents found in the Records of the Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation. Even though the statement of annual report and the speech manuscripts are given 
in public, and do not provide an exact reflection of each executive’s perception and conception, 
it can be considered as a proxy of the consensus of GE’s and WH’s top management thinking 
at the time and allows an analysis of the changes in these perceptions and conceptions. Most of 
the historical documents were collected by the author at the miSci Archives (previously Sche-
nectady museum archives), Schenectady, NY, and the Library and Archives of the Heinz His-
tory Center, Pittsburgh, PA148.  
This chapter investigates why similar GE/WH corporate strategies for diversification led 
to different consequences in the conventional steam business and what influence top manage-
ment had in terms of corporate strategy.  
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The next section starts by comparing financial and industrial data to verify the tendencies 
and differences in corporate performance and business competitiveness of the two firms over 
the two decades. It demonstrates that there was already a gap in the actual size of the number 
one and number two firms and, although it widened toward the end of the 1950s, the gap in fi-
nancial standing had relatively narrowed but the market share in steam turbine business had 
been widened toward the end of the 1960s. The subsequent section then raises the impact of 
going from oligopolistic to international competition in the U.S. conventional steam turbine in-
dustry, a traditional core business during the period. This demonstrates that WH had already 
started losing its competitiveness during the 1950s while GE was leading the competition. An 
explanation is then offered on how corporate strategy influenced differences in the steam tur-
bine business, as it is the result of top management perceptions and conceptions as applied to 
diversification for corporate growth and to address evolving social and governmental demands.  
The conclusion drawn is that, even while both top managements responded with similar 
strategies to increasing demands, the accelerated gap between GE and WH in the U.S. conven-
tional steam turbine was mainly a result of differences in levels of available resources. 
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I. Divergence in Business Competitiveness 
This section discusses the size and financial standings of both GE and WH during the 
period, using data on sales, profits, costs and growth ratios. 
1. Traits of Corporate Performance, 1946-1970 
Over the long history of U.S. electrical manufacturing it becomes evident that GE was 
larger than WH in many regards, and remained the number one firm in the industry since the 
1892 birth by merger of Edison General Electric and Thomson-Houston. As seen in figure 2-1, 
GE was 41-49% larger than WH in terms of sales until 1954, with the exception of just after the 
end of the war in 1946. From the mid-1950s, when WH was struggling with the labor strike149, 
a gap in sales volume developed. Although WH gradually closed the gap at the end of the 
1960s, GE was still more than twice the size of WH toward 1970. 
A similar tendency can be found in their net incomes, as shown in figure 2-2, but with a 
moderately larger gap. Although GE had already gained 46-55% more in net income from the 
late 1940s to middle 1950s, the gap was even more pronounced in terms of sales from the mid-
1950s. GE averaged 70% more sales than WH between 1954 and 1970, although in the 1960s 
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WH gradually closed the gap and, by the late 1960s, was back to the same level seen in the 
early 1950s. 
 
Figure 2-1. Net sales ($ million) for GE and WH and the resulting gap (WH/GE %), 1946-1970. 
Source: Compilation of data from GE, Annual Reports, various years and WH, Annual Reports, 
various years. 
 
 
Figure 2-2. Net income ($ million) for GE and WH and the resulting gap (WH/GE %), 1946-1970. 
Source: Compilation of data from GE, Annual Reports, various years and WH, Annual Reports, 
various years. 
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Regarding the actual size of the firms, the post-war period can be divided into three time 
periods: the first goes until the mid-1950s, when the gap had GE about double the size; the sec-
ond is the decade spanning the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, a period during which the gap ex-
panded even further; and the last period covers the second half of the 1960s, when WH closed 
the gap to levels that were seen prior to the mid-1950s. 
The three periods are observed in terms of profitability in figure 2-3. The differences in 
the net income on sales ratio increased about 1% after the mid-1950s and then reduced from the 
mid-1960s. As for the operating profit on sales ratio, there is a slight difference. The growth in 
the gap started from the early 1950s and then shrank towards the end of 1950s. Aside from the 
differences that existed between firms, profitability was clearly declining for both firms by the 
1970s. This was following the general trend for U.S. firms during the period, as they lost core 
business competitiveness to foreign rivals as a result of unrelated diversification150. Moreover, 
it also indicates that GE had entered more aggressively into a “growth without profit” strategy 
than did WH during the 1960s. 
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Figure 2-3. Operating profit and net income on sales, 1947-1970. 
Source: Compilation of data from GE, Annual Reports, various years and WH, Annual Reports, 
various years. 
Note: To allow a comparison between firms, the author calculates operating profit by the fol-
lowing method: GE operating profit is derived by subtracting compensation of employees, job 
dividends, materials etc., and depreciation charges from net sales data drawn from the annual 
report; WH’s operating profit is derived by subtracting wages and salaries, employee insur-
ance and pensions, social security taxes, materials and services from others, and wear of facili-
ties from net sales data drawn from the annual report. To more clearly demonstrate the ten-
dency, 1946 is excluded from the graph. 
In terms of cost structure, the growth in the profitability gap is reduced, not because WH 
had improved its profitability but mainly because GE had moved more closer to WH’s perfor-
mance in the 1960s. Through 1946 to 1970, GE generally fell below WH in its cost to sales ra-
tio (see table 2-1). However, along with WH, GE’s ratio started to increase from around 1960. 
Comparing the average labor and material costs of 1947-60 to that of 1961-70, GE’s ratio in-
creases from 39.1% to 41.7% and 45.8% to 48.2% respectively while WH increases went from 
40.2% to 42.2% and 47.9% to 49.1% respectively. In addition, GE carried a larger depreciation 
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ratio than WH, and its level went considerably higher toward 1970 while WH’s ratio was de-
creasing. Due mainly to increasing costs both firms trended to less profitability during the 
1960s, with GE declining more than WH and leading to similar respective profitabilities until 
1970. 
Table 2-1. Costs to sales, 1946-1970. 
 
Source: Compilation of data from GE, Annual Reports, various years and WH, Annual Reports, 
various years. 
Note: WH Material cost data from 1964 to 1969 is estimated each year through other data. 
 
GE WH GE WH GE WH GE WH
1946 51.7% 65.1% 44.2% 50.3% 2.8% 2.2% 99.8% 119.8%
1947 41.7% 43.3% 45.0% 42.3% 2.1% 1.3% 89.1% 90.1%
1948 40.4% 39.9% 44.7% 47.5% 2.3% 1.2% 87.5% 90.5%
1949 40.3% 39.4% 45.1% 45.9% 2.9% 1.5% 88.3% 89.1%
1950 35.5% 37.5% 44.2% 45.2% 2.6% 1.5% 82.3% 85.5%
1951 37.5% 38.0% 43.1% 46.6% 2.4% 1.4% 83.0% 87.0%
1952 37.2% 37.7% 45.8% 48.5% 2.3% 1.5% 85.2% 89.1%
1953 36.7% 38.5% 47.5% 49.5% 2.2% 1.8% 86.3% 91.4%
1954 37.8% 39.6% 47.4% 47.8% 2.7% 2.3% 87.9% 90.5%
1955 38.8% 40.2% 47.4% 50.4% 2.9% 3.0% 89.1% 95.3%
1956 37.4% 41.5% 48.7% 54.4% 2.7% 3.1% 90.0% 100.5%
1957 39.6% 39.6% 46.5% 50.7% 2.8% 2.4% 88.7% 94.1%
1958 39.8% 41.3% 43.5% 48.9% 3.0% 2.5% 88.8% 94.1%
1959 41.0% 42.8% 45.9% 46.6% 2.8% 2.4% 88.2% 93.2%
1960 44.0% 43.9% 46.9% 46.1% 2.8% 2.4% 91.7% 93.8%
1961 42.7% 43.9% 46.3% 48.7% 2.6% 2.5% 90.3% 96.5%
1962 42.6% 44.3% 47.8% 47.7% 2.7% 2.9% 90.2% 96.2%
1963 43.1% 42.8% 46.3% 50.1% 2.6% 2.8% 90.2% 96.9%
1964 44.3% 41.3% 47.9% 50.5% 2.6% 2.7% 91.8% 94.9%
1965 40.7% 41.4% 49.3% 48.5% 3.0% 2.7% 95.7% 93.0%
1966 40.8% 42.7% 51.6% 47.1% 3.3% 2.3% 96.4% 92.5%
1967 39.8% 42.0% 47.7% 49.1% 3.6% 1.9% 92.5% 93.8%
1968 40.2% 40.3% 48.5% 50.6% 3.6% 2.0% 89.8% 93.6%
1969 41.6% 40.9% 48.8% 49.4% 4.2% 2.0% 95.2% 93.1%
1970 43.3% N/A 46.7% N/A 3.8% 2.0% 94.9% 95.8%
47-60 39.1% 40.2% 45.8% 47.9% 2.6% 2.0% 87.6% 91.7%
61-69 41.7% 42.2% 48.2% 49.1% 3.1% 2.4% 92.5% 94.5%
47-69 40.1% 41.0% 46.8% 48.3% 2.8% 2.2% 89.5% 92.8%
X≥40% X≥45% X≥2.5% X≥90%
X≥45% X≥50% X≥3% X≥95%
TotalLabor cost Material cost Depreciation
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GE sustained more growth on sales and profits, along with increasing costs, until 1960. 
WH, meanwhile, experienced more growth during the 1960s (refer to table 2-2). On average, 
however, they have almost the same rate of growth in sales but not for profits, and GE success-
fully gained a better position on both operating profits and net income. 
Table 2-2. Growth rate of sales, profits and costs, 1947-1970. 
 
Source: Compilation of data from GE, Annual Reports, various years and WH, Annual Reports, 
various years. 
Note: To calculate the comparative growth ratio, 1946 and 1956 are excluded, when WH profits are 
minus. 
 
During the postwar economic growth of the U.S., a period later called the ‘golden age’, 
both firms grew but somewhat differently in some respects. The gap in size was maintained at 
around twice the volume in sales and profits, and did not lead to a larger difference in profita-
bility and costs during 1946-1955. In the next term from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, how-
ever, the gap started expanding considerably. The reason for this growth in the gap is mainly 
due to the decline of WH. On the contrary, during the second half of the 1960s, GE started a 
downward turn in profitability while WH had recovered from its stagnation and returned the 
gap back to the same level as the early 1950s.   
GE WH GE WH GE WH GE WH GE WH
47-50 13.8% 13.2% 32.6% 20.6% 22.1% 16.9% 10.9% 12.0% 10.8% 11.2%
51-55 7.5% 3.8% -3.7% -14.7% 9.8% -9.8% 9.4% 6.0% 9.4% 6.2%
57-60 -1.1% -0.9% -18.3% 0.4% -6.9% 2.9% 0.7% -1.0% 0.0% -1.0%
61-65 8.7% 5.7% 4.0% 17.5% 10.1% 23.8% 9.1% 5.0% 10.3% 4.7%
66-70 5.0% 13.7% 14.8% 4.3% -0.8% 1.5% 4.5% 14.4% 4.6% 14.7%
47-60 9.2% 8.2% 4.5% 3.7% 5.9% 3.8% 9.7% 8.7% 9.5% 8.5%
61-70 7.8% 9.4% 4.3% 11.1% 3.4% 12.1% 8.0% 9.4% 8.3% 9.4%
47-70 8.5% 8.2% 5.8% 4.3% 5.5% 4.2% 8.8% 8.6% 8.8% 8.5%
Sales Operating profit Net income Operating cost Total cost
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Nevertheless, GE was the number one firm in the industry during the period and consist-
ently surpassed WH in many aspects. There was, however, a common problem for both of 
them in that they faced increasing costs and decreasing profitability towards the 1970’s. 
2. Competition in Conventional Steam Turbine Business, 1946-1970 
Throughout the period GE and WH were the “Big Two” in the U.S. electrical machinery 
business. Unlike other industries, such as automobiles and aluminum, electrical machinery is 
more a web of industries with threads to a broad range of products, including electrical generat-
ing and distribution apparatus, other industrial equipment, consumer appliances and defense 
products151. A post-war increase in the demand for electricity that came along with economic 
growth saw a corresponding high growth in key sectors.  
Electrical energy use has consistently grown since the war, stabilizing at around 7% after 
the mid-1950s (see figure 2-4). Industry took the lead in the consumption of electricity through-
out the period, although its rate of increase declined toward 1970, from 9.5% (1946-57) to 
5.6% (1958-70). Residential and commercial use were also driving-forces for electric con-
sumption during the period: the rate of increase for residential use was 11.9% (1946-57) and 
9.1% (1958-70) and for commercial use was 10.4% (1946-57) and 9.3% (1958-70).  
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Figure 2-4. The use of electric energy, 1946-1970 (in millions of kilowatt-hours). 
Source: Compilation of data from the United States Bureau of the Census, The Statistical History of the 
United States: from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Basic Books, 1976): S 120-132, p.828. 
Note: Since the increasing rate takes a five-year moving average, it ranges from 1949 to 1968. 
 
While rapidly electrifying society, the electrical machinery industry accelerated its eco-
nomic growth, especially during the 1950s. While the value added by electrical machinery was 
5.2% in 1947, within a decade it expanded to 6.6% of the total for all manufacturing in 1958152. 
In terms of corporate sales, this radically rose from around 1950, as can be seen in figure 2-5. 
The 1960 Fortune’s list of the largest industrial companies had 12 electrical industry firms 
among the 100 largest industrial companies, another 9 companies followed in the next group of 
100 largest, and a total of 45 electrical machinery firms were among the 500 largest industrial 
companies153. 
The electrical machinery industry is fundamentally divided into two categories of prod-
ucts, products that produce electricity and products that use electricity. The former consists of 
goods such as generators, transformers, switchgear, distribution line equipment, and related 
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equipment infrastructure, generally called electric apparatus. The latter include household ap-
pliances, elevators and escalators, factory machinery, light bulbs, radios, television receivers, 
and electronic equipment154.  
 
Figure 2-5. Corporate sales, 1929-1957. 
Source: Jules Backman, The Economics of the Electrical Machinery Industry (New York: New York Uni-
versity Press, 1962): chart II-3, p.47. 
 
Even though all these electrical machinery products were essentially introduced together 
postwar, there are slight variations amongst them when segregated. Table 2-3 shows the ship-
ment value for four product groups, into which the number of products was 30 in 1947, 33 in 
1958, 34 in 1963 and 1967. Through all the years, electrical apparatus consistently accounts for 
at least 25% or more of shipment values. On the other hand, electrical appliances saw its value 
go from 31% in 1947 down to 17% by 1967, while radio and television added to its value dur-
ing the 1960s.  
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Table 2-3. Shipments of electrical machinery, by main classes of products, 1947-1967155. 
 
Source: Compilation of data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of 
Manufactures: 1947, vol.2, Statistics by Industry (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1949): pp. 592, 603, 642, 684, 702, 704-05, 720-21, 733, 741, 748, 831; U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures: 1958, vol.2, Industry Statistics, part 2, Major 
Groups 29 to 39 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1961): pp. 35A-9, 12, 
35B-13, 21, 35E-12, 14, 20, 35G-17, 18, 20, 36A-14, 17-21, 36B-11, 14-17, 36C-10, 12, 14-15, 36D-13, 
17, 19-20, 36E-9, 12-13; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufac-
tures: 1967, vol.2, Industry Statistics, part 3, Major Groups 34-39 and 19 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1971): pp. 35A-10, 35B-16, 35E-17, 25, 35G-19, 20, 36A-19, 36B-15, 36C-12, 
36D-21, 36E-12. 
Note: Because many aspects of Census industry definitions changed between 1947 and 1958, the data 
demonstrated above do not cover exactly the same group of products. 
 
In addition, different patterns of competition were laid down for each product group or 
for each product within a group. Although most of this industry did not require large amounts 
of capital, resulting in a low “barrier to entry,” categories such as a turbine generators main-
tained a high “barrier to entry” due to the requirement for large amounts of capital invest-
ment156.  While a number of firms intensely competed in the low barrier to entry category, a 
few firms rolled out oligopolistic competition in the capital intense category. As a result, both 
large and small firms competed in the low-capital product category but not at all in the other 
Million $ Percent of Total Million $ Percent of Total
Electrical apparatus 2993 31% 5213 30%
Electrical appliance 3032 31% 3793 22%
Radio and television 1534 16% 3508 20%
All other 2222 23% 4845 28%
Total 9781 100% 17359 100%
Million $ Percent of Total Million $ Percent of Total
Electrical apparatus 6050 24% 9474 25%
Electrical appliance 4114 16% 6437 17%
Radio and television 8136 32% 11050 29%
All other 7043 28% 11380 30%
Total 25343 100% 38341 100%
1947 1958
1963 1967
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category, even though they were all electrical manufacturing firms. And GE and WH were the 
only two firms in the industry that provided the full-line of electric products over the period157. 
Among the broad range of electrical product categories into which the two big firms 
were competing, electrical apparatus stands out, especially conventional steam turbines for gen-
erating electricity. This is where they held competitive advantage as first movers, mainly be-
cause the requirement for large amounts of capital and technical know-how made it difficult for 
new firms to enter158. Consequently, the conventional steam turbine business was dominated by 
the two firms and evolved into their traditional core business line159. 
Through 1946 to 1970, the total collective market share for GE and WH accounted for 
more than 70% of the business, as shown in figure 2-6. In fact, looking at the graph it appears 
that the combined share never went below 75% until 1970, and was often in the upper 90% 
range. However, there have also been fluctuations in shares of market over the period. Postwar, 
three domestic firms, GE, WH and Allis-Chalmers, accounted for almost 100% of the steam 
turbine market. It was a tight domestic competition period between 1946 and 1958, with GE 
maintaining an average share of about 59.5% and WH holding 32.8%, about half the size of 
GE. When Allis started to increase its market share in the mid to late 1950s, both firms gener-
ally decreased their shares with GE losing a relatively greater share than WH.  
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Figure 2-6. Market share of turbine generator orders, 1946-1970. 
Original source: Tabulation of Electrical Equipment Antitrust Actions data, filed at S.D.N.Y. 
Source: Compilation of data from Ralph G. Sultan, Pricing in the Electrical Oligopoly, Vol. 2 
(Boston, MA: Division of Research, 1974): table 13.2., p.228. 
Note: Orders by the U.S. utility and industrial organizations (aggregate kw. basis) 
 
Starting in 1959 the industry faced major changes, mainly due to foreign firms entering 
the market and the impact of an antitrust lawsuit. With regard to competitiveness, the Tennes-
see Valley Authority (TVA), which had been a major customer for electrical machinery prod-
ucts, awarded a generator and turbine contract to a British firm, C. A. Parsons & Co., a first in 
postwar times and due to a lower price despite a heavy import duty160. On the regulatory front, 
in early 1960 the U.S. government indicted the domestic electrical machinery firms and their 
executives for violation of antitrust law and price-fixing. Confronted by these challenges, Allis, 
the third competitor, announced its exit from the business in December 1962161.  
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With the Allis withdrawal both GE and WH increased their shares, recovering their total 
share to approximately 95% of the level attained in the early 1950s. Following the second half 
of the 1960s, the share started to reduce as foreign firms began to continuously receive orders. 
This time was different, however, from the situation experienced in the second half of 1950s. 
While losing its share, WH only acquired 10% of orders in 1970 while GE increasingly recov-
ered up to 62.7%, a position held previously. 
GE and WH were the first movers in the U.S. conventional steam turbine business162, 
and their dominance was twice jeopardized between 1946 and 1970 but on different fronts. The 
first menace was the third competitor, Allison, that was depriving them of their full market 
share up until 1958, and the second is the entry of foreign firms that started increasing their tur-
bine generator orders during the 1960s. When confronted by these two menaces the relative 
shares for GE and WH performed differently. The first menace in the 1950s reduced both their 
shares but more for GE, the second menace in the 1960s reduced WH’s share while GE was 
recovering its share. GE maintained its competitiveness while WH experienced a general 
downturn over the course of a number of decades. 
3. Corporate Performance and Business Competitiveness 
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During the postwar golden age period of economic expansion, both GE and WH experi-
enced sound corporate growth. Looking at their corporate and business performance, however, 
their growths do not reflect identical processes. In the 1950s GE continued to grow well while 
WH was somewhat challenged in terms of performance. In the conventional steam turbine 
business, GE and WH started losing their shares toward the late 1950s due to the increasing 
competitiveness of the third competitor during a period of rapid expansion in electrical demand. 
In fact, GE lost more than its relative share. In the following decades, the gap in corporate per-
formance was reduced but the gap in shares of the turbine business increased. On the one hand, 
WH improved its performance while GE grew stagnant, and the gap returned to the same levels 
as seen in the early 1950s. However, due primarily to increased costs, both their levels of profit-
ability were approximately half of that experienced in the early 1950s. On the other hand, the 
divergence between the two became increasingly evident when foreign firms started entering 
the U.S. steam turbine market. While GE was improving its market share back to the same 
level seen in the early 1950s’, the late 1960s saw WH with its worst performance in terms of 
market share. 
Why did this occur? Does this imply that the performance of core business does not 
equate to overall corporate performance? The key to understanding this discordance is to 
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closely examine diversification and the link between corporate and business performance. Dur-
ing the golden age period, GE and WH implemented diversification in two tranches. The first 
was under a plan called the expansion program, which lasted until the late 1950s. This expan-
sion greatly affected their steam turbine business. 
 
II. Domestic Competition and Expansion Program 
1. Domestic Competition in U.S. Conventional Steam Turbines, 1946-1958 
The U.S. experienced an expansion in electricity usage through the period of postwar 
economic growth, which prompted an associated demand for turbine generators. Total growth 
in the consumption of electricity from 1946 to 1958 was 8.4%, with residential use, at 11.6%, 
the most expanded among the sectors, followed by commercial use at 10.1% and industrial use 
at 8.3%. The electric utility companies followed a cyclical type of behavior in plant expendi-
tures in order to meet the growth163. There are three such cycles of orders for turbine genera-
tors, as shown in figure 2-7 and table 2-4: the first postwar cycle up until 1949, the second cy-
cle from 1950 to 1954, and the third cycle between 1955 and 1958.  
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Figure 2-7. Turbine generator orders and backlogs, in kilowatts, and index of order price. 
Original source: Exhibits material, Ohio Valley Electric v. General Electric, 62 Civ. 695 (S.D.N.Y. 
1965). 
Source: Ralph G. Sultan, Pricing in the Electrical Oligopoly, Vol. 1 (Boston, MA: Division of Re-
search, 1974): chart 2.7., p.55. 
 
Table 2-4. Number of turbine generators ordered in the United States. 
 
Original Source: the American Electric Power Company. 
Source: Compilation of data from Richard F. Hirsh, Technology and Transformation in the 
American Electric Utility Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): figure 25., 
p.95. 
 
Year
number of
orders
1950 234
1951 103
1952 69
1953 27
1954 102
1955 132
1956 104
1957 62
1958 25
Total 858
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Over these cycles, new demands were placed on the electrical manufacturing firms by 
the client electric utilities. The electric utilities saw larger scale steam turbine generators as one 
means of meeting the rapid growth in electricity usage164. Although 25-100 Megawatt units had 
been the standard for equipment installed up until the 1940s, 100-200 Megawatt units appeared 
in the 1950s and immediately accounted for almost the same percent of installation as the 25-
100 Megawatt, as shown in figure 2-8. Electrical manufacturing firms had to respond to this 
drastic change in demand. 
To meet the postwar demand, both GE and WH undertook capital investments to expand 
their manufacturing production for steam turbine generators. However, at this time there was 
already a gap forming between the number one and number two firms. 
 
Figure 2-8. Steam turbine generating equipment, percentage distribution of capacity installed in U.S., by 
size of equipment. 
Source: Jules Backman, The Economics of the Electrical Machinery Industry (New York: New York Uni-
versity Press, 1962): chart VI-3, p.155. 
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Since GE anticipated a continued trend for increased electricity consumption after the 
war, the firm took two actions to meet this expected significant demand165. First, they started 
working on a new product design for the steam turbine generator that would realize larger ca-
pacity, higher pressures and temperatures as a solution to the increasing electricity usage166. 
The new product required custom-designed machines that were much more complex to engi-
neer and to build167. Herman Hill, manager of manufacturing, Large Steam Turbine Generator 
Department of GE described at the time: 
“In 1946 the operation was converting from wartime production to building land sets. 
There were not many machines in production. Two things happened: volume and the 
size of the machines were both increasing. It became obvious that the new designs 
would not be able to be produced in these [current] facilities. (Stenographer’s minutes, 
Ohio Valley Electric v. General Electric et al., 62 Civ. 695, S.D.N.Y., 2031-2035)168” 
Consequently, they undertook massive investments in existing plants, the principal manufactur-
ing facility in Schenectady, New York and the facility for assembling medium-sized turbines 
located in Lynn, Massachusetts, this in order to expand manufacturing capacity169.  
This strategy was successful and met the expectations of electric utilities, which began 
demanding larger custom-designed units in the early 1950s to operate optimally within their 
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specific systems170. These large custom-designed turbines then fast became the standard prod-
uct. This trend led to significant increases in the average size of a turbine generator, from about 
30,000 kilowatts after the war to almost 200,000 kilowatts in the early 1960s171. As a result of 
this change in the industry, GE increased its production capability from an estimated 3 giga-
watts in 1946 to an annual 12.5 gigawatts capacity by 1963172. 
While GE was offering new products as a response to aggressive forecasts for future de-
mand and manufacturing capacities, WH was being far more conservative173. More precisely, 
WH did not anticipate the shift in demand to larger custom-designed turbines that was caused 
by GE174. This led WH to a different form of postwar expansion of manufacturing capacities. 
In addition to its principal plants located in in the east, in South Philadelphia and Pitts-
burgh, WH acquired the lease on a plant for the manufacturing of turbines, located in 
Sunnyvale, California and operated by Joshua Hendy Iron Works175. This west coast plant 
sought to manufacture existing designs of turbines to respond to the rapid growth in demand for 
the west and was capable of producing the new product that had become the mainstream in the 
early 1950s176. This decision was made under an alternate assumption regarding the growth of 
electrical consumption. WH saw “standardization” as the solution, which simplified product 
design and aspects of the manufacturing process177. Product standardization led to increased 
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productivity within existing available facilities, thereby providing more volume of products to 
electric utilities. In fact, WH’s production of standardized turbines accounted for approximately 
54% of its manufacturing capacities in 1950178. 
When new larger custom-designed products emerged as the business standard, however, 
WH managed to cope with the shift. D. W. R. Morgan, former general manager of the WH 
steam division, recalled the problems that WH faced in the change: 
“The standard machine was an ordinary single-cylinder high-pressure and single-cylinder 
low-pressure turbine. When we get into the higher pressure, higher temperature ma-
chines, we have much more difficult problems. Even in 1946 I became concerned as to 
the percentage of that kind of business, realizing that it carried with it very substantial 
increases in cost, not only increases in cost of the article itself, but enlargement of our 
engineering and drafting work in the research departments that would be required. 
Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the real desires of the power industry be-
came more apparent. It placed a very substantial load on our engineering group. (Testi-
mony of D. W. R. Morgan, general manager of Westinghouse steam division, 1948-
1953, Ohio Valley Electric v. General Electric, 2224-2227)179” 
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As the recent product designs offered by GE were gaining support from utilities, WH had no 
choice but to respond in order to meet the competitive pressures brought on by GE and cus-
tomer demands180. One consequence was that WH’s engineering capacity had to quickly grow 
seven to ten times181. At the beginning, “it became an exceedingly difficult time to procure 
enough engineers to do the job, particularly 1950, 1951, 1952182.” WH had to hastily invest in 
the plant to expand and convert its manufacturing capabilities for a newly designed turbine. In 
1952, WH leased a South Philadelphia Merchant Marine plant that WH had set-up and oper-
ated during the war, while also establishing a budget for a new development laboratory183.  
In addition to catching up to the demand for larger turbines, WH was suffering signifi-
cantly from labor issues, more than was the case for GE. Both firms were preoccupied with 
post-war union relations, as the unions succeeded in shutting down every North America GE 
and WH plant in 1946, the largest strike in the history of the industry184. This strained relation-
ship between corporate management and unions continued into the 1950s, adversely affecting 
the production of steam turbines. While GE managed to avoid the strike, much due to Lemuel 
Boulware’s labor relation policy, and continued to manufacture the product, WH had to delay 
product shipments due to the effects of a 156-day nationwide strike and a 299-day walkout in 
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South Philadelphia that took place from 1955 to 1956185. Although WH still managed to main-
tain the flow of new orders through its marketing efforts (see overhead expense of 1956 on ta-
ble 2-5), the accumulated backlog of orders led to additional costs while it returned to a normal 
delivery situation after the strike186. Furthermore, in the 1950s WH was short of the necessary 
engineering capacity for the manufacture of new larger turbines. WH’s stretched steam turbine 
division engineers were working on not only the new custom-designed turbine but also on 
other business lines, such as jet engines, nuclear power, and wind tunnels187.  
The large capital expenditure for changing production methods and the human resource 
problems had consequences to WH, which succeeded in increasing its annual production capa-
bility from an estimated 1.5 gigawatts to 7 gigawatts over 1946 to 1963, but which also saw a 
rapid increase in product cost, particularly starting in 1953, as can be seen in table 2-5188
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    Table 2-5. Cost and profits to sales. 
 
Original source: Exhibits subm
itted to the court, Ohio Valley Electric v. General Electric, 62 Civ. 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
Source: Com
pilation of data from
 Ralph G. Sultan, Pricing in the Electrical Oligopoly, Vol. 1 (Boston, M
A: Division of Research, 1974):  
table 6.3., table 6.4. and table 6.5., pp.197-199. 
a Direct cost includes direct labor, m
aterials, com
ponents, and indirect factory expense. 
b Overhead expense includes engineering, m
arketing, adm
inistration, em
ployee relations, finance expense. 
c Tax includes federal tax and other assessed financial charges such as interest. 
 
 
Y
e
ar
G
E
W
H
A
llis
G
E
W
H
A
llis
G
E
W
H
A
llis
G
E
W
H
A
llis
G
E
W
H
A
llis
1
9
4
7
8
3
.2
%
7
6
.7
%
1
0
6
.0
%
3
0
.5
%
2
1
.1
%
3
0
.5
%
-
1
3
.7
%
2
.2
%
-
3
6
.5
%
-
1
7
.9
%
2
.3
%
-
3
6
.5
%
-
8
.9
%
1
.2
%
-
1
8
.2
%
1
9
4
8
7
1
.3
%
6
6
.9
%
1
0
0
.4
%
2
1
.6
%
2
0
.8
%
1
8
.9
%
7
.1
%
1
2
.3
%
-
1
9
.3
%
9
.0
%
1
2
.4
%
-
1
9
.3
%
5
.2
%
6
.5
%
-
1
0
.0
%
1
9
4
9
7
5
.0
%
5
5
.0
%
7
7
.2
%
1
9
.9
%
1
7
.1
%
1
8
.1
%
5
.1
%
2
7
.9
%
4
.7
%
4
.6
%
2
7
.9
%
4
.8
%
1
.8
%
1
0
.6
%
2
.0
%
1
9
5
0
6
6
.7
%
5
5
.6
%
7
5
.9
%
1
3
.3
%
1
5
.7
%
1
6
.9
%
2
0
.0
%
2
8
.7
%
7
.2
%
1
6
.4
%
2
8
.7
%
7
.1
%
1
0
.0
%
1
2
.3
%
3
.2
%
1
9
5
1
6
5
.9
%
6
5
.7
%
6
8
.8
%
1
2
.1
%
1
7
.2
%
2
5
.4
%
2
2
.0
%
1
7
.1
%
5
.8
%
2
3
.9
%
1
7
.1
%
5
.8
%
8
.4
%
6
.0
%
2
.4
%
1
9
5
2
6
6
.7
%
6
9
.2
%
6
9
.7
%
1
2
.2
%
1
8
.2
%
2
3
.1
%
2
1
.1
%
1
2
.6
%
7
.2
%
2
4
.7
%
1
2
.6
%
7
.2
%
7
.7
%
3
.9
%
3
.2
%
1
9
5
3
6
2
.6
%
8
3
.7
%
8
1
.6
%
1
4
.5
%
2
5
.1
%
2
8
.2
%
2
2
.9
%
-
8
.8
%
-
9
.8
%
2
6
.9
%
-
8
.9
%
-
9
.8
%
8
.2
%
-
3
.0
%
-
3
.9
%
1
9
5
4
6
1
.8
%
7
3
.0
%
7
5
.5
%
1
6
.3
%
1
7
.3
%
3
1
.1
%
2
1
.9
%
9
.7
%
-
6
.6
%
2
7
.3
%
9
.8
%
-
6
.6
%
1
1
.5
%
4
.4
%
-
3
.0
%
1
9
5
5
6
2
.1
%
7
7
.9
%
7
2
.6
%
1
1
.9
%
1
8
.8
%
3
5
.2
%
2
6
.0
%
3
.3
%
-
7
.8
%
2
6
.4
%
3
.2
%
-
7
.8
%
1
1
.7
%
1
.6
%
-
3
.7
%
1
9
5
6
6
3
.4
%
7
9
.6
%
7
4
.0
%
1
4
.1
%
5
9
.0
%
4
5
.0
%
2
2
.5
%
-
3
8
.6
%
-
1
9
.0
%
2
1
.3
%
-
3
8
.6
%
-
1
9
.0
%
9
.2
%
-
1
8
.5
%
-
9
.1
%
1
9
5
7
6
7
.5
%
8
0
.5
%
7
9
.6
%
1
4
.1
%
2
3
.6
%
2
4
.3
%
1
8
.4
%
-
4
.1
%
-
3
.9
%
1
8
.6
%
-
4
.1
%
-
3
.9
%
7
.6
%
2
.0
%
-
1
.9
%
1
9
5
8
6
4
.4
%
7
5
.0
%
8
2
.1
%
1
4
.0
%
1
6
.3
%
1
0
.0
%
2
1
.6
%
8
.7
%
7
.9
%
2
1
.8
%
8
.6
%
1
2
.2
%
9
.6
%
4
.1
%
6
.1
%
A
ve
rage
6
7
.6
%
7
1
.6
%
8
0
.3
%
1
6
.2
%
2
2
.5
%
2
5
.6
%
-
-
-
1
6
.9
%
5
.9
%
-
5
.5
%
6
.8
%
2
.6
%
-
2
.7
%
D
ire
c
t C
o
st
a
O
ve
rh
e
ad
 E
xp
e
n
se
b
1
0
0
%
(S
a
le
s) -
 (D
ire
c
t C
o
st+
O
v
e
rh
e
a
d
 E
xp
e
n
se
)
P
re
-
T
ax P
ro
fit
A
fte
r-
T
ax P
ro
fit
c
57 
58 
 
Table 2-5 demonstrates both the continued trends and the changes that arose between 
GE and WH through 1947 to 1958. GE maintained profit earnings during the period, with 
the exception of the transitional year of 1947 when GE was moving into its new and effi-
cient manufacturing facility in Schenectady189. WH, on the other hand, started a decline in 
profitability in 1952, when they offered more new larger custom-designed turbines190. 
WH’s direct costs increased considerably at that time. Comparing the two firms, there is a 
revealing shift in their respective profitability positions prior to and after the new larger tur-
bines became the industry standard. WH’s profitability was actually superior to that of GE 
up until it had to move away from the previous turbine design. GE was in a much better po-
sition than WH after the mainstreaming of large turbines because WH’s transition costs had 
simply been all that much higher. Meanwhile, in order for the third firm to draw market 
share from the big two, Allis had to pay extra overhead charges for receiving orders by dis-
counting its product and undercutting the prices of its competitors191.   
The smoother transition for GE is a result of its product strategy. GE anticipated a 
postwar higher growth in the use of electricity and associated products, they chose techno-
logical change as a product strategy and, as the technological leader, GE was placed in an 
advantageous position to forecast and influence future product designs192. The strategy was 
founded on having access to the necessary resources, such as capital, technological and hu-
man resources. Responding to the product strategy, GE became the first to invest in the ex-
pansion of manufacturing capacities. The new product responded well to the increasing de-
mands of electric utilities, who were primarily concerned with avoiding any electricity 
shortage arising from the rapid growth in electrical consumption. GE had successfully 
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gained first mover’s competitive advantage and continued to be successful as an influential 
lead firm in the industry.  
WH, on the contrary, was now a complete follower and this mainly due to a con-
servative forecast for the growth in electricity usage. The WH business model was to em-
bark on a geographic market expansion for the existing product design, leaving them in a 
significantly disadvantaged position when the market shifted. To catch up to the required 
technological and production capacities WH hastily invested in turbine manufacturing 
plants, but it had already lost several years to GE193. To worsen matters, WH was also 
faced with problems in its human resource capacities. WH was about half the size of GE 
and the allocation of available resources to large, custom-designed turbine projects was far 
more challenging.  In such a situation, the strike and engineering shortage seems to have 
left WH with no role other than that of follower. After all, even as a follower WH managed 
to maintain the second market share position, but only by absorbing higher costs during the 
three cycles of orders for turbine generators194.  
2. Diversification and the Military 
There is a reason why WH was unable to concentrate heavily in the turbine business, 
there were huge pressures to diversify businesses in the postwar period. WH top manage-
ment pursued corporate growth through diversification, especially in the military market. It 
was not only WH playing this game, as GE and other domestic electrical and electronics 
manufacturing firms pursued defense-related business, and one driving force behind this 
movement was an urging from government to do so. 
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By the late 1940s the United States had transitioned from wartime to peace, and a 
major discussion gradually emerged over whether there was a need to maintain a large mili-
tary force during peacetime195. In early 1950, President Truman ordered the secretaries of 
state and defense to reassess the existing defense and foreign policy196.  A report was deliv-
ered a few months later, entitled “United States Objectives and Programs for National Se-
curity,” also known as National Security Council Memorandum (NSC) 68. The report 
called for a large expansion in military capabilities in order to constrain the Soviet Union 
and, as such, was an influential government document that was setting the course for the 
Cold War197. From the perspective of economics and business, it was significant that the 
report challenged the traditional view that military spending was harmful to the econ-
omy198, as follows: 
“Progress in this direction [achievement of a GNP of $300 billion per year] would 
permit, and might itself be aided by, a build-up of the economic and military 
strength of the United States and the free world; the necessary build-up could be ac-
complished without a decrease in the national standard of living because the re-
quired resources could be obtained by siphoning off a part of the annual increment 
in the gross national product.199” 
Moreover, the analysis supported a view that the American economy and business enter-
prises were fully capable of offering both military and civilian products without issue: 
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“One of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience was that the 
American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can pro-
vide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simul-
taneously providing a high standard of living.200” 
Although Truman initially resisted approval of NSC 68 as the new national military policy, 
it eventually became the framework for military expansion when the Korean conflict sud-
denly occurred a few months later, in 1950201. Consequently, the national defense budget 
began increasing rapidly in the early 1950s, as shown in figure 2-9. 
 
Figure 2-9. National defense budget, 1946-1960. 
Source: Compilation of data from “Table 3.1. Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940–2020,” 
Office of Management and Budget and “Gross Domestic Product: Current-dollar and ‘Real’ GDP,” 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
In the process of this expansion, the military budget supported the purchase of armaments 
such as aircraft, missiles, ships, electronics, and vehicles. While aircraft and missiles ac-
counted for the majority of expenditures, ships and electronic-related goods gradually in-
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creased to displace expenditures on vehicles and weapons, as per table 2-6. In terms of con-
tracting, figure 2-10 indicates that aircraft-related firms dominated as prime contractors for 
the Department of Defense during the 1950s, but also shows that electronics-related firms 
escalated their share of contracts in the late 1950s. A military expansion focused on aircraft 
and electronic products inevitably involved GE and WH, as both were much involved in 
aircraft, missile, and electronics related products.  
Table 2-6. Department of Defense average monthly expenditures of durable goods industries, 1954 
to 1959 (in millions of dollars, for years ending June 30). 
 
Source: Compilation of data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States: 1960, 81th Annual Edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1960): No. 308. Defense Expenditure and Obligations, employment in Selected In-
dustries, and New Orders and Sales of Durable Goods Industries: 1954 to 1959, p.241. 
Note: Excludes military assistance program.  
 
GE did not attempt to actively engage in military business after the war. In fact, GE 
president Charlie Wilson was criticized by one of its leading electronics engineers because 
of his rapid postwar transition of the electronics business from wartime to peacetime202. 
However, Ralph Cordiner, the successor to Wilson in 1950, began referring to the advanta-
geous aspects of defense business. On Management Conference in 1954, he described: 
“One factor that has been most helpful in eliminating the need for outside borrowing 
has been a contribution by those involved in defense activities. At present, 79% of 
our inventories and accounts receivable for defense production converted by pro-
gress collection that amounts to about $400 million.203” 
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Aircraft and
guided missiles
737 62.2% 730 74.6% 693 73.8% 839 79.9% 932 82.2% 929 80.1%
Ships and harbor craft 90.8 7.7% 84.1 8.6% 74.6 7.9% 74.8 7.1% 96.3 8.5% 128.1 11.0%
Electronic and
communications
68.8 5.8% 53 5.4% 64.2 6.8% 73.4 7.0% 72.9 6.4% 76 6.6%
Combat Vehicles, artillery,
weapons, and ammunition
287.8 24.3% 111.2 11.4% 107.6 11.5% 63.4 6.0% 32.6 2.9% 26.6 2.3%
Total 1184.4 100.0% 978.3 100.0% 939.4 100.0% 1050.6 100.0% 1133.8 100.0% 1159.7 100.0%
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He “preferred commercial non-defense business because it is generally more open for Com-
pany-determined innovations and is more profitable.204” But he still regarded the defense 
business as a high return on investment since the investment requirements were low and 
compensated for narrow profit margins205.  Since GE had “concentrated its defense efforts 
not on the mass production of items..., but on undertaking the difficult, unsolved research 
and production problems of military technology,” a half of GE’s defense work was research 
and development by the late 1950s206. And commercializing military technology, lavishly 
funded by the military, for non-defense business was the ultimate payoff for defense con-
tracts, such as commercial jet engines, electronic computers and, most spectacular of all, 
atomic energy207.  
 
Figure 2-10. Distribution of major military prime contracts by industry for the 100 largest defense 
contractors: Three periods. 
Source: Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic 
Analysis (Boston, MA: Division of Research, 1962): figure 5.1., p.122. 
Note: All 100 Firms = 100% 
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In addition to these advantages, Cordiner and his management team also looked to 
the defense business as a must in terms of social responsibility. Guy Suits, who was a vice 
president and director of research at GE, described in 1957:  
 “all industry continues to have a deeply important public responsibility to participate 
in the national defense program---even though commercial business offers a gener-
ally more profitable utilization of technical skills and facilities208” 
Thus GE top management deemed that business did not need defense, but defense needed 
business209. This allowed GE to not seek exclusive rights to all the business, but rather to 
cooperate with small firms on defense projects. For example, GE sought out, recruited, and 
trained 4,000 subcontractors to work on the jet engine program during the Korean War210. 
They also encouraged the closet possible teamwork between small and large businesses in 
order to cope with the substantial problems of defense work211.  
Beyond these factors, it can be assumed that GE also considered the defense business 
as a way of gaining support from the government. When Robert Paxton, past-president of 
GE, made a 1958 address entitled “new responsibilities for managers”, he stressed the im-
portance of government relations. This was based on the fact that the political climate had 
just as much an effect on a business’ bottom line as do the conditions of its market or its 
technology, mainly due to taxes, inflation, regulations, labor law and patent protection and 
such212. There was also a rise of labor union connections to positions of political power, al-
lying with welfare-state politicians who were all about big government, big spending, big 
taxes, and increased government restrictions on business, in response managers needed to 
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seek out ways to gain political support, in order to build an effective counterforce to the un-
ions213. Thus, GE had little choice but to contribute to defense business if they wanted to 
attain a better political climate for their business. 
Although both GE and WH had already engaged in defense business during wartime, 
both continued to be partly obligated to participate in defence contracting in the 1950s and 
expand this business not only on the basis of economic incentives but also driven by social 
motivations (see figure 2-11).  
 
Figure 2-11. Incentives for contributing to defense business. 
Source: Author. 
 
As a result of this expansion in defense business, their rankings as military contract 
firms followed suit, as per table 2-7: GE was ranked 9th from June 1940 to September 1944 
and then climbed to 3th during the FY 1951-1953 period, while WH went from 21st to 
14th . However, by the end of the 1950s, the WH ranking for defense contracts dropped 5 
spots to 19th while its commercial rank remained rather static, meanwhile GE maintained 
an equally high ranking for both military and commercial. A factor in WH’s decline in its 
military rank was its withdrawal from major defense business in 1960. 
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Table 2-7.  Military rank of GE and WH, 1944-1960 
 
Source: Compilation of data from Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisi-
tion Process: An Economic Analysis (Boston, MA: Division of Research, 1962): table 5A.1., pp.604-
611. 
 
Early on, the major military products were divided into propulsion and electronics 
products. The main product of the former category was the jet engine. During the war the 
contract committee saw that the engineers who worked with steam turbines had experience 
with the aerodynamics of compressors and turbines, so GE and WH were chosen to develop 
the gas turbine aircraft engine (i.e. jet engine), and became pioneers in the industry for the 
U.S. during the war214. Both firms continued to provide aircraft engines after the war, 
mainly for military use. They also provided ship propulsion turbines and later came nuclear 
propulsion equipment for the Navy’s submarine fleet, which eventually led to nuclear 
power plants. The second category, electronics related products, covered a wide range of 
products including airborne radar, rocket and missile firing system, radio and communica-
tion equipment, and computer later. Digital computers, in particular, became a major post-
war electronics product. GE and WH had been working on early computing technology 
during the prewar period, to simulate power network systems215. But the wartime develop-
ment of analog computers, such as gunfire systems, led their employees to the digital com-
puter216. Among the products, jet engine, nuclear power, and computer businesses were 
particularly notable as postwar spin-off business arising from military technology. While 
1939 1945 1954 1959
GE 10 4 4 4
WH 33 14 13 15
-
6/1940
-9/1944
FY 1951
-1953
FY 1958
-1960
GE - 9 3 4
WH - 21 14 19
Commercial Rank
Military Rank
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both firms engaged in these three business lines, they also diversified into commercial busi-
nesses. 
Among the spin-off businesses, it was in the computer business that they took differ-
ent paths. While GE established the computer department for commercial use in 1956, once 
it started developing some digital computers after receiving military (e.g. OAR: later called 
OARAC in 1947) and commercial (i.e. ERMA in 1956) orders. WH mainly developed an 
analog computer, called Anacom, which continued to work in the electrical power field un-
til 1990217. Although WH also developed a digital computer for weapons systems (i.e. 
SOLOMON), they decided to withdraw from the business since they did not have the fund-
ing available to go into renting computers218.  
Aside from the computer business, at the beginning of the postwar both GE and WH 
took fairly similar diversification strategies for their commercial and military businesses. 
By the end of the 1950s, however, WH’s business structure had gradually shifted away 
from that of GE. As demonstrated on table 2-8, WH provided 120 categories of products to 
market in 1950. These products broadly consisted of heavy equipment for electric power 
system, propulsion equipment including jet engines, electrical equipment for consumer and 
industrial use, and other related products including defense products, financial services, ra-
dio stations, and medical products. In 1950 the consumer product category accounted for 
31.5% of total sales, industrial products were 60.6%, defense products and others were 
7.3%, and radio stations were 0.6%219. Up until 1960, WH had entered into nuclear power 
generation, significantly expanded its defense products, and was into heating, ventilating 
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and air conditioning businesses. As reflected in its diversification in the military market, 
WH defense products and nuclear power generation, the latter derived from military tech-
nology, were remarkably enlarged. As a result of this expansion and disposal of businesses, 
WH’s sales by segment changed as consumer products dropped to 25%, apparatus and gen-
eral products constituted 55%, and atomic and defense products took a 20% share in 
1960220. Although the WH business profile of 1960 is not fully compatible with that of 
1950, it does indicate that defense related business remained an important segment of WH 
business. Consequently, WH was embedded into the U.S. military-industrial complex. 
However, unlike GE, WH withdrew from jet engines as a major aircraft product, and from 
locomotives as well as x-ray tubes in the medical category. The expansion of atomic and 
defense, and disposal of jet engines and other products, was largely implemented under 
“Mr. Expansion”, WH President Gwilym A. Price.221 His expansion strategy also influ-
enced WH steam turbine business. 
Gwilym Alexander Price was elected WH president in January 1946, after he 
changed careers from banking to join the firm as a vice president in 1943 and serve as exec-
utive vice president from 1945222. After Price took the helm, WH executed two large capi-
tal investments under its expansion program. The first expansion, under a $132 million 
budget, started in 1946 and was to convert its plants to peacetime production and to expand 
its facilities for electrical products223. This was fulfilled in 1948 when its productive capac-
ity was increased by 50%224. The second expansion involved government financing, to ex-
pand its manufacturing capacity for defense products, and was carried out between 1951 
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and 1955225. The program budget, which at $296 million dollars was almost double the size 
of the first one, led to another 50% increase in production capacity226.  
Table 2-8. Diversification of products in Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 1950-1960. 
 
Source: Compilation of data from “Principle Products Analysis 1952-1982,” 1982, box16, folder 8, 
Records of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania Sen-
ator John Heinz History Center. 
 
During these expansions, WH placed a different focus on major defense product 
businesses. For example, Price made atomic energy the number one priority with the goal 
to build the nuclear power plant227. WH had seen itself as the pioneer in the field of atomic 
products ever since it built the first industrial atom smasher in 1937. Price’s priority led to 
Product Category 1950 1951-1960
Power Generation (non nuclear) 7 8
Nuclear Power Generation 0 8
Transmission and Distribution 14 16
Power Modulation Equipment 6 9
Transportation (land)
       Elevator related 2 2
       Locomotive related 3 0
       Other 1 1
Transportation (non land)
       Marine 5 5
       Air 2 1
       Space 0 3
Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning 7 14
Refrigeration 4 5
Industrial Process Equipment 16 18
Lighting and Lamps 19 21
Hompe Appliances 5 8
Defense Product 7 15
Materials and Material Related Products 11 16
Medical 2 1
Entertainment and Leisure activities 4 6
Maintenance, Service, Financial Services 1 2
Miscellaneous Components and Special Products 4 6
Total 120 165
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the establishment of the atomic power division in 1948, and saw WH invest some two mil-
lion dollars in 1954 for the first privately-financed plant for the manufacture of atomic 
power equipment228. As a consequence, WH provided a number of “firsts” in nuclear re-
lated products, such as the first practical atomic engine for submarines in 1953 and the first 
full-scale nuclear power plant in 1957229.  
Although WH also developed the first American-designed and American-built jet en-
gine in 1941, not enough was invested in jet engines for WH to maintain its competitive ad-
vantage230. In the 1955 congressional investigation of WH’s J-40 engine program, which 
focused on delays in WH’s jet engine product development, the WH gas turbine aviation 
division officially admitted failures, such as underestimating the magnitude of the task, fail-
ing in the rapid expansion of their engineering staff, placing inadequate emphasis on re-
search, and scattering their bases of operation231. As the subcommittee’s investigation team 
testified, the WH jet engine division had not been sufficiently invested by the company232. 
In order to redeem its honor, WH tried to develop a new engine, the J-54, at its own ex-
pense. However, the government did not accept the engine for production233, mainly be-
cause they had already considered that “[t]he Air Force (and Department of Defense) is al-
ready sorely pressed to find sufficient funds to keep four major engine contractors produc-
tive. One more contractor would further disperse our resources.234” As a result WH left the 
jet engine business in 1960. Reinout Kroon, a former chief engineer of the division, de-
scribed: 
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“The J40 story is sort of sad. We were able to make the required thrust, as I recall, 
well. But the airplane which was to use the engine became much heavier than antici-
pated, and that required more thrust. This we saw no way of providing. We were 
criticized for not anticipating engine growth in our design. 
This may indeed have been one of the reasons why Westinghouse got out of the 
business. But I think the more basic reason was that after the war, finances began to 
dry up. The Services decided that, in the long run, they could only afford two suppli-
ers of jet engines, Pratt & Whitney and GE. It was probably a wise decision. West-
inghouse management had much difficulty adapting to the style of aircraft engine 
manufacturing, which was so different from the turbine activity they had been used 
to235.” 
Thus, the disposal of the jet engine line arose from a double bind, one where WH top man-
agement was unable to fully understand and support the business and the government re-
ducing its budget in the middle of 1950s (see figure 2-9). Since the jet engine division 
could not obtain enough facility space, even in the 1950s its research and development fa-
cility remained at South Philadelphia, where the steam turbine division was also located236. 
Nuclear power and jet engines are the extreme cases of support, or lack of, from WH 
top management. There is also a sort of middle case from the wind tunnel project. WH was 
awarded a contract to build a propulsion wind tunnel for the U.S. Navy, the largest built to 
date237. Regarding this defense project, D. W. R. Morgan, a general manager for the West-
inghouse steam division, described: 
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“That [the wind tunnel] was a huge undertaking requiring a great deal of engineering 
and development. As a matter of fact, that compressor on that wind tunnel required a 
motor of 216000 horsepower and the blades in the compressor were placed on a 
drum that was 18 foot [sic] in diameter, the blades were six foot [sic] long and about 
two toot [sic] wide. Incidentally all the engineering was done within the Steam Divi-
sion. (Testimony of D. W. R. Morgan, general manager of Westinghouse steam divi-
sion, 1948-1953, Ohio Valley Electric v. General Electric, 2228-2229)238” 
This enormous wind tunnel project was technically challenging but was apparently limited 
by a development approach that was applicable more to commercial products239. Further-
more, the technological challenge, as Morgan testified, was not completed through a new 
organization but through its existing steam turbine division.  
WH top management were greatly engaged in both the diversification of business and 
the expansion of production capacity that went on up until the middle of the 1950s. The nu-
clear power business saw significant investments but the technology was related to its 
steam turbine line, and this required the reassignment and use of existing division staff. In 
addition, jet engine technology was also related to steam turbines, and also did not obtain 
sufficient investment so this became an additional draw on steam turbine resources. Moreo-
ver, the huge and challenging wind tunnel building project was fully undertaken by the 
steam turbine business. Thus, the expansion had not effectively followed diversification for 
some business lines, especially those that lacked sufficient human resources.  
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In fact, GE was also faced with similar problems. To sustain business growth, they 
called back retired engineers and salesmen to help GE solve both the technological chal-
lenges arising from government requirements and the increasing demands for electrical 
products and electrical energy240. As shown in table 2-9, GE’s increase in the number of 
employee was comparatively greater when compared to WH. Both top management teams 
were faced with similar problems and went on to execute their respective expansions and 
diversifications, but differences emerged on how they managed the sizable growth in na-
tional demands that had been placed on them. 
Table 2-9. The Number of employees of GE and WH, 1946-1958. 
 
Source: Compilation of data from GE, Annual Reports, various years and WH, Annual Reports, vari-
ous years. 
Note: GE’s definition of employee changed in 1948, 1954 and 1956. 1948 data includes the num-
ber of employees on Nucleonics projects operated for the U.S. Government; 1954 excludes 10,805 
employees at atomic projects operated for the U.S. Government; 1956 includes 11,496 employees 
at the governmental atomic projects. 
 
 
 
 
Year GE year-to-year WH year-to-year WH/GE
1946 160968 - 93049 - 57.8%
1947 197324 36356 102065 9016 51.7%
1948 196798 -526 105812 3747 53.8%
1949 179300 -17498 94729 -11083 52.8%
1950 183800 4500 98279 3550 53.5%
1951 210200 26400 108654 10375 51.7%
1952 216800 6600 112582 3928 51.9%
1953 222070 5270 122729 10147 55.3%
1954 210151 -11919 117143 -5586 55.7%
1955 214794 4643 115857 -1286 53.9%
1956 280497 65703 125050 9193 44.6%
1957 282029 1532 128572 3522 45.6%
1958 249718 -32311 114652 -13920 45.9%
First
Postwar
Cycle
Second
Postwar
Cycle
Third
Postwar
Cycle
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3. Competition in Technologies and Diversification in the Military-Industrial Complex 
While advancing their diversification in defense related businesses, GE and WH were 
also competing in the conventional steam turbine industry where the product and produc-
tion technology had changed to larger-scale custom-designed turbines. The new turbines 
required more engineers while some of the defense business also required attention from 
steam turbine engineers. Diversification in the military-industrial complex was executed 
not only on economies of scale and scope but also more on responsibilities of scale and 
scope. This left GE and WH, as large firms, partially obligated to work on defense business 
and their status of being technologically advanced electric and electronics firms also re-
quired a wide range of defense products. 
The “size” of the firm had a strong bearing on the ability to respond to both corporate 
growth and social obligations. GE had the advantage over WH, and WH was disadvantaged 
vis-a-vis GE. GE, for example, was successful in leading in the development and building 
of the new turbine because it had access to more human resources. The size of the firm be-
came a major competitive advantage. Also, GE responded to government requirements by 
significantly increasing its workforce. WH, half the size of GE, not only had diversify into 
defense products but also had follow GE in its core business. The diversification into de-
fense products had a much more serious impact for WH on its steam turbine business be-
cause they simply did not have a sufficient supply of engineers, even to undertake the de-
sign of the new product. As a consequence WH run into more severe problems. However, 
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WH was still able to maintain market share in the 1950s for its steam turbine through its 
customer preference strategy. 
 
IV. International Competition and New Ventures, 1959-1970 
1. Foreign Competitors and Emerging New Demand, 1959-1970 
The U.S. steam turbine business encountered a huge change in the 1960s. The early 
trigger was the prosecution for antitrust violations, known as the Great Price Conspiracy, 
and later came the 1965 Northeast power blackout. During the decade, GE and WH were 
both rewarded by another growth in electricity demand but, again, somewhat differently. 
 (1) Collapse of Price Conspiracy 
The electrical machinery industry became the stage for corporate scandals in the 
early 1960s, at the time becoming the biggest criminal case in the history of the Sherman 
Act241. In 1960, 29 electrical manufacturing firms and 45 of their executives were indicted 
on charges of price fixing, rigging, and market splitting on 20 product lines (including 
steam turbines)242. GE and WH were judged to be leading the conspiracy. As a result of the 
judgement, conspiring firms and individual officers received fines totaling $1,924,500, 7 
executives went off to prison, and another 23 were given suspended jail sentences and 
placed on probation for five years243.  
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The beginnings of this antitrust case arose from changes in the marketplace for U.S. 
steam turbines. In 1959, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a government-owned elec-
tric utility company, purchased turbine generators from Brown Boveri Corporation of Swit-
zerland and the C.A. Parsons Co of England because the prices offered by American firms 
were nearly 37% higher than Brown Boveri and 50 percent higher than Parsons244. As a re-
sult, Brown Boveri and Parsons had collectively won 13.3% of domestic orders in 1959 
(see figure 2-6)245. Robert A. Monroe, a former chief design engineer at TVA, recalled: 
“the foreign manufactures bids came in so far under those of the American companies that 
we felt constrained to give the business to them.246” In fact, the price of electrical machin-
ery equipment, in particularly steam turbines, had been rapidly increasing during the 1950s, 
as shown in table 2-10. For this reason, TVA decided to invite bids from qualified foreign 
firms247. 
Table 2-10. Wholesale price index (1947-49=100). 
 
Original Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Source: Clarence C. Walton and Frederick W. Cleveland, Jr., Corporations on Trial: The Electric 
Cases (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1964): table 2-1, p.30. 
 
Year
All
Commodities
Machinery and
Motive Products
Electrical
Machinery
Equipment
Steam Turibne-
Generators
1950 103.1 108.6 106.4 104.7
1952 111.6 121.5 120.3 118.6
1955 110.7 128.4 128.2 134.5
1956 114.3 137.8 138.4 160.8
1957 117.6 146.1 149.0 191.9
1958 119.2 149.8 155.2 201.2
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This posed a great threat to GE and WH, since TVA was a major customer that repre-
sented 8.8% of the market and was the largest single customer for turbine generators in 
1960248. Both firms announced they would protest the awards as detrimental to national se-
curity249. In addition, they stated that the gap in price came primarily from differences in 
labor costs between the U.S. and Europe which resulted in the higher bid (refer to figure 2-
12)250.  
 
Figure 2-12. Total cost comparison: Heavy electrical apparatus, United States vs Western Europe, 
1959. 
Original Source: Westinghouse Electric Corporation. 
Source: Jules Backman, The Economics of the Electrical Machinery Industry (New York: New York 
University Press, 1962): chart XI-3, p.298. 
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While the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization started investigate the national 
security and import of foreign turbine, TVA reported further that some U.S. manufacturers 
were submitting identical bids on equipment and materials251. The Senate Subcommittee on 
Antitrust and Monopoly announced to investigate the identical bids252. Following a result 
of the investigation that such imports did not threaten the national security, three major tur-
bine manufacturing firms (i.e. GE, WH and Allis) began cutting prices on large steam tur-
bine253. As another identical bids among the domestic firms were reported later, eventually 
the government investigated the whole 20 cases in electric machinery industry254. It led to 
reveal the price conspiracy. 
The course and consequence of this antitrust case brought some changes to the steam 
turbine business. First, foreign firms were officially permitted to enter the major U.S. mar-
ket.255 Second, the price of turbines fell as a result of the collapse of the conspiracy.256 Im-
ported turbines and the collapse of the conspiracy met the next cycle of lower demand for 
turbines, and combined to make the industry more competitive by the middle of the 
1960s257. 
(2) Aftermath of the 1965 Northeast Blackout 
An unexpected development, however, this rescued the industry from its severe pre-
dicament. The power outage hit New York particularly hard as the Niagara power grid 
dropped out during rush hour on November 9, 1965, quickly becoming a chain reaction that 
cut power to more than 25 million people in eight states and two provinces in the U.S. and 
Canada, later called the Great Northeast Blackout of 1965.258 The event spurred electric 
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utilities to re-evaluate and consider installing new capacity to ensure reliability.259 This led 
to two responses for the requirement for new capacity. 
One was for emergency power. A relatively common deficiency uncovered by the 
blackout was a lack of emergency power, so electric utilities began installing gas turbines 
in their plants, which required the least time for manufacture and installation.260 As shown 
in table 2-11, internal combustion plants increased significantly after 1965. Moreover, the 
larger the size of the plant, the more likely they would be installed. Although Gas turbines 
were used in a variety of other applications, its use for electric utilities rapidly increased af-
ter 1965 (see figure 2-13).  
Table 2-11. Privately owned electric utility generating plants, by type of plant and plant size, 1959-70. 
 
Source: Compilation of data from the United States Bureau of the Census, The Statistical History of 
the United States: from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Basic Books, 1976): S 58-73, 
p.822. 
Note: Plant size interval in kilowatts 
 
GE and WH had both been providing gas turbines ever since GE delivered the first 
gas turbine for electric use in 1949261. Even after WH withdrew its aircraft engine business 
in 1960, WH maintained its gas turbine division within its steam turbine division262. On the 
Nuclear plants Hydro plants
Under
500000
Over
500001
All All
Under
5000
Over
5000
Gas turbine
plants Total
1959 655 39 3 888 295 25 - 1905
1960 660 47 4 866 291 28 - 1896
1961 637 59 5 839 282 36 - 1858
1962 619 67 7 821 262 42 - 1818
1963 602 72 7 812 251 54 - 1798
1964 581 83 7 786 237 61 - 1755
1965 564 89 7 754 234 36 40 1724
1966 556 95 8 749 226 41 51 1726
1967 545 112 8 439 231 58 101 1494
1968 530 127 8 734 229 68 147 1843
1969 516 140 10 719 229 80 199 1893
1970 506 155 13 702 223 89 235 1923
Internal combustionSteam plants
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other hand, GE’s continued interest in the aviation business allowed it the agility to transfer 
knowledge between its aircraft engine and power generation turbine businesses263. 
 
Figure 2-13. Gas turbine U.S. installations. 
Source: Euan F. C. Somerscales and Robert L. Hendrickson, “America’s First Power Gener-
ating Gas Turbine,” Brochure of Landmark Designations, the History and Heritage Program 
of ASME: figure 2., p.4. 
 
The second response by electric utilities for increased capacity was the installation of 
larger scale turbines. Since the blackout led to the creation of nine regional power pool ar-
rangements, it enabled utilities to install larger size turbines under the rule that each re-
gional group purchased 7 to 10% of the entire regional group capacity264. Through this rule, 
small utilities, which were unable to purchase large turbines before, could now cooperate 
with other utilities in the same region to build large, even nuclear, power plants265. Follow-
ing this change in demand there was a gradual increase in the late 1960s in the production 
of larger scale steam turbine and nuclear power plants, as seen in table 2-11. In terms of 
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production of capacity, after the blackout the demand for nuclear power plants rose to be-
come equivalent to that of fossil-fired plants, as shown in figure 2-14. The nuclear power 
plant market expanded rapidly and appeared to be competitive with conventional fuels. 
 
Figure 2-14. Orders for turbine generators, 1960-1968. 
Source: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, The Nuclear Industry, 1969: Chart G., p.13. 
 
GE and WH offered nuclear power plants as well as gas turbines. In the nuclear 
power market, competition emerged differently from what was the case for conventional 
steam turbines and gas turbines. As shown in table 2-12, WH obtained a similar share of 
nuclear power contracts to that of GE. This was the first time WH was on the cusp of being 
the market share leader in the turbine business. Prior investments in the nuclear power busi-
ness, led by WH president Price led, was bearing fruit in the 1960s. 
Table 2-12.  Number of contracts of nuclear plants in the U.S. central station. 
 
Source: Compilation of data from U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, The Nuclear Industry, 
1970: table IV-5 and 6., pp.154-156. 
Note: The data is considered from the year 1953 to September 30, 1970 
Number of
Contracts
Size
(Mwe-Net)
Number of
Contracts
Size
(Mwe-Net)
Number of
Contracts
Size
(Mwe-Net)
Number of
Contracts
Size
(Mwe-Net)
1953-59 2 265 3 338 3 366 8 969
1960-65 5 2950 5 3145 3 1170 13 7265
1966 6 4867 9 7744 5 3694 20 16305
1967 13 10657 8 7076 10 8209 31 25942
1968 4 4438 9 8171 3 2182 16 14791
1969 3 3129 3 2986 1 1140 7 7255
1970 4 3688 4 3752 6 6722 14 14162
Total 37 29994 41 33212 31 23483 109 86689
Share (%) 33.9% 34.6% 37.6% 38.3% 28.4% 27.1% - -
WH GE Other Total
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(3) Conventional Steam Turbines in a New Business Setting 
A wave of change descended on the turbine business during the 1960s, including for-
eign competitors, collapse of the price conspiracy and a growth in demand for new prod-
ucts. Although GE and WH managed to respond, a divergence in their respective business 
competitiveness became apparent by the late 1960s. 
The collapse of the price conspiracy coupled with new competition from foreign 
firms led to a more competitive industry, as U.S. firms granted price concessions in order to 
fill their excess manufacturing capacity with orders266. The market prices were discounted 
30% to 35% in 1961267. Allis-Chalmers, the third domestic firm, then announced its inten-
tion to leave the business in late 1962268. The exit of Allis left only two domestic firms and, 
boosted by increasing demand, price leadership soon replaced price competition269. The 
following year GE changed its pricing policy to adhere strictly to the levels published in a 
new price book, and WH subsequently followed this lead270. It allowed them to submit vir-
tually identical prices for electrical machinery during the 1960s271. They formed a tacit col-
lusion through a non-cooperative process, different from the approach taken in the 
1950s272. However, foreign firms, particularly Brown Boveri, had weakened this collusion 
and were immediately the major source of competition during the period. For instance, 
GE’s relationship with American Electric Power went from bad to worse when the latter 
chose Brown Boveri’s products in the middle of 1960s, since the price offered underbid 
that offered by GE and WH273. As a result, price and cost competitiveness were much more 
factors in obtaining market than in the previous decade. 
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Following the blackout, the rapid growth in demand largely went to steam turbines 
over gas turbines and nuclear power. As with the other products, these required larger scale 
turbine generators to expand capacity. As shown in figure 2-14, the number of orders and 
total capacity for steam turbines expanded suddenly, starting in 1965. GE and WH took on 
a new product strategy to exploit this opportunity, by offering gas turbine “packages” for 
power generation274. This product strategy met the needs of utilities and allowed the firms 
to reduce the total cost of gas turbine manufacturing.275 
 
Figure 2-15. Capacity and number of turbine generators ordered in the U.S. 
Original source: American Electric Power Company. 
Source: Richard F. Hirsh, Technology and Transformation in the American Electric Utility 
Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): figure 25., p.95. 
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However, the sudden boost in demand for large turbines posed a huge problem. The 
rapid change in the size of units and the excess of orders led to the large turbines experienc-
ing problems in operation (e.g. turbine blades) and there was a decline in reliability from 
about the late 1960s276. WH’s problems, however, were more serious277. When compared 
to the much more reliable and less labor-intensive General Electric unit, for example, the 
WH unit had become, as some plant managers commented, ‘supertroublesome.278. The rea-
son behind WH’s serious problems was that it received too many orders to handle279. In ad-
dition, there was also a possibility that the problems were due to an unbalanced research 
and development investment in the 1960s280. Therefore WH decreased its technological ca-
pability in conventional steam turbines by focusing on nuclear power technology, while GE 
was able to more adequately invest in both conventional steam turbine and other technolo-
gies. 
In the conventional steam turbine industry, price competitiveness and technological 
capabilities in the late 1960s drove the contrast in market share between GE and WH (see 
figure 2-6). GE maintained price leadership and better cost competitiveness, and also had 
sufficient size to continuously invest in steam turbines. On the other hand, WH was faced 
with a higher cost structure when building its steam turbines. In fact WH, starting in 1959, 
tried to decrease its product cost through a “block building” approach, which was focused 
on standardizing or modularizing components of the product281. This worked but only tem-
porarily. Direct costs of WH decreased from 72.9% in 1959, to 65.0% in 1960, and then to 
58.6% in 1961282. However, this strategy became less useful when the size of turbine gen-
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erators were rapidly increasing as it was difficult to sustain in such a fast-changing techno-
logical environment283. As a consequence, WH was unable to reduce its costs. As a result 
of this difference, price competition from foreign firms had a more negative effect on WH. 
Furthermore, since GE was twice the size of WH, GE could not only afford invest-
ments in new technologies, such as nuclear power, but also in gas turbine and steam turbine 
technologies, while WH had to remain more focused on nuclear power. This allowed GE to 
maintain the reliability of its product even when faced with a rapid increase in the size. 
WH, on the contrary, experienced a decline in reliability and reputation. As a result, WH 
lost an even greater share of its market in conventional steam turbines. Hence the diver-
gence in market share seen in the late 1960s resulted from the fact that WH was unable to 
also adequately concentrate on its traditional business, as in the 1950s. 
2. Diversification and Social Change 
The reason WH was unable to concentrate on turbine business during the 1960s, 
however, was not the same as for the 1950s, it was more an extension of their traditional 
logic. GE and WH undertook their prewar diversification following a logic of “the benign 
circle of electric power.” Ralph J. Cordine, GE president during the 1950s described: 
“A turbine generator installed in a power station makes possible the sale of more 
lamps, appliances, motors, and other users of power. And as more people buy lamps, 
appliances and so on, they create the need for another turbine generator and more 
transmission equipment. Thus, each new use of electricity accelerates the turn of the 
circle---creating a bigger potential market for General Electric products, not only in 
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end use equipment, but in equipment to produce, transmit, and distribute electric 
power.284” 
In short, they believed that the more that society accelerated its electrification, the more 
their core business, turbine generator products, would be in demand, and electrical machin-
ery firms would thereby increase profits. Since electric utilities had helped push the mes-
sage that greater electricity consumption increases sales285, utilities and manufacturing 
firms had a shared interest in electrifying society. When utilities promoted the “Medallion 
Home” program in 1957, which was an extension of the “Live Better Electrically” program 
in 1956, GE and WH both followed suit286.  
The Medallion Home program was an attempt to encourage sales of all-electric 
homes by placing a “visible but not conspicuous” medallion on the new house287. Utilities 
offered lower, promotional rates to the owner of those houses288. Since industrial consump-
tion initially led to the growth of electric usage in the 1940s and 1950s289, a reasonable way 
of sustaining growth was through an expansion of residential usage.  
For electrical manufacturing firms, the all-electric home concept served as a potential 
market for their products. As they forecasted orders, even with an aggressive forecast by 
GE, they expected a decline in orders for turbines in the late 1950s cycle290. Thus the pro-
gram compensated for the drop in orders of turbines. WH began proposing the “Total Elec-
tric Home” concept in 1959, and GE referred to “total electric living” and “Gold Medallion 
Homes” as its product market in 1959291. According to a GE estimate, the average new 
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home in the U.S. contained $575 (at factory selling prices) in electrical equipment and re-
lated materials, and Gold Medallion homes could utilize as much as $3,020 worth of GE 
appliances and equipment292. This highlighted the potential market gains by expanding resi-
dential use of electricity and electrical products293. To exploit market opportunities, both 
firms launched a series of specialized task teams, such as GE’s Residential Market Devel-
opment Operation in 1959 and WH’s Residential Marketing Department in 1960294. 
Through these teams, the firms offered home building contractors integrated proposals for a 
set of preinstalled products for the home.  
This emphasis on the consumer market was driven by social changes that were occur-
ring in American society. Ralph Cordiner, as Chairman of the Board of GE, foresaw in 
1958 that the “[r]ising level of income and education, along with the sharp increase in 
household formation in the 1960s, will mean a bigger, higher-quality market for residential 
uses of electricity”295. In 1962 WH described the emergence of a large consumer market as 
follows: “[d]espite an unprecedented expansion of new construction in the United States, 
population growth continues to create new and greater needs for homes, schools, shopping 
centers, hotels, motels, office buildings, government buildings and apartment buildings.”296 
Around 1960, both top managements had confidence that the trends in the consumer market 
would continue throughout the 1960s, and this could be exploited for additional corporate 
growth. 
Also in the 1960s, actions by the U.S. government presented another potential market 
under the Democratic administrations of John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) and Lyndon B. 
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Johnson (1963-1969). The government embraced macroeconomic planning as an integral 
aspect of modern policy, and expanded its involvement into social security areas, from edu-
cation to welfare, while still maintaining the national defense budget.297 Figure 2-16 pre-
sents the major categories of expenditure for the U.S. government from 1958 to 1970.  
 
Figure 2-16. National defense, human resources, physical resources budget, 1958-1970. 
Source: Compilation of data from “Table 3.1. Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940–2020,” 
Office of Management and Budget, and “Gross Domestic Product: Current-dollar and ‘Real’ GDP,” 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Note 1: human resources consists of education, training, employment, and social services, health, 
medicare, income security, social security, and veterans benefits and services.  
Note 2: Physical resources includes energy, natural resources and environment, commerce and 
housing credit, transportation, community and regional development.  
Note 3: Each budget does not reach 100%, because net interest and other functions such as inter-
national affairs agriculture etc. are excluded on data. 
 
While the outlay for national defense continued to account for approximately 40% to 50% 
of the total federal budget, the outlay for human resources gradually increased in amount. 
Its percentage of GDP particularly increased from 1966 onwards, from approximately 5% 
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to 7%. Although defense, highway building, and the space programs were particularly im-
portant areas of government spending that shaped the expansion of entire sectors of the 
economy298, the budget for human resources was also attractive to GE and WH, as de-
scribed later. Table 2-13 presents expenditures for selected subcategories of the space pro-
gram. The physical resources expenditures, such as transportation and community develop-
ment, were provided a fix amount during the 1960s. On the other hand, while outlays for 
general science, space and technology research peaked in 1966, all subcategories for human 
resources gradually increased and continued to account for a high percentage in the late 
1960s. 
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 Table 2-13. Selected subcategories budget, 1962-1970.
 
Source: Com
pilation of data from
 “Table 3.2. Outlays by Function and Superfunction: 1962–2020,” Office of M
anagem
ent and Budget, and  
“Gross Dom
estic Product: Current-dollar and ‘Real’ GDP,” U.S. Departm
ent of Com
m
erce, Bureau of Econom
ic Analysis. 
Note 1: m
illion dollars. 
Note 2: a num
ber of parentheses is percent of GDP. 
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In addition to the huge potential consumer market that was emerging from population 
growth, GE and WH also saw these large government expenditures as a potential market for 
growth. Gerald L. Phillippe, president of GE, stated “just as we found with consumer and in-
dustrial expenditures, governments have a wide latitude of discretion in what programs to 
push....Here again the opportunity for the electrical industry is big.299” He made reference to 
selling electrical solutions to the problems faced in the governmental market300. As examples, it 
raised the provision of adequate street lighting to prevent violent crimes, educational facilities 
for educational television, and electrified rapid transit to address the traffic congestion crisis301. 
And they saw transportation systems, education, public safety, urban renewal, street lighting, 
water and sewage treatment as potential government related markets302. While emphasizing the 
expanding population and the growing needs of humans, WH president Donald C. Burnham 
considered city transport, purified water, undersea exploration, waste and refuse disposal as so-
cial problems that posed as potential markets303. 
GE and WH understood the new governmental policy to be part of the social change. 
They also saw the growth in population and urbanization as fundamental factors of this change. 
In the coming of the “Age of Cities”, they positioned themselves as solution providers through 
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the electrification of city problems, problems called “urban sprawl,” “urban scatteration,” and 
“slurb”304. These emerging societal problems were growth opportunities for the two firms. 
To seize the opportunities, two concepts were pursued, the customer-oriented and the 
systems approach. Regarding the former, Mark W. Cresap, Jr., WH president, in 1962 de-
scribes it as follows “defines and identifies a market from the point of view of the customer’s 
needs and concentrates Company skills, facilities and resources and serving this market305”. 
Also, General L. Phillippe, GE president in 1963, referred as “our still-important technological 
mastery is geared up to serve known market objectives306”. Thus, they emphasized the im-
portance of a market strategy for this new emerging market. As a result, in 1963 GE reor-
ganized the Residential Market Development Operation to create the Construction Market De-
velopment Operation and then, in 1965, again restructured to form the Community Systems 
Development Division, meanwhile WH established the Marketing Communications Depart-
ment in 1964 to undertake all marketing operations307. 
The new focus on urban markets to meet the needs of a growing number of consumers, 
combined with electrical manufacturing capacities, led to the foundation of the systems ap-
proach as the optimal approach to obtaining profits from a growing market. Marketing was 
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now not so much geared on the actual products and would focus on systems. The system sell-
ing approach first appeared in military and industrial markets in the late 1950s, and then ex-
panded to other businesses308. The concept of total electric living serves as a prime example. 
The idea was applied not only to residential, but also to non-residential markets, such as com-
mercial and institutional309. As examples, systems were offered in the industrial market through 
automation and computerization systems, in the government market through mass transporta-
tion systems, and in the military market through missile guidance systems310. It is assumed that 
they believed their role in society was more than just that of an electrical machinery firm but 
also as a provider of social systems, the electrified society led to a growth in demand for electri-
fied systems as solutions.  
Although this new systems-based approach can be seen as expanding the logic applica-
ble to “the benign circle of electric power,” the traditional logic for business operations, it was a 
strong enough driver that allowed for expansion and diversification of their businesses to pro-
mote corporate growth in the 1960s. In response to the $12 billion tax cut approved by Con-
gress in 1964, spurring an impressive increase in private investment311, GE and WH acceler-
ated their respective businesses expansions under a new logic, namely mergers and acquisi-
tions. 
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Starting 1963, under President Fred J. Borch, GE looked for market opportunities that 
were both growing at a faster rate than the GNP and also suited to GE capabilities312. They 
identified nine business lines: nuclear energy, computers, commercial jet engines, polymer 
chemicals, entertainment, community development and housing, personal financial services, 
medicine, and education313. GE hoped to achieve $1 billion in sales through the expansion314. 
Among the business lines, nuclear power, computers, and commercial jet engines were seen as 
businesses for the future315. At the same time, GE started to internationalize its business. Alt-
hough GE performed well in international markets through exports, there was concern over the 
increasing penetration into U.S. markets by foreign competitors in the early 1960s316. They re-
garded the reduction of world trade barriers as healthy but it also introduced a shock of change 
that could not be ignored317.  
GE’s subsequent expansion took two tracks during the 1960s. Since most of the “busi-
ness of the future” had already been established within the firm, GE focused on mergers and 
acquisition for internationalization, as shown in table 2-14. They mainly purchased European 
firms that were operating in the same businesses, such as electrical machinery. Among the “fu-
tures” businesses, the computer business was the only one that was rapidly expanded through 
M&A. Other businesses for the future, such as education and media, were also established 
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through M&A and joint ventures but these were smaller businesses at the time. Community de-
velopment and housing, however, was the ultimate goal for the total electric living idea that GE 
itself established for communities and homes of the future, and GE announced in 1968 that it 
would build such a city in Columbia, Maryland318. 
Table 2-14. A list of new business for GE, 1960-1970. 
 
Source: Compilation of data from Moody’s Industrial Manual, various years and GE, Annual Reports, 
various years. 
Note: (JV) indicates Joint venture, (EB) indicates establishment of new company. 
 
Through this expansion, however, GE did not achieve what they had aimed for by the 
end of the decade. Although GE’s sales grew rapidly, profitability did not follow this growth in 
sales (see figure 2-1 and figure 2-3). By the late 1960s GE had achieved “growth without 
Year Name Business Nationality note (1)
1960 Compagnia Generale di Elettricità electronics etc Italia controlling interest disposed in 1968
1964 Compagnie Bull General Electric computer France half interest disposed in 1970
Société Industrielle Bull-General Electric computer France half interest disposed in 1970
Prometheus housewares West Germay controlling interest disposed in 1971
ESGE group housewares Swissland disposed in 1971
James N Kirby appliance Australia majority interest
1965 Landers, Frary & Clark housewares US
N.C.Joseph housewares UK
Olivetti-GE computer Italia majority interest disposed in 1970
(JV) Simplex-GE Manufacturing control device UK half interest joint venture with Simplex Electric
(JV) Simplex-GE control device UK half interest joint venture with Simplex Electric
(JV) General Learning education US joint venture with Time
(EB) GE Overseas Capital financing US
(EB) GE Cablevision media US
1966 Kuba-Imperial group consumer electronics West Germay disposed in 1970
Computron material West Germay half interest disposed in 1968
GE-Enka Fibers material - controlling interest disposed in 1970
APAG Apparatebau consumer products Swissland disposed in 1969
Electromat lamps Chili controlling interest
Fabricantes de Material Eléctrico lamps Chili controlling interest
General Medical Balteau X-ray Belgium renamed GE Medical
four cable television systems media US
(EB) ECCO electronics Ireland
(EB) Ventas de General Electric Controls push button controls Puerto Rico
(EB) GE Pilot Service general controls Puerto Rico
(EB) Carboloy lamps Italia controlling interest
1967 GE Espanola electrical products Spain controlling interest
(EB) Electronic Industry electronics Hong Kong
1968 Metropolitan Television media US renamed GE Broadcasting Co. of Colo.
Caribe GE - Puerto Rico merged formed GE Power Products
(EB) Business Development Services financing US
1969 Benerson - US
(EB) GE Devices - -
(EB) Stentor - -
(EB) Berwyn Power Equipment - -
note (2)
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profit319”. The major contributors were three “future” businesses. As shown in table 2-15, nu-
clear power, commercial jet engines, and computers were all racking up losses. Reginald H. 
Jones, vice president of finance, surmised: Computers, in particular, had no positive prospects 
for GE top management. 
 “our debt to capital ratio had been climbing. And we just said [    ] there is a breaking 
point where we will lose our triple A rating as a corporation if we continue to pile on 
debt and if we try to do all of these things that we have got on our plate right now. (Tes-
timony of Reginald H. Jones, U.S. v. IBM, Trial Transcript, 8831-32.)320” 
Consequently, GE left the computer business in 1970. This is mainly because GE al-
ready held more than a 20% market share in the nuclear power and jet engine markets, and 
could operate these in a competitive posture that was more suited to the firm but, above all, it 
would be difficult to abruptly leave these businesses due to contractual relationships321. Around 
that time, GE decided to divest European foreign businesses that did not contribute to GE prof-
its and where GE managers were not inclined to work322.  
Since GE failed to successfully expand and diversify its businesses during the decade, its 
corporate profitability declined in the late 1960s. However, they were capable of covering the 
losses due to the strong financial position that had been built over its history. In other words, 
97 
 
GE had invested surplus fund in new businesses while maintaining its investments in traditional 
businesses.  
Table 2-15. Estimated profit contribution for major product categories of GE, 1968-69. 
 
Original Source: U.S. v. IBM, Plaintiff Exhibit 362, p. 11; and Wall Street Institutional reports. 
Source: Modified from William E. Fruhan, Jr., Financial Strategy: Studies in the Creation, Transfer, and 
Destruction of Shareholder Value (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1979): table 6-5, p.158. 
 
WH’s approach, on the other hand, differs from that of GE. For example, they went fur-
ther than GE in advancing the total electric living idea. As seen in table 2-16, unlike GE, WH 
mainly purchased domestic firms in a variety of businesses, including furniture, softdrinks, edu-
cation, construction, residential development, auto rental, etc. These M&As were conducted 
under the concept derived by WH senior management, which Donald C. Burnham, WH presi-
dent described: 
Product category 1968 1969
Nuclear turnkey -150 -150
Other nuclear -30 -25
Turbine generators 114 82
Transmission and distribution 70 62
Total utility business 4 -31
Commercial jet engines division -30 -50
Other heavy capital goods 85 65
Total heavy capital goods 55 15
Computer division -30 -1
Other light industrials 225 161
Total light industrials 195 160
Consumer products 255 215
Aerospace and defense 65 50
Non-operating earnings
(Primarily GE Credit Corp.) 71 84
Total 645 493
Pretax profit from nuclear,
computer, and jet engine businesses -240 -226
Pretax profit from other operations 885 719
Total pretax profit 645 493
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 “We are seeking growth in two directions. One is serving customers better with im-
proved products and services in our existing businesses. The other is new businesses 
evolving from the Company’s capabilities and resources and from new environmental 
needs of people throughout the world...Among them are the further promise of atomic 
power, underseas exploration, transportation, urban development, water desalting, edu-
cation and an expanding electronics technology.323” 
After seeing GE’s forward action to build a city, WH increasingly purchased a variety of busi-
nesses. Similar to GE, WH had worked towards the ultimate goal of the total electric living 
idea. In 1966 WH purchased the Coral Ridge Properties in Florida and decided to build a new 
city, Coral Springs, for the following purpose: 
 “to broaden Company experience in urban planning and stimulate development of prod-
ucts and services for the city of the future. Designed for 60000 residents, the community 
is being built to the highest architectural, construction and landscaping standards, and 
will combine the advantages of city and suburban living......Coral Springs will be an ex-
cellent vehicle for developing and testing new products and systems which will aug-
ment the Company’s capabilities to serve the rapidly growing urban development and 
building construction market324.” 
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To be able to build a city, WH began to go out and purchase any business that was related to 
the building of a city. For example, this would explain why WH acquired a furniture business. 
To provide a full housing system, kitchen cabinets and other basic furniture could be incorpo-
rated into the system, along with the electrical system. One can further assume that the reason 
WH acquired an auto rental business in Florida could be due to the anticipated demand in the 
city where WH began building. WH extended its involvement in businesses linked to the total 
electric living concept much deeper than GE. 
With regards to community development, WH committed to a market of population 
growth exceeding that premised by GE. WH identified water-supply as a potential business in 
1962, with the following reference “An expanding population, greater individual consumption 
and increased industrial use of water as a raw material are draining our supplies at an unprece-
dented rate and have raised the threat of future water shortages.325” In fact, water related ma-
chinery had been one of WH’s small business lines since 1948, when Kuwai approached them 
for large-volume seawater purification326. Although not a major business within the firm, WH 
held onto the water business as did GE for its plastic business. However, WH saw these small 
existing businesses as having the potential to grow in the new society. 
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Table 2-16. A list of new business for WH, 1960-1970. 
 
Source: Compilation of data from Moody’s Industrial Manual, various years and WH, Annual Reports, 
various years. 
 
Consequently, WH advanced its diversification in a manner different from that of GE. 
As per table 2-17, in the 1960s WH increased its number of products from 165 to 231. While 
WH disposed of a few products, other new product categories were expanded in response to the 
Year Name Business Nationality note (1)
1961 Thermo King refrigeration products US
1962 Radio station WINS media US
1963
Controls business of Hagan Chemical &
Controls
industrial products US
Ateliers Jaspar-Westinghouse industrial products Switzerland majority interest
1965 Dick X-Ray X-ray US
Chase Electric - US
Electric Marketeer Manufacturing industrial veicles, carts US
I-XL Furniture furniture US
Goshen Realty Corporation furniture US
Philacor appliance Philippine minority interest
1966 Coral Ridge Properties residential developmentUS
DECO Electronics electronics products US
Seven-Up Bottlers of Fairfield Country softdrink US
Seven-Up Bottling Co. softdrink Puerto Rico
Radio station KFWB media US
Lighting Inc. - Puerto Rico
Lincoln Warm Air Heating Equipment air heating system UK
1967 Sanford Brothers industrial services US
Florida Antennavision media US
CATV service in New York media US
Compagnie des Dispositifs Semiconducteurs
Westinghouse
semiconductor France majority interest
1968 K.W. Battery industrial products US
Measurement Research Center education US
MCA, Inc media US
1969 Hub Electric lighting US
Seven Up Bottling Co of Los Angeles softdrink US
Seven Up Bottling Co of San Bernardio softdrink US
Seven Up Bottling Co of Bakersfield softdrink US
Intercounty Construction water&waste treatment US
C.W. Blakeslee & Sons construction US
1970 C & C Construction water&waste treatment US
Econo-Car auto rental US
Longines-Wittnauer Watch timepieces&mail-order US
Ateliers de Constructions Electriques
de Charleroi
electrical product Belgium
Southern Prestressed Concrete construction services US
Ideal School Supply Company education US
Americar auto rental US
Seven Up Bottling Co of Southern Indiana softdrink US
Seven Up Bottling Co of Indiana  softdrink US
101 
 
building a city initiative and new government policies, such as health, social service, and edu-
cation. Thus WH, more than GE, pursued potential demands arising from social changes. For 
GE, on the contrary, its diversification actually led to better financial performance in the late 
1960s. 
Table 2-17. Diversification of products in Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 1960-1970. 
 
Source: Compilation of data from Principle Products Analysis 1952-1982, 1982, box16, folder 8, Records 
of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania Senator John 
Heinz History Center. 
 
Product Category 1960 1961-1970
Power Generation (non Nuclear) 8 9
Nuclear Power Generation 8 12
Transmission and Distribution 16 20
Power Modulation Equipment 9 12
Transportation (land)
       Elevator related 2 4
       Other 1 4
Transportation (non land)
       Marine 5 3
       Air 1 1
       Space 3 4
Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning 14 13
Refrigeration 5 6
Environmental Equipment and Services 0 6
Industrial Process Equipment 18 19
Lighting and Lamps 21 23
Homp Appliances 8 7
Defense Product 15 28
Materials and Material Related Products 16 15
Medical 1 0
Health, Social Services, Education 0 7
Home Building, Real Estate Development, Building Tr 0 8
Entertainment and Leisure activities 6 12
Maintenance, Service, Financial Services 2 7
Miscellaneous Components and Special Products 6 11
Total 165 231
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3. Competition in a New Setting and Diversification in the Socio-Industrial Complex 
Throughout the 1960s GE and WH continued to compete in the conventional steam tur-
bine business, but the business environment had changed significantly. Instead of simply gain-
ing from the third competitor’s exit, foreign firms began gaining market share and emerged as 
new competitors after the collapse of price conspiracy, and this demanded more price competi-
tiveness. In addition, there was the new demand in turbine products that emerged after the mas-
sive blackout in 1965. Both firms suddenly received a number of orders for large conventional 
turbines while also receiving orders for gas turbine and nuclear power plants. While GE man-
aged the orders, WH was overwhelmed. As a consequence, WH’s share market was reduced 
towards the late 1960s, much owing to its decline in reputation. 
On the other hand, the top managements of both firms tried to identify new businesses 
for corporate growth. They had seen the growth in population, urbanization, and new govern-
mental policies as potential markets. To profit on the situation, they took similar approaches, 
customer-oriented and system. Although both firms diversified into a number of similar busi-
nesses, their diversification efforts were quite different as a whole. In responding to the govern-
ment’s new social security policy, they became part of the socio-industrial complex, as opposed 
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to the military-industrial complex, by entering into the community development and housing, 
medicine, and education sectors327.  
WH evidenced a much deeper commitment to these new businesses than did GE,  while 
WH followed the logic of an expansion to the benign cycle. Although the benign cycle was val-
idated by economies of scale and scope, based on a cost advantage to the supply side, WH di-
versification was based on factors of demand and market. Customers desired the system, and 
firms could sell products, even those unrelated to their business, as long as they provided them 
as the part of the system. Thus expansion that occurred had actually moved WH away from the 
original benign cycle, as the new business was largely different from its electrical machinery 
the past logic no longer applied. The new strategy, however, improved the performance of WH.  
GE, besides entering into new businesses, also chose to internationalize its business. 
Among the new businesses, the performance of the computer business was far below expecta-
tions, despite undertaking major international M&As. In addition, other international busi-
nesses also contributed less to GE less than forecasted. Consequently, GE grew in sales but 
with a lesser increase in profit. The premise of GE’s internationalization was based on econo-
mies of scale and scope on a global scale. Although GE followed its virtuous logic, it was una-
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ble to gain the reward in profits. One reason, it is assumed, is that they failed to build a corre-
sponding organization. This could be because GE managers resisted working in foreign coun-
tries and GE imposed its American way onto locals328.  
GE, due to its size, could cover both the massive orders for turbines and the losses it in-
curred in its corporate expansion and diversification. On the other hand, WH succeeded in im-
proving its profitability through diversification, but was unable to adequately invest in its con-
ventional steam turbines in order to maintain its technological quality. These differences led to, 
on the one hand, similar corporate performance and, on the other, divergent business competi-
tiveness between GE and WH during the course of the 1960s. 
 
V. Same Logic, Different Size 
This chapter explores the development of a wider gap between GE and WH in terms of 
corporate performance and business competitiveness in the postwar domestic conventional 
steam turbine business.  
First, it is revealed that both firms improved corporate performance and maintained busi-
ness competitiveness in steam turbines under the oligopolistic conditions that existed between 
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domestic firms in the late 1950s. Corporate performance was significantly challenged by a hu-
man resource shortage that was brought on by diversification into the military-industrial com-
plex. Because both firms were implicitly obligated to cooperate on national defense, they 
needed to expand their defense business. Meanwhile, GE was leading technological change in 
the steam turbine industry, and WH had to follow the GE product strategy. The increase in de-
mand for larger custom-build turbines required more human resources. Consequently, both 
firms faced human resource shortages in the steam turbine business. In the end, it was the larger 
firm that had an advantage in responding to both diversification and the evolving steam turbine 
business. Since GE was twice size of WH, GE was able to maintain its corporate performance 
and business competitiveness. WH, on the other hand, was in a more severely challenged situa-
tion and even had to leave some businesses, including jet engines. Although both firms main-
tained a similar strategic logic for corporate diversification and product competition, the size of 
the firm was the deciding factor in terms of their divergent corporate performances. 
Over the following decade, it is confirmed that they diverged in their business competi-
tiveness in the steam turbine business while, towards 1970, closing the gap in corporate perfor-
mance. Human resource shortages and competition with foreign firms were the fundamental 
factors that allowed WH to lose market share. An abrupt increase in demand for much larger 
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turbines occurred after the blackout of 1965, and both had to manage a large number of more 
complex turbine orders. While GE succeeded in delivering on orders, WH received orders 
more than they could handle. As a consequence, due to declining WH product reliability and 
reputation, foreign firms increased their market shares at the expense of WH. Over this period 
both top managements were looking for businesses that had potential for corporate growth, and 
diversification was part of this strategy. They saw new markets emerging from social/demo-
graphic changes, such as population growth, urbanization, and new government policies. 
Through customer-oriented and system approaches, they diversified their businesses into the 
socio-industrial complex. The respective degrees of diversification, however, ultimately led to 
different corporate performances. WH was committed to expanding domestic business and 
selling “systems”, while diversifying into new businesses that supported the overall strategic 
logic. Although GE also sold “systems” like WH, GE invested more in international acquisi-
tions and the computer business while remaining less diversified in new businesses such as 
health and education. By 1970, this resulted in WH recovering its profitability, through in-
creased sales and profits, while GE declining in its profitability because of failures in its inter-
national and computer businesses, closing the gap in corporate performance between the two 
firms. 
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An examination of the two firms from 1946 to 1970 requires a number of assumptions. 
First, that both shared the same corporate logic in terms of the need to pursue diversification, 
public responsibility and the benign cycle. Under this new corporate logic, diversification was 
directed to new growth related to their business, but not only just for financial reasons. Govern-
ment policies also had a large influence on diversification. As a result, both firms were more 
embedded into relations with the government and society.  
Second, the amount of available human resources largely affects business competitive-
ness in the steam turbine business. GE determined its human resources capacity to be its key 
competitive advantage when it led the mainstreaming of custom-built turbines. In an industry 
that has high barriers to entry, the level of resources of the firm is vital to business competitive-
ness, and this as long as all follow a similar business strategy. Lastly, a corporate strategy for 
expansion impacts on business competitiveness when a firm does not have enough business re-
sources available to also maintain the required level of support for existing business.  
Although the corporate logic and strategies of two firms might be similar, a difference in 
size and the level of resources would be a determining factor for business competitiveness. GE 
and WH applied similar corporate logic to their diversifications, but while GE was able to use 
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its size to overcome its failure in the 1960s, WH was unable to recover from the failure it en-
countered in the 1950s. 
By the end of the golden age, although their financial standings seemed similar, GE and 
WH had very much diverged their business competitiveness in conventional steam turbines. 
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Chapter 3 
Managing Crises in the Midst of the “Great U-Turn” of 1971 to 1979 
"Silently waiting for something, and when the time comes, it flies straight toward."  
Haruki Murakami, Colorless Tsukuru Tazaki and His Years of Pilgrimage 
 
I. American Enterprises as Contributors to the Decline of the U.S. Economy 
This chapter reveals the differences in managerial perceptions for both GE and WH, and 
how they responded to the first oil crisis and the associated period of economic inflation that 
occurred in the 1970s. 
After “the Golden Age”, a growth period when large American enterprises created com-
petitive advantages and glorified their successes, signals gradually emerged in the late 1960’s 
that revealed a rise in new global competition and that the American economic system had lim-
its. The U.S. was confronted with a multiplicity of challenges, including high debt financing 
costs, inflation, an oil crisis, and a general economic decline. These challenges fostered more 
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intense competition from foreign enterprises during the 1970s, and prompted American enter-
prises to explore other means to attain corporate growth while coping with these other chal-
lenges.  
The factors that contributed to America’s economic decline in the 1970s have been ex-
plored extensively in the fields of economics and management study. Economists have demon-
strated the impact that significant events can have, such as the impact of the Vietnam War, the 
oil crisis or even from government policies that were introduced while the American economy 
was in decline329. For example, in one of the eminent research studies on this subject, Eckstein 
Otto concluded that, amongst the other events that occurred, the oil crisis was the most critical 
factor for decline330. Meanwhile, from a management scholars’ perspective, Robert H. Hayes 
and William J. Abernathy suggested that American management was the chief contributor to 
the American economic decline in that period, after having been admired for a strikingly effec-
tive post-World War II performance through the 1950s to the 1960s331.  
Business historians acknowledge that American enterprises had to deal with terrible ex-
ternal factors, including new directions (if not misdirections) in government policy332, but also 
they also conclude that American enterprises and industries lost their competitive edge in the 
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1970s as a result of management strategies undertaken in the previous decade. The top manage-
ments of large American industrial enterprises had already embarked on an active program of 
M&A, extending the logic for diversification to sectors unrelated to core business in terms of 
technology or traditional markets333. In doing so, enterprises that had led the previous period of 
phenomenal growth simply ignored the prevailing logic that an enterprise gains a competitive 
edge on the basis of economies of scale and scope in related industries, by constructing organi-
zational capabilities under three-pronged investments334. As of yet, no consensus has emerged 
amongst scholars on the decisive factor for America’s economic decline in the 1970s but stud-
ies do suggest that the top management in American enterprises had to address rather disastrous 
conditions, brought on by changes in the external environment and compounded by the highly 
diversified businesses that resulted from their management actions in the previous decades. In 
terms of management response, this was the starting point for divergence amongst some Amer-
ican enterprises, a process that continued toward the 1990s335.  
GE and WH were no exception. They both found themselves caught in a difficult predic-
ament in terms of their core manufacturing businesses, a condition brought on by foreign enter-
prises (i.e. West European and Japanese) while other political and social environmental 
changes served as added sources of pressure.  After the disastrous 1970s, GE and WH followed 
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their own paths on rather distinct corporate transformations that continued until the 1990s. As 
raised in the previous chapter, it was becoming clear that, although both enterprises similar 
“outsides”, their “insides” had already started to differ.  Commonly faced with such profound 
external challenges in the 1970s, how did the perceptions and responses of the top management 
teams result in divergence toward the 1980s? 
The 1970s is the period during which GE and WH changed their respective management 
systems. From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, both enterprises had started realigning their or-
ganizational structures and introduced strategic management systems. GE undertook its second 
major post-war change in organizational structure, establishing the Office of the President and 
doubled the number of operating groups from five to ten336. GE then started incorporating a set 
of strategic management tools into its management system, such as Strategic Business Units 
(SBUs) and Product Portfolio Matrix (PPM). Around the same time WH was creating three 
vice-chairman positions for the new top management team337 and reorganized from a group 
structure to a structure that more resembled four companies338. WH also introduced an alternate 
strategic management tool called Vabstram (the Value Based Strategic Management System). 
Although WH was falling slightly behind GE in performance, on the surface the two were su-
perficially similar as large 1970s electric and electronics conglomerate enterprises. 
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However, studies indicate that enterprises had been growing differently in terms of man-
agement practices, financial aspects, and corporate growth. In analyzing the transformation of 
U.S. industrial enterprises listed as Fortune 100 companies in 1974, Nohria, Dyer and Dalzell 
describe the divergence that emerged between GE and WH as very symbolic in light of the US 
move from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. More specifically, they contend that GE 
was more than a step ahead of WH in terms of organizational control and its introduction of 
strategic management processes over the period339. More detailed descriptions of GE can be 
found in studies of Sakamoto and Rothschild340. To extricate itself from the profitless growth it 
experienced in the late 1960s, GE endeavored to institutionalize advanced strategic manage-
ment and planning341. For example, each of the SBU strategies within GE was subject to a per-
sonal review and evaluation undertaken by the CEO himself342. GE recognized its own strate-
gic management system to be distinct when compared to other companies343. In this regard, GE 
and WH were diverging in terms of their practices for organizational systems and strategic 
management.  
With regard to financial aspects, O’Sullivan’s analysis provides us some indication. Us-
ing both companies as examples to explore the relationship between financial systems and cor-
porate growth, she reveals that the financial behavior of the two companies strikingly diverged, 
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beginning in the mid-1970s344. One of her findings is that GE, toward the end of twentieth cen-
tury, was more successful than WH at achieving efficiencies in the use of working capital while 
WH continued to maintain a higher financial dependence on working capital345. GE’s relative 
dependence on financing declined, even in periods of economic decline, which suggests that 
GE was more adept than WH at managing financial aspects.  
GE clearly outperformed WH in the 1970s. Regarding the sustainability of corporate 
growth, Fleck’s quantitative and descriptive examinations of GE and WH, from their founda-
tion to the end of the 1990s, demonstrates that the gap in growth that already existed prior to the 
1970s gradually expanded during the 1970s346. She cites coordination by top management as a 
key factor, not to mention their very distinct approaches to expansion and dissimilar approaches 
to managing risk347.  
However, these previous researches were not specifically focused on the relationship be-
tween the two top managements and the divergence that took place in 1970s. As an introduc-
tory story on the transformation of American enterprises that took place after 1974, Nohria, 
Dyer and Dalzell’s study provides the historical aspects and vital events of the decade but the 
scope is limited to analyzing how top management responded to environmental changes. Alt-
hough O’Sullivan conducted an in-depth analytical study of GE and WH, her main focus was 
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on the relation between the U.S. financial system and corporate finance over a period that cov-
ered almost 100 years. Her study does not consider the specific dynamic of top management 
influence. On the other hand, Fleck does demonstrate the most comprehensive understanding 
of the managerial capabilities of GE and WH, but her study lacks analytical detail on the pro-
cess by which top management perceived, anticipated, and behaved in the 1970s. To examine 
which of the top management responses contributed to the divergent positions that resulted, it is 
necessary to gain an understanding of underlying factors in the contrasting transformation pro-
cesses of both the enterprises in the late twentieth century. 
One reason this has not been sufficiently explored is due to a limitation in historical 
sources of information. This chapter overcomes this constraint through the use of a set of his-
torical documents, as follows. For top management perceptions of GE in the 1970s, this is ex-
amined through Executive Speeches and Reports to Shareowners, drawing from the speech 
manuscript collection of GE executives. For WH, an examination of the collection of speeches 
is also pursued, found in the Records of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation that consists of 
speeches given mostly by senior management. Both speech collections cover from 1970 to 
1980. Even though the speech manuscripts are public, and do not provide an exact reflection of 
each executive’s perceptions and conceptions, these can be considered as the consensus of 
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GE’s and WH’s top management thinking at the time and allow for an analysis of the changes 
in a company’s perceptions and conceptions. In addition, the methodology also uses strategic 
and R&D planning documents and financial data to examine how the perceptions and concep-
tions of top management are reflected in corporate behavior. As for GE’s materials, Corporate 
Annual Reports, the Downs Collection and the R&D Planning Series are accessed, whereas 
Corporate Annual Reports, Series XIII Research and Development/Science and Technology 
Center 1919-1998, and the Records of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation are used for 
WH. Planning documents, in particular, can be seen as indicators that are reflective of top man-
agement thinking. Although other documents and data provide insight to top management 
thought, one reason to use planning documents is that these tend to reflect what top manage-
ment is anticipating for the future on the basis of perceptions of the environment.  
Some documents used in this chapter are late drafts and are not the final planning docu-
ments. However, they still provide sufficient information to adequately satisfy the object of the 
research. Most of historical documents were collected by the author at the miSci Archives, 
Schenectady, NY, and the Library and Archives of the Heinz History Center, Pittsburgh, PA348.  
This chapter investigates how the top managements of both GE and WH perceived the 
changes in the external environment, developed blueprints for the short-term, and took actions 
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under a defined approach. The next section explores why the performances of GE and WH di-
verged during the 1970s under declining economic conditions. The subsequent section then 
takes a close look at the responses of top management to changes in the business environment, 
focusing on the periods before and after the first oil crisis.  It analyzes how GE’s and WH’s 
managerial perceptions changed, and the underlying logic behind the perceptions. It concludes 
by comparing perceptions from both managerial perspectives, while revealing that decisions 
from top management in response to these environmental changes ultimately extended the de-
gree of divergence of the two firms. 
 
II. Divergence in Financial Standings 
1. Financial Standings in the 1970s 
Large U.S. industrial enterprises had expanded their business much as a by-product of 
wars in the 1950s, and then entered new industries and markets for the continued growth of their 
enterprises during the 1960s. After the third merger movement of the 1960s, referred to as the 
conglomerate merger349, many U.S. enterprises entered new businesses to try to achieve growth. 
The two large lead enterprises in the electric manufacturing industry, GE and WH, were part of 
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this community.  Despite differences between them in corporate strategy and M&A (see chapter 
2), they both had more or less similar financial standings in the early 1970s. In fact WH had 
surpassed GE in areas of financial strength, profitability and growth, as shown on table 3-1350. 
The changes in the economic environment, instigated by the Nixon Shock in 1971 and the 1973 
oil crisis, and the recession from November 1973 to March 1975 strained the financial 
performances of both firms. Although both profitability and growth indicators had become 
increasingly worse, WH’s decline was much more pronounced (see table 3-1). The second half 
of the 1970s saw the gap between them increase even further. Although both firms went onto 
recover their financial standings, as shown in figure 3-1 and table 3-1, WH was unable to fully 
recover its profitability and growth, and worsened in efficiency, while GE even improved in 
performance.  
This gap stems chiefly from decisions taken by WH top management and to a significant 
problem that was unique to WH. During the first half of the 1970s, both firms appear to respond 
similarly to the changes, by disposing of unprofitable businesses. Being comparatively less active, 
GE sold its mainframe business to Honeywell as well as a number of other businesses acquired 
in the 1960s351. WH, meanwhile, went onto to sell its portable home appliances business in 1972, 
its domestic major appliances, car rental and leasing businesses in 1975, while also acquiring 
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resort hotel, education and manufacturing-related service businesses. Althoughtnhe gap 
remained at about the same level, WH had fallen into a worse financial standing. 
Table 3- 1. Financial standings of GE and WH, 1971-1980.
 
a) Earnings before income taxes and minority interest. 
b) Earnings before income taxes and minority interest. 
c) Earnings before income taxes and minority interest. 
Source: GE, Annual Report, 1970-1980 and WH, Annual Report, 1970-1980. 
 
Figure 3- 1. Revenue and net income of GE and WH, 1970-1979. 
Source: GE, Annual Report, 1970-1979 and WH, Annual Report, 1970-1979. 
Indicator
Financial
Measurement
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
GE 128.1% 138.7% 128.4% 134.6% 140.4%
WH 210.9% 198.3% 173.6% 176.8% 140.4%
GE 40.7% 41.7% 40.5% 39.5% 43.4%
WH 50.2% 50.2% 45.3% 44.7% 41.1%
GE 11.5% 12.1% 12.2% 10.7% 9.7%
WH 11.5% 9.1% 6.6% 4.8% 5.6%
GE 8.4% 8.8% 8.7% 7.5% 7.1%
WH 8.8% 6.9% 5.1% 3.6% 4.7%
GE 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4
WH 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3
GE 8.0% 8.6% 13.0% 15.9% -0.1%
WH 7.4% 9.8% 12.1% 1.7% 1.1%
GE 42.9% 13.3% 12.8% -1.1% -5.1%
WH 74.1% -14.3% -16.2% -29.5% 33.3%
Indicator
Financial
Measurement
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Average
GE 145.2% 145.2% 141.8% 136.6% 130.2% 136.9%
WH 132.9% 130.2% 124.0% 129.1% 126.2% 154.2%
GE 43.6% 43.4% 43.8% 44.2% 44.3% 42.5%
WH 40.2% 41.5% 38.6% 33.0% 37.1% 42.2%
GE 13.5% 13.8% 14.3% 14.4% 13.5% 12.6%
WH 6.8% 7.7% 7.4% 6.7% 8.2% 7.5%
GE 10.4% 10.8% 11.0% 10.6% 10.0% 9.3%
WH 5.9% 7.0% 7.0% 6.3% 6.5% 6.2%
GE 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
WH 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3
GE 17.2% 11.6% 12.2% 14.3% 11.1% 11.2%
WH 4.8% -0.1% 8.6% 10.0% 16.1% 7.2%
GE 71.4% 16.1% 14.0% 11.1% 4.3% 17.9%
WH 31.4% 18.2% 9.8% -2.0% 21.2% 12.6%
Efficiency
Total Asset
Turnover
Growth
Sales Growth
Ordinary Income
Growthc
Financial
Strength
Current ratio
Equity Ratio
Profitability
ROAa
ROSb
Financial
Strength
Current ratio
Equity Ratio
Profitability
ROAa
ROSb
Efficiency
Total Asset
Turnover
Growth
Sales Growth
Ordinary Income
Growthc
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The turning point in their divergence occurred in the second half of the 1970s. Starting in 
1972, under Reginald Jones and his team, GE introduced the strategic management system on a 
full scale352. Although the new strategic planning system and new organizational systems, such 
as SBU (Strategic Business Unit), and Sector organization structures are fundamental aspects of 
Jones’ management approach, in terms of impact in financial standing, it is the 1976 acquisition 
of Utah International (hereafter Utah), a natural resources business, that provides the symbolic 
outcome in terms of management. Jones decided to aquire Utah as a stable and predictable 
earnings and cash-flow generator, to take advantage of its consistently high ROI and positive 
cash flows353. William Rothschild, a senior executive in Coporate Planning at the time, describes 
how he was shocked when Jones made the acquisition, mainly because the cash-generation 
expectation for Utah seemed unduly optimistic and the potential for conflict arising due to the 
dissmilarity in business and differences in the corporate cultures of GE and Utah354. However, in 
terms of financial data, GE’s financial standing started improving after the acquisiton, and Utah’s 
natural resource business generated almost 14% of operating profits up until 1980 (see table 3-
2). This supports that Utah accomplished, at least superficially, Jones’ goal even though one 
should also consider the performance of existing businesses under the economic recovery355. 
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WH, on the other hand, had to face its own specific problem. When Robert Kirby and his 
team took the helm of WH in 1975,  they had to deal with 17 lawsuits launched by 27 public 
utility customers, alleging a breach in uranium supply conracts356. WH had guaranteed uranium 
fuel deliveries to the 27 utilities at an average price of $9.50 per pound, which reflected the 
uranium price at the time, in order to help to promote the nuclear-power market357. Since sales 
of uranium was regarded as an adjunct to the sale of reactors, and was almost always done at the 
request of the reactor customer358, GE also made similar contracts. Although GE, like WH, 
guaranteed a fixed-price delivery of uranium, it hedged its risk by also contracting to purchase 
supplies at fixed prices359. Since WH, unlike GE, did not enter into similar contracts with 
suppliers, WH was forced to decline deliveries when uranium prices soared to almost $40 per 
pound in 1976360. As a result, only WH was sued by public utility customers. 
The rapid rise in uranium prices had been conspired through a cartel of 29 uranium 
producers, such as Gulf Oil Corporation361. After being sued by utility customers for two billion 
dollars in damages, WH filed a damage recovery suit against uranium producers, citing a 
violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act362. In the course of the trial WH lost $20.5 million in 
1977, $67.9 million in 1978, and $405 million in 1979363. In the end, WH, which was the 
middleman in the conflict, reached a settlement with both the 27 public utilities and the 29 
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uranium producers and, even after obtaining reparation from the uranium producers, WH still 
expended an aggregate total of $435.1 million by December 31,1980364. 
Near the end of the trial, in March 1979, the Three Mile Island accident became the most 
serious accident in the U.S. commercial nuclear power plant operating history365. It had a more 
serious affect on WH, which had regarded nuclear power systems as its key business line for 
future growth and, in response, had undertaken intensive investment in the field366. At the time, 
the WH system was present in 28 operational nuclear power plants and in 39 backlog orders in 
the domestic market, and in 16 plants and 23 backlog orders internationally367. Due to the 
accident, the market had a slowdown, several orders were cancelled, and regulatory requirements 
and governmental indecisiveness had increased368. As a result, plant constructions were delayed 
and costs increased due to the immense time it took to process the licensing of nuclear plants369. 
Even though the business remained profitable, the excess in cost reached $259 million in 1979 
and $254 million in 1980, and the excess in progress billings rose to $1,380 million in 1979 and 
$1,274 million in 1980370. These nuclear power business issues hampered WH’s financial 
standing during the second half of the 1970s and was a considerable draw on the time of top 
management. 
2. Corporate Growth and Business Structures, between 1971 and 1980 
123 
 
In terms of relative financial standing, by 1980 GE had strengthened its entire financial 
position and WH, while its position had improved, had not yet fully recovered, particularly in 
terms of profitability. Comparing performance and business structures for the two between 1971 
and 1980 provides additional consideration.  
First, one looks at the achievement of growth during the 1970s. In 1971, the total sales for 
GE were $9,425.3 million and net earnings were $471.8 million, and this increased to $24,959 
million in total revenues and $1,514 million in net earnings in 1980, these amounts do not exactly 
match those reflected in table 3-2 due to the exclusion of corporate items and eliminations371. 
The net earnings more than tripled while revenues more than doubled. On the other hand, WH’s 
total revenues amounted to $8,514.3 million in 1980, up from sales of $4,630 million in 1971, 
and net earnings went to $402.9 million from $175 million, both almost doubled during the 
1970s372. Their gaps, however, widened from 2.3 to 3 times in terms of sales and revenues and 
from 2.9 to 3.8 times in terms of net earnings (see figure 3-1). This demonsrates that GE managed 
to financially outperform WH.  
Another factor that could result in a difference in growth is the business structure. The 
power system business, the traditional core business for both GE and WH, was rapidly positioned 
differently within their respective structures. Although each power system group did not contain 
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exactly the same business units, it continued to be a vital cash-generating business for WH during 
the 1970s, much more the case than for GE, as shown in table 3-2. In addition, as cash-generators, 
they had rather different businesses in 1980, namely natural resources for GE and broadcasting 
for WH. Aside from the natural resources and broadcasting distinction, the historical 
backgrounds also differed. For example, WH had been developing its competitiveness in the U.S. 
broadcasting industry while GE introduced the natural resource business line through acquisition, 
under a strategic management decision taken in the 1970s. Regardless of these backgrounds, as 
cash-generators the two business lines accounted for almost 14% and 10% of GE and WH profits, 
and contributed 5.2% and 3% respectively to their revenues.  
A lesser, but still important, element of their business structures was the growth in financial 
service subsidiaries, namely General Electric Credit Corporation (hereafter GECC) and 
Westinghouse Credit Corporation (hereafter WCC). Contributions coming from both the 
financial service arms declined by 1980, down to 4.0% for GE and 3.3% for WH from the 1971 
levels of 6.0% at GE and 8.6% at WH373.  The difference in the growth of these businesses, 
however, was rather significant. By 1980, GECC increased its net income 3.7 times from that of 
1971, whereas the increase for WCC over the same period was only 1.5 time (see table 3-2). 
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Particularly after 1977, GE experienced an accelerated growth in GECC net income, from $67 
million in 1977 to $77 million in 1978, to $90 million in 1979 and then to $115 million in 1980374.  
Table 3- 2. GE and WH: Business segment performance for 1971 and 1980 (in millions of dollars). 
 
 
a) Net earnings. 
b) Net earnings. 
Note: The data exclude corporate items and eliminations. 
Source: GE, Annual Report, 1971, 1980, and WH, Annual Report, 1971, 1980. 
 
1971
GE Sales Net earnings
Industrial Components and Systems 2865 27.1% 141 27.4%
Consumer 2383 22.5% 106 20.6%
Industrial Power Equipment 2131 20.1% 114 22.1%
(Power Systems: estimated) 1321 12.5% 26 5.0%
Aerospace 1623 15.3% 37 7.2%
International 1584 15.0% 86 16.7%
GECC - - 31 6.0%
Total 10586 515
1980
GE Revenues Operating profit
Industrial Products and Components 5157 19.4% 568 19.6%
Consumer Products and Services 5599 21.1% 558 19.3%
Power Systems 4023 15.2% 194 6.7%
Technical Systems and Materials 7128 26.9% 774 26.7%
International 3234 12.2% 285 9.8%
GECC - - 115 4.0%
Natural Resources 1374 5.2% 404 13.9%
Total 26515 2898 (1514)
a
1971
WH Sales Net income
Power Systems 1504 32.5% 76 43.4%
Industry and Defense 2019 43.6% 61 34.9%
Consumer Products 759 16.4% -8 -4.6%
Broadcasting, Learning and Leisure Tim 304 6.6% 26 14.9%
(Broadcasting estimated) 109 2.4% 18 10.3%
Other 44 0.9% 5 2.8%
WCC - - 15 8.6%
Total 4630 175
1980
WH Revenues Operating Profit
Power Systems 2998 33.9% 272 40.7%
Industry Products 3227 36.4% 219 32.8%
Public Systems 2245 25.4% 115 17.2%
Broadcasting 267 3.0% 64 9.6%
Other 115 1.3% -24 -3.6%
WCC - - 22 3.3%
Total 8852 668 (403)
b
126 
 
3. Key Businesses and Divergence 
The fundamental factors contributing to the divergence in financial standings between 
GE and WH include the large acquisition by GE and WH’s struggle in the courts. In terms of 
actual business, the nuclear power and natural resource businesses took on a key role in extend-
ing the gap. GE top management chose natural resource as a way to counter a stagnant econ-
omy. WH top management was greatly consumed in managing the uranium problem, which 
had strong ties to nuclear power. Although both GE and WH shared a common trait as energy 
firms, their responses in the energy sector led the electrical manufacturing firms to have differ-
ent corporate standings by the 1980s. 
 
III. Managerial Perceptions: First Oil Crisis 
1. GE Perceptions and Conceptions 
The energy crisis influenced GE and WH. Especially they both had changed their per-
ception of business environment before and after the first oil crisis in 1973. But their emphasis 
of impact of the crisis was different. 
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GE’s top management quickly perceived that “Inflation is now a worldwide prob-
lem…The energy crisis is real,375” and tried to analyze the situation in order to consider an ef-
fective counterplan. As for the first oil crisis, they understood:  
“the reality is that the energy crisis was not caused by Arab sheiks, by environmental ac-
tivists, by the international oil companies, by federal energy planners, or even by profli-
gate advocates of unrestrained growth. . . . the principal cause of the energy crisis was the 
lack of institutional mechanisms capable of foreseeing and dealing with all of the com-
plex interrelated elements of the world energy situation.376” 
While considering the oil crisis as a problem of institution, they gained a good understanding of 
inflation, having the insight to separate the contributors to inflation post-1975 from that which 
occurred prior, as follows: 
      “The current double-digit inflation can trace many of its roots to the excess demand of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. . . . These rapid rising government outlays put the nation’s ex-
isting capacity to produce under substantial strain. . . .[but] As we approach 1975, inflation 
no longer reflects excess demand. . . . Now we have cost-push inflation. And it is almost 
certain to continue as the force suppressed by the wage-price controls of the past four 
years spread through the system, and the recent explosion of oil process and materials 
costs.377” 
Regarding tactics employed against the effects of inflation, GE merged with Utah International 
in 1976, proclaiming the move as “a valuable hedge against worldwide inflation.378” In addi-
tion, while taking into account economic data (see Appendix 1 and 2), the top management of 
GE concluded that the serious problem of inflation was the fundamental factor contributing to 
an investment capital shortage, capital that was essential for corporate and economic growth: 
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      “We’ve all been worried – rightly – about the energy shortage. I think there’s another short-
age that ought to worry us even more – the shortage of capital needed to energize eco-
nomic growth and employment. Fuel we can get, though the price may be high by any 
past standards. But capital we cannot get unless we have sharp reversal in the anti-profit, 
anti-business attitudes and policies that have been rotting out the very foundations of our 
economy.379” 
Although there is a fundamental difference of focus between the oil crisis and inflation, GE 
urged the U.S. government to cope with these problems through strong and pointed criticism, 
to change the government policy lens from one that was consumer-oriented380” to one that 
would be on “production side.381” The recommendations include tax reform, dealing with gov-
ernment spending, and deregulation of nuclear plants and other businesses. 
While contending with changing government economic policy, GE, as a power system 
company, also had to deal with the energy problem. After the oil crisis, GE embarked on multi-
ple responses to cope with the energy situation. GE did not focus on a particular technology, 
such as nuclear energy, but instead pursued multiple equipment and infrastructures as energy 
options. Due to the prevailing obstacles facing nuclear plants, such as regulation, technological 
development, uncertainty over the supply of enriched uranium, plutonium treatment, etc., the 
utility industry decided to move away from nuclear plants and turned to gas turbines382.  This 
led to the situation whereby “General Electric’s backlog of gas turbine orders is now the largest 
in our history.383” Another part of the reason is that GE had been less competitive in the nuclear 
energy field 384.  
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GE’s top management then took a slightly more positive attitude to nuclear power, be-
ginning in 1977. Nuclear resurfaced as one of the other options for further growth of energy 
when they stated: 
“Over the long term, into the next century, nuclear fission will not be the end-all, be-all 
energy source. But until such new sources as solar and fusion can be developed, coal and 
nuclear fission – together with what additional oil and gas may be available – are the only 
options that can provide the time and the bridge we need to manage the next transition in 
U.S. energy supply.385” 
In 1978, while contending that whether it is coal or nuclear that would be the main option for 
increasing US energy supply would largely depend on government policy, they started to re-
gard nuclear as not the option of last resort but one of the first options386. 
GE’s top management perceived that the vital concern was the treatment of inflation, un-
derstood to be of more concern than the oil crisis because it undermined the capital investment 
that was needed for growth through improved productivity. On the other hand, they accepted 
the uncertainty of what would emerge as the next new energy source, and therefore took a posi-
tion that could respond to any possible situation, although nuclear power was clearly regarded 
as the most viable resource in the end. 
2. WH Perceptions and Conceptions 
While GE’s top management was in the process of perceiving the problems of inflation 
and the oil crisis, WH’s top management were also perceived these situations in a manner that 
was both somewhat similar and somewhat different. Regarding the concerns of an energy 
shortage generated by the oil crisis, WH perceived that the “energy shortage is clearly not of a 
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temporary nature,387” and coal and uranium were the possible candidates for substitutes to oil 
because other energy sources such as geothermal, solar, wind and tides were likely to be of mi-
nor importance388. However, they then adopted nuclear energy as the main long-term solution 
to the energy problem and in the expansion of the uses of electricity, while shifting to an elec-
tric economy389. Much can be attributed to overcoming historical difficulties in the introduction 
of electric power in the early 20th century, as a parallel to the situation of nuclear energy390, and 
WH’s had gained confidence as having “pioneered the development of nuclear power.391”  On 
the other hand, inflation was regarded as the main factor of wage and cost of living increases392. 
The situation under the oil crisis and inflation was understood to be negatively influencing the 
electrical equipment industry, as they stated: 
 “It [electrical equipment industry] grew in a `Benign Circle.393  `. . . This circle began to 
disintegrate in about 1972. . . . Somewhat later, specifically, with the Arab oil embargo of 
1973, there came a sharp rise in the cost of energy. Suddenly, for the first time, electric 
utilities began to see the real constraints on their growth. . . . As if that were not enough, 
other problems developed. An upward spiral of construction costs, a sharp increase in in-
terest rates on borrowed money. The construction time for major capital projects, notable 
nuclear power plants, stretched out. 394” 
Behind such an understanding of the situation, they emphasized energy as a basis for increasing 
economic prosperity. There was a necessity for an expansion of nuclear plants, based on the as-
sumption that the likely scenario was a medium growth in nuclear power coupled with a maxi-
mum use of coal, as well as deregulation and a new government policy for support395. This un-
derstanding and their actions reinforced the underlying perception that “the `essence  `of West-
inghouse is the vital role we are playing in the energy field.396” 
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Hence, based on the understanding that the outlook of growth was electricity, they re-
placed many of their unprofitable, non-electric businesses with a commitment of returning to 
their core business line, namely electricity, in other words “Westinghouse is transforming itself 
back into a profitable electrical company.397” In particular it focused on the generation, trans-
mission, distribution and efficient utilization of energy398. This is quite opposed to the prevail-
ing 1973 perception that “WH is moving into the services industries, which certainly will be the 
high-profit area of the future399”. 
WH’s top management perceived that the oil crisis was a great opportunity for WH as a 
leading company in the building of nuclear plants, and that it had bright outlook for corporate 
growth as an electrical equipment company. To address inflation, they divested unprofitable 
business and introduced a program to improve productivity, but this assumed that they would 
achieve a reduction of the price of electricity through nuclear energy as one of the ways to com-
bat against inflation. That is, the nuclear power business was perceived as the solution for both 
the oil crisis and inflation. 
3. Differences in Actions during the Stagnation  
Although both GE’s and WH’s top management faced the same situation, there is a cer-
tain difference in their perceptions. GE was concerned more about finding solutions to inflation 
while WH emphasized more the opportunity that the energy crisis posed for corporate growth. 
These top management perceptions were reflected on their corporate behaviors. Taking up their 
respective R&D planning, one can examine verify how these plans are reflective of their be-
haviors400.  
In the early 1970s, WH invested more in R&D than GE401 and was considered to have a 
strong technological capability. For instance, GE understood WH to be characterized as: a 
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strong broad program in motors, controls, drives, automation equipment; as excellent work in 
transformers, switchgear, wire and cable, and ballast; as ineffective in home appliances, 
housewares, lighting, distribution equipment, commercial equipment, medical systems; as 
strong in steam turbines in turbine products; major push in drives and controls in locomotives, 
transit systems, off-highway vehicles402. On the other hand, GE planned to increase corporate 
R&D expenditures in the 1970s after cutting off the budget in the late 1960s403. Corporate 
R&D of GE was concentrated in a broad range of technology, from signal electronics and en-
ergy generation to communications and quality of life technologies404. 
Subsequent to the first oil crisis and the economic recessions in 1974 and 1975, both firms 
took account of these experiences and reflected them in their respective R&D plans. WH’s top 
management perceived that there was an opportunity in the power energy field. This is indi-
cated through the founding of the Advanced Power Systems Division in 1976, which was the 
former Astronuclear Laboratory, but was also clearly influential in the R&D program in 1976 
as shown figure 3-2. It reflects “a heavy emphasis on programs of importance to the Power 
Systems Company. . . , it is easy to estimate that 50 to 60 percent of the entire Laboratories’ ef-
fort might be classified as ‘for Power Systems’.405”  
Besides the power system, advanced technology (e.g. biological sciences, materials, de-
sign techniques) was also the target for the corporate R&D effort. However, some of the power 
system programs were affected by the decreased funding in R&D of 1978 on table 3-3. This is 
attributed to issues in completing program goals or other existing problems, and the program 
related to power systems remained essentially constant in the level of effort406. 
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Figure 3- 2. Research program of WH in 1976. 
Source: “Strategic Plan, 1976-1980,” box168, folder 13, Records of the Westinghouse Electric Corpora-
tion, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania Senator John Heinz History Center. 
 
Table 3- 3. WH prioritized candidates for increased / decreased funding in 1978. 
 
Source: “Strategic Plan, 1978-1982,” box169, folder 1, Records of the Westinghouse Electric Corpora-
tion, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania Senator John Heinz History Center 
 
On the other hand, when looking at the perception of GE’s top management, which does 
not actively emphasize a particular business line such a power system, it is reflected in GE’s 
R&D investment to some degree. On figure 3-3 and table 3-4, it reveals that, although power 
generation related R&D funds tends to increase with growing external funds, it remains a stable 
amount of funds.  
Increasing Program Fund Decreasing Program Fund
Computer Based Automation, Desgn and ControlBatteries
Design Services Coal Gasfication and Fossil Fuel Treatment
Generator(Electric) Heating, Refrigeration and Air Conditioing
Laser Chemistry and Optical Synthesis Homopolar Machinery
Gas Turbine
Laser, Gas
Liquid Metals
Nuclear Reactors
Power Conditioning
Uranium, Exploration and Production
WH
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Figure 3- 3. Investment of R&D in the power generation and delivery business of GE. 
Source: CRD Back up Data of Activities 1978, C. 
 
Table 3- 4. Growth trends for company funded RD&E of GE from 1977 to 1979. 
 
Source: CRD Back up Data of Activities 1978, D. 
 
Notably, it plans to invest in the technological systems and materials sector, which is given re-
sponsibility for a wide range of the company’s high-technology and materials businesses, in-
cluding aircraft engines, diverse types of aerospace products, a variety of man-made materials, 
medical systems, mobile radio, data communication products, and information services. This is 
reflected in the research program candidates for incremental funding as shown on table 3-5. 
Moreover one can presume that investment in high-technology reflects a business of significant 
capital investment, and serves as a proxy of the prevailing management perception. 
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Table 3- 5. GE prioritized candidates for increased / decreased funding in 1978. 
 
Source: CRD Back up Data of Activities 1978, D. 
 
These investments in high-technology is actually reflected on GE managerial perception, 
which more emphasized on the inflation. In addition to a merger with Utah, new management-
education program was developed as the major managerial action as a solution of inflation for 
GE. “Effectively Coping with Inflation,” or COIN was the program which helps managers un-
derstand chronic high inflation, realized how it distorts financial data, and learn how to mini-
mize its impact407. This program was the product of study on inflation “to learn to live with 
it408” in GE. Through the program, it indicated the expansion of service and high-technology 
was the strategic response to inflation409. Thus the reason of increasing R&D investment in 
high-tech was the response to inflation. 
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IV. Same Situation, Different Perceptions 
This chapter examines how the top managements of GE and WH perceived the changes 
in external environment, conceived blueprints for the future, and behaved with a defined ap-
proach during the 1970s. In the stagnate economy, GE and WH began financially diverging af-
ter the first oil crisis. The fundamental factors of the divergence were a big merger with Utah 
by GE in 1976 and WH own problems with uranium contract from 1975. The former greatly 
improved GE financial standing and the latter aggravated WH financial standing.  
The turning point of both firms was the first oil crisis in 1973. After the crisis, uranium 
price rapidly increased and inflation was drastically accelerated. Each top management re-
sponded to the oil crisis differently. Emphasized more the opportunity that the energy crisis 
posed for corporate growth, WH saw nuclear power business as the solution against inflation 
and lower corporate growth behind its superior competitiveness in the business and lagging 
competitiveness in conventional steam and gas turbines. Subsequently R&D investment went 
to power system business. GE was concerned more about finding solutions to inflation. Fol-
lowing the study of the strategy for inflation, GE acquired the natural resource business as a 
valuable hedge against worldwide inflation, educated their manager to formulate adequate 
strategy under inflation, and endorsed the expansion of service and high-technology business as 
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a way of the solution for corporate growth. The emphasis of high-technology was reflected on 
its R&D investment while power business was not regarded as the key strategy unlike WH. 
This set of different action of the 1970s between them led GE to achieve further growth 
even in stagnate economy and WH to become sluggish. As a major result, their financial stand-
ings were diverged by the end of the 1970s. 
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Chapter 4 
Managing Restructuring in the Emergence of “Mega-Competition,” from 1980 to 1999  
"the law of selection trumps the dominant gene."  
Haruki Murakami, Colorless Tsukuru Tazaki and His Years of Pilgrimage 
 
This chapter explores historical factors that drove the divergent corporate transformations 
of GE and WH in the 1990s. 
The last two decades of the twentieth century served as an important turning point, not just 
for the U.S. economy and industrial enterprises but also on a global scale. New technologies and 
political agendas led to an accelerated globalization of the economy and heightened competition, 
resulting in a regrowth of the U.S. economy in the so-called “new economy” of the 1990s. New 
information, electronics, and transport technologies enabled a reduction in the costs of interna-
tional communications and shipping410. International capital mobility increased through the in-
troduction of new technologies and the spread of financial deregulation around the world, while 
institutional investors became major providers of financial capital411. Although U.S. business 
enterprises were faced with a changing composition of the workforce and increased labor costs, 
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technological changes permitted companies to export jobs to countries with lower labor costs 
even though migrant flows were still tightly restricted at the time412. In addition, since numerous 
countries were following a worldwide trend to reduce tariffs, this increased access to foreign 
markets during a period when international trade was growing413. Moreover, the end of the Cold 
War saw former Communist countries in Eastern Europe and China begin a shift toward becom-
ing market economies. The end result saw the world economy go into full-scale globalization, 
an environment of “mega-competition”414. U.S. industrial enterprises were challenged by global 
competition more than ever before. 
In order to stand up to this new level of global competition, large U.S. industrial enterprises 
were obligated to refocus on core business lines, their core competencies, through a restructuring 
of their businesses and organizations415. As Constantinos Markides416 examines, during the 
1980s in the U.S. there were two movements at play, one where overdiversified enterprises were 
found to be refocusing and another where underdiversified firms were increasing their level of 
diversification, however both these movements had the same common objective of sharpening 
the overall focus on core and related businesses. During the same period, changes in public policy 
had impacts on large U.S. enterprises, though deregulation, anti-inflation measures, and relaxa-
tion of antitrust policy417. This trend in U.S. enterprises went hand in hand with the great merger 
140 
 
movement that accompanied restructuring and asset redeployment418. This, the forth merger 
movement in U.S history, was accelerated by innovations in financial services, such as the intro-
duction of leveraged buy-outs (LBO), managerial buy-outs (MBO) and junk bonds419.  
However, according to Bronwyn Hall’s analysis, the level and degree of merger move-
ment varied between U.S. industries. LBO and other private acquisitions of publicly traded man-
ufacturing firms overwhelmingly took place in low-tech and in parts of stable-tech industries, 
such as food and textiles, in sectors where R&D investment and innovation was deemed to be of 
less importance420. With her data and findings, Alfred Chandler then went onto suggest that the 
high-tech industries and the other parts of stable-tech industries were less prone to financial re-
structuring when long-term investments, such as in R&D, where present because these enter-
prises were successful in making the required long-term investments and, as a result, remained 
powerful competitors in the midst of global competition421. Thus, as Takashi Hikino summarizes, 
capital markets were instrumental in the reorganization of mature, low-tech industries, whereas 
the growing high-tech field was often supported by internal growth of the enterprise422.  
GE and WH were also members of the movement to restructure business. In fact, from 
1981 to 1984 GE divested 152 businesses while acquiring another 232, meanwhile WH, between 
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1980 and 1984, sold off 15 and acquired 39423. However, in the course of this restructuring move-
ment the firms further extended the gap in performance and underwent different corporate trans-
formations by the end of the century. While GE maintained its lead position in the steam turbine 
business, and concurrently built competitiveness in new businesses such as financial services, 
WH was not only divesting its traditional business but also all other manufacturing businesses as 
it transformed itself into a media company, renamed as CBS Corporation. How did this restruc-
turing movement relate to the divergent transformations that followed? 
The early 1990s was the critical turning point, a period when WH was saddled with huge 
debt built up by its financial services subsidiary. After the recession of the early 1990s, GE was 
achieving growth with a much more accelerated M&A strategy while WH commenced its drastic 
restructuring to become a broadcasting business. Although poor management of the financial 
subsidiary is the direct reason, another factor should be considered. Before its debt crisis, WH 
was unable to accomplish sufficient growth to both cover the losses generated by financial ser-
vices and avoid selling off high-tech businesses. On the other hand, GE managed to deal with 
the problems of its financial services subsidiary through high growth and by generating enough 
earnings from the steam turbine business in spite of the emergence of global competition. Thus, 
in order to gain a deeper understanding of the divergent transformations between the firms in the 
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1990s, it is necessary to explore how GE and WH conducted their respective restructurings in 
the 1980s. 
Although this restructuring in the 1980s is a vital aspect for explaining the transformation 
that ensued, there exists little in the way of comparative studies that provide detail on their re-
structuring, at least beyond just the large M&A cases, particularly in the case of WH. 
Denise Fleck provides the most comprehensive examination of GE and WH. Her exami-
nation covers over a hundred years, analyzing various sorts of secondary data to reveal two dis-
tinct traits regarding the continued growth of the firms, and it is these traits that led to the signif-
icant divergence in GE and WH performance424. One of the traits is organization-related. GE was 
managing and organizing its business resources through integration efforts and a systematic ap-
proach, with strong top coordination coming from the well-developed managerial hierarchy, 
while WH resources were managed by a fragmented and piecemeal approach characterized by 
weak top-level coordination and oversight, which came from a poorly developed managerial 
hierarchy 425. The other trait is business-related, in terms of the characteristics of the way the 
businesses were managed. GE pursued ambitious and forceful goals, aimed at building a finan-
cially sound business while instilling motivation to pursue technological improvements, innova-
tion and to handle changes in the environment. WH’s less ambitious goals were aimed at building 
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a financially satisfactory business with a tendency to manage change without a similar motiva-
tion to innovation and technology426. In the process of building these organizational and business 
traits, GE had a stronger presence in high-tech and developed a good capacity for risk manage-
ment, while WH was less inclined to high-tech and disregarded risk427. The historical traits reveal 
that GE fostered a self-perpetuating destiny while WH pursued a self-destructing destiny, allow-
ing GE to manage the troubles of its financial subsidiary and effectively manage both old and 
new businesses whereas WH took significant financial hits that led to its decay and its exit from 
the financial services business428.  
Spanning over a century in time, Fleck’s analysis provides a rich historical context and 
comprehensive perspective to the divergence of GE and WH, including raising organization 
structures as contributing factors to this divergence. Outside of her research purpose, her study 
does not fully examine the restructurings that occurred in the 1980s nor the reason why WH 
divested its traditional core business. There is no doubt, of course, that GE in the end succeeded 
in being superior to WH, but further investigation of the restructurings is required to develop a 
deeper understanding of the corporate transformations that occurred. 
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Taking GE and WH as representative cases, Nohria, Dyer and Dalzell’s study focuses on 
the 1974-2000 period but also brings in a comparison to other corporate transformations under-
taken by a number of U.S. industrial enterprises listed on the Fortune 100. Within this broader 
examination of U.S. industrial corporate transformations, the study draws comparisons from the 
process of transformation undertaken by GE and WH over the period of study. According to their 
findings, GE’s top management created more opportunity and choice for growth by acknowl-
edging the need to change earlier than WH, while the top management of WH shifted its priorities 
from the pursuit of growth to the pursuit of shareholder value while being reluctant to other 
changes429. The contrasted transformations that resulted came from dramatic changes taking 
place within the enterprises, such as in corporate strategy, structure, management systems, and 
governance, all in response to a America’s shift from an industrial economy that was based on 
physical assets and production, to a post industrial economy that, due to the impact of new infor-
mation technology and social and demographic changes, was based on intangible assets and ser-
vices430. In the case of WH, the study raises that institutional investors (e.g. Calpers) were partic-
ularly influential up to the turning point431. The study somewhat positively assesses the transfor-
mation of WH, rather raising it as a failure, due to the focus taken from a shareowner’s perspec-
tive432. 
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O’Sullivan’s analysis complements this point. Exploring the role of the U.S. financial sys-
tem in providing funding to GE and WH, she raises that investments in working capital deter-
mined the patterns for financial dependence and autonomy433. GE, until the 1990s, relatively 
declined its financial dependence by more successfully achieving efficiencies in its use of work-
ing capital, while WH continued to rely on external funding to invest in working capital rather 
than pursuing efficiency in its operations434. Her argument implies that WH, more than GE, was 
left with relatively less autonomy and needed to be concerned with its investor value. The find-
ings contend that investors both directly and indirectly influenced WH’s restructuring and trans-
formation over the last two decades of the century. 
Nohria, Dyer and Dalzell’s study provides a detailed context of the transformation as well 
as insight into the relationship between business environmental changes and responses by the top 
management of GE and WH. Their findings on the two transformations cover not only internal 
factors of the firms but also external factors, which are partially supported by the O’Sullivan 
study. The main purpose of study was to provide a broad perspective of the changing paradigm 
for large industrial enterprises in the new economy, however, it provides less clarification on how 
the restructuring actually progressed, how it affected traditional business lines, and how it was 
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influenced by historical drivers other than mention of management impacts from previous dec-
ades.  
In addition to these studies, there are numerous other studies of GE which cover the 1980s 
and 1990s, less so for WH. For instance, Francis Aguilar, in providing restructuring information 
and a variety of corporate data, contends that corporate strategy was the key to success for GE. 
Meanwhile, Alfred Chandler points out that GE’s strategic control, through tight controlled 
budgets and clearly defined strategic targets, was a factor of success435. While Kazuichi Sa-
kamoto provides an overview of the restructuring and organizational change, and Keiji Natsume 
demonstrates the influence corporate strategy has on corporate performance and American soci-
ety, Noel Tichy and Stanford Sherman and William Rothschild describe in detail the restructur-
ing and reorganization of GE under CEO Jack Welch436. Comparing GE to Toshiba Corporation, 
Akitake Taniguchi and Shin Hasegawa propose that GE created its new enterprise system 
through restructuring and organizational innovations, which differs from the Chandler’s model, 
while Yasuyuki Kamigusa points out the main characteristic of GE’s restructuring was an effi-
ciency in capital investment437. According to these studies, it can be said that corporate strategy 
and restructuring are the fundamental elements of corporate transformation, and a vital factor in 
GE’s new enterprise system was the strategic control exercised by its headquarters. William 
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Ocasio and John Joseph further examine this aspect though close analysis to define the structure 
behind this new strategic control at GE438.  In the last two decades of the century, GE combined 
both new and old businesses by improving its annual planning cycle, through the GE Operating 
System, which saw a shift in the role of top management from one of coordinating planning with 
budgeting, to one centered on coordinating strategy formulation with implementation through 
corporate initiatives439. 
Although these studies verify many aspects of GE’s restructuring and the changes behind 
transformation, it is left relatively unclear how GE’s restructuring differs from that WH, mainly 
because focus is placed exclusively on GE, seeks to compare large U.S. enterprises in different 
industries, or compares similar business enterprises in different countries. In addition, there is not 
much attention paid to the interaction between corporate strategy and traditional business lines, 
such as steam turbine. Thus it is necessary to investigate another aspect of GE’s restructuring, 
with a comparison to WH, to fully understand the divergent transformations that took place. This 
is because the refocusing was not simply limited to where they had competiveness, such as their 
core business lines or high-tech business. The diversification also went to service businesses and 
included some divesting from high-tech and core businesses.  
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The reason this has not been explored sufficiently is mainly due to a limitation in the avail-
ability of research materials. This chapter combines a variety of secondary source and historical 
documents to overcome this limitation, as follows. The tendencies in M&A approaches of both 
firms examined through data provided in the Thomson One Banker’s Mergers and Acquisitions 
database. Although the data does not cover all M&A cases, particularly for the 1980s, it still 
provides an understanding of differences between the two. For the restructuring, research infor-
mation and data is lacking on WH because it was not a popular topic of examination during the 
period, while GE was often selected as a research subject. To address this gap, an examination 
of WH’s historical documents in the Records of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation is pur-
sued, including some business restructuring and M&A data from the time. In addition, the annual 
reports of GE and WH serve as the basis for determining the turning points in corporate transfor-
mations and top management perceptions. Regarding competition in core business lines, the 
steam turbine industry is examined by using data from secondary sources, found in Anna Bergek, 
Fredrik Tell, Christian Berggren and Jim Watson, “Technological Capabilities and Late 
Shakeouts: Industrial Dynamics in the Advanced Gas Turbine Industry, 1987-2002,” Industrial 
and Corporate Change 17, no. 2 (2008): 225-392, and Mike Curtis, “United States: Advanced 
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Turbine System,” in Innovation in Energy Technology: Comparing National Innovation Systems 
at the Sectoral Level (Paris, France: OECD Publishing, 2006) 295-317. 
Using these materials, this chapter examines why past actions led to different corporate 
transformations and business competitiveness in the traditional business of GE and WH.  
The next section quantitatively verifies the final point of divergence between GE and WH, 
particularly in terms of corporate investment and performance. The early 1990s is shown as the 
point of divergence. The subsequent section shows the degree to which GE and WH maintained 
their global competitiveness against foreign competitor in the steam turbine industry. It is ar-
gued that the previous corporate strategies affected their relative competitiveness when the com-
bined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) arrived as the new main product in the steam turbine industry. 
The following section clarifies how historical factors influenced their business restructurings 
during the period. Thus it is shown that the destiny of both firms was largely dependent on 
actions by their top managements taken in the 1980s. In the end, it is revealed that it is an accu-
mulation of past managerial actions taken by GE and WH that largely influenced their relative 
competitiveness in the steam turbine industry as well as the divergent transformations in the 
1990s.  The two had similar conceptions when faced with a changing business environment, 
150 
 
but past diversifications and the resulting financial standings did not offer the same options for 
managerial responses. 
 
II. Divergence in Corporate Transformation440 
1. A Crucial Period of Transformation 
Although both firms were experiencing low growth and profitability in the 1970s, WH, 
without doubt, was facing a much tougher financial situation in the late 1970s, as shown in fig-
ures 4-1 and 4-2. WH was faced with uranium price contract problems with customers and had 
to defend against 17 lawsuits launched by 27 public utility customers, a process that lasted from 
1975 until the contract litigation settlements in 1979441. As a consequence, the settlements from 
these legal actions caused $493 million in losses to WH. Meanwhile, in 1976 GE was in the 
process of merging with the natural resources company, Utah International, in order to increase 
its profitability. It was also further strengthening its financial base by introducing strategic man-
agement tools (e.g. SBU, PPM), and new organizational models, such as the Sector organiza-
tional structure442.  
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Figure 4- 1. Revenues of GE and WH, 1970-1989 ($ millions). 
Source: GE, Annual Report, various years and WH, Annual Report, various years. 
Note: Revenues consist of sales and other income including financial business net earnings. The consoli-
dation with financial business revenue started from 1988. 
 
 
Figure 4- 2. Net earnings of GE and WH, 1970-1989 ($ millions). 
Source: GE, Annual Report, various years and WH, Annual Report, various years. 
 
Since the gap of their respective business sizes extended through the 1970s, GE was al-
ready three times the business size of WH by 1980. GE’s consolidated revenue, when the fi-
nancial services division is factored out, grew 10 to 8 times larger by the late 1990s. Up to the 
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time WH’s financial services business problem became visible in 1990443, both firms had suc-
ceeded in gradually increasing net income through the 1980s, as shown on figure 4-2.  The di-
vergence in financial standings had influence on the amount of investments undertaken during 
the two decades, as reflected in figure 4-3, a period which sees WH’s investment increasing at a 
relatively lower rate than that of GE. 
 
Figure 4- 3. Investments of GE and WH, 1974-1999 ($ millions). 
Source: GE, Annual Report, various years, WH, Annual Report, various years, CBS Corporation, Annual 
Report, various years, CBS Corporation, Form 10-K, various years. 
 
Their investment approaches were reflected in the process of corporate transformation. 
Entering the 1980s, GE and WH commenced the process of restructuring their business portfo-
lios. During the Reaganomics period, starting in 1981, GE took a “No.1 or No.2” strategy un-
der new CEO Jack Welch and executed a series of large scale mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
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to restructure itself. GE divested 152 businesses, including Utah International, and obtained 232 
businesses through acquisitions, joint ventures, formations of new companies, and other equity 
investments from 1981 to 1984444. Meanwhile, WH was also acquiring and divesting busi-
nesses under an alternate management tool, Vabastram (the Value Based Strategic Manage-
ment System), though with far less volume of M&A when compared to GE. Although both en-
tered the Factory Automation business through M&A and sold off electrical appliances, WH 
made acquisitions in nuclear service, beverage bottling, broadcasting, and divested some of its 
broadcasting and businesses in the educational division. Meanwhile, GE obtained software ser-
vices, insurance companies and disposed of its natural resources businesses. Although revenues 
were stable, both GE and WH increased net income 1.5 times from 1980 until 1985 (see fig-
ures 4-1 and 4-2). As reflected in figure 4-3, the increase in investments in the first half of the 
1980s for both companies was more than that of the entire 1970s.  
The last half of the 1980s was a business growth period for both GE and WH, centered 
on M&A and boosted by an international relaxation of monetary restrictions that resulted in the 
development and expansion of the global financial market. Both companies rode this wave. GE 
expanded their financial service subsidiaries through M&A, acquiring financial businesses such 
as Kidder Peabody Group, Navistar Financial Corporation, D&K Financial Corporation and 
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Montgomery Ward Credit Corporation. In addition to financial businesses, GE merged Radio 
Corporation of America (RCA) and other businesses in order to strengthen its holdings in lines 
such as medical equipment, plastics and locomotives, while parting with a set of RCA business, 
with the exception of NBC, and business related to factory automation and TV manufacturing. 
WH mergers, on the other hand, focused mainly on broadcasting, furniture, nuclear service, 
real estate, and business related to residential construction, while it divested elevator, transmis-
sion and distribution equipment businesses. Starting in 1986 the increases in volumes of invest-
ment began to differ between GE and WH, as seen in Figure 4-3. Whereas WH had a relatively 
low level of investment, with a downward trend, GE maintained a high level that was generally 
on an increased slope. Going back to figure 4-1 and4-2, one can see that GE grew its business 
size and net income while WH was relatively stable on both up until the end of the 1980s.  
All things considered, in the 1980s GE and WH pursued different paths in their respec-
tive business portfolios even though they were both competing in the similar business fields of 
power systems, industrial appliances and defense electronics. GE strengthened its high-tech in-
dustry holdings and financial services while WH placed more weight on services and relatively 
low-tech industries. There is at least one point in common in their M&A decisions in the 1980s. 
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Their corporate management decisions on business portfolios were largely affected by path-de-
pendence, in that they would generally select a business that was within the business lines they 
possessed prior to 1980, although there are a few exceptions, rather than enter into entirely new 
ones,445. These decisions were later reflected in the business growth that resulted in the late 
1980s. 
The last decade in the 20th century also serves as the last decade of the story between 
GE and WH. In 1992, both firms’ revenues declined to certain degrees. Timed to high income 
attained in 1993, GE divested the aerospace business to Martin Marietta, in order to strategi-
cally pull out of the munitions industry, which saw firms scrambling to downsize once demand 
had ebbed after the cold war. Meanwhile, WH disposed of its financial business, Westinghouse 
Financial Services, which had losses that inflated like a balloon until it burst in 1991446. Subse-
quently, as on figure 4-4 and 4-5, GE’s revenue and investment amounts were on the increase 
while WH never recovered to pre-1992 levels, even after it transformed itself into a media cor-
poration as CBS. GE remained as an industrial corporation with new profitable business lines 
and WH was transformed to a media service company by the close of the decade. 
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Figure 4- 4. Revenues of GE and WH, 1988-2000 ($ millions). 
Source: GE, Annual Report, various years, WH, Annual Report, various years, CBS Corporation, Annual 
Report, various years, CBS Corporation, Form 10-K, various years, and Viacom, Form 10-K, various 
years. 
Note: Revenues consist of sales and other income including financial business net earnings. The consolida-
tion with financial business revenue started from 1988. 
 
 
Figure 4- 5. Net earnings of GE and WH, 1988-2000 ($ millions). 
Source: GE, Annual Report, various years, WH, Annual Report, various years, CBS Corporation, Annual Re-
port, various years, CBS Corporation, Form 10-K, various years, and Viacom, Form 10-K, various years. 
 
The early 1990s signal the final point of divergence for both companies as industrial cor-
porations, as reflected in figure 4-6, when GE and WH clearly take opposite trajectories in the 
period 1992 to 1997. While both increased their investment ratios, GE continued to increase net 
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income and business size while WH saw reductions in both. This emerged from something that 
occurred in the previous term, from 1987 to 1991. GE’s ratio for business growth increased and 
investment reduced, while its net income ratio was going up, largely because GE’s business 
growth expanded more than its increase in investment, and its restructuring of industrial busi-
ness lines was fundamentally completed by 1986. WH experienced a decline in all of its varia-
bles during the same period. In contrast to GE, WH saw decreased investments and net income 
as a result of its business portfolios and financial crisis. In the other three periods GE and WH 
took similar paths, mainly because they were both industrial corporations operating under simi-
lar macro-economic circumstances. Both of the industrial corporations were hard pressed to in-
crease profits with any degree of significance in the 1970s, a period that posed a major chal-
lenge for all American firms. In the 1980s, they both restructured their businesses and organiza-
tions under Reaganomics, which provided the platform for realignment of American firms. It is 
vital to point out what both GE and WH did as far back as the 1970s to 1980s, as the lead up to 
the last decades of the 20th century. 
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Figure 4- 6. Correlation of investment and performance for GE and WH, 1972-1997. 
Source: GE, Annual Report, various years, WH, Annual Report, various years, CBS Corporation, Annual 
Report and Form 10-K, various years. 
Note: All data take a five-year moving average. As a result, although the observed period from which 
the data is taken is from 1970 to1999, the actual analyzed period is reduced to 1972-97. Both the busi-
ness growth rate and investments increasing rate are processed through (1) calculating the ratio to the 
previous year, and (2) taking an average for every five-years (e.g. 1972-76, 1977-81). Net income as a 
percent of revenue is averaged for every five-years (e.g. 1972-76, 1977-81). Only the last set of three 
data represents a six-year average, 1992-97. This model has been modified to allow for international 
comparison. For detail, see Addendum A. 
 
2. The Start of Transformation 
GE and WH were responding to changes in the economic, political and social environ-
ment, post American Century, with similarities and differences shown in the two decades prior 
to 1990s, as evidenced by their respective investment trajectories447. 
During the weak economic period of the 1970s and early 1980s, Reginald Jones (tenure: 
1972 - 1981) took the helm of GE and Ronald Kirby (tenure: 1975 - 1983) was the CEO of 
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WH. Although there were some similarities, such as both companies having an MBA-holding 
CEO and both introducing strategic management tools (GE Matrix and PIMS at GE, Vabas-
tram at WH), the GE business structure was already different to some degree from that of WH, 
as a result of the business expansion period from the 1950s to the 1960s. A very significant ex-
ample of coping with the effects of 1970s inflation occurred when Jones acquired Utah Interna-
tional in 1976, at the time the largest merger in the U.S. corporate history, choosing an entry 
into the natural resources business to attain growth in profitability448. GE managed periods of 
inflation through diversifying and strengthening its materials sector, including chemicals, met-
allurgical products and natural resources, as well as services, including financial, information, 
broadcasting, installation maintenance and repair services, transportation equipment centered 
on aircraft engines and locomotives, and international operations449. Meanwhile WH strength-
ened its existing businesses through investments and M&A, while coping with the uranium 
pricing problem and the Three Mile Island Accident. Of note, WH, under CEO Kirby, an-
nounced in 1980 that it had acquired one of the nation's largest cable TV systems, the Tele-
prompter Corporation.  The deal, concluded in 1981, was to complement its historic strength in 
broadcasting and served as the biggest acquisition in the history of WH450. 
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The natural resources business for GE and broadcasting business for WH were the key 
contributors to profitability, as seen on table 4-1.  
Table 4- 1. GE and WH revenue and operating profit (%) by segment, 1977-1980. 
 
Source: GE, Annual Report, various years and WH, Annual Report, various years. 
Note: The table includes intersegment sales and excludes “interest and other financial charges” and 
“corporate items and eliminations” 
 
Although both businesses accounted for a low share of the overall revenue structure, they com-
prised more than a ten percent share of operating profits. While their business portfolios varied 
to some degree, GE and WH took rather similar responses in terms of investment in the 1970s 
to early 1980s. Both consistently increased the investment ratio in new plants, improved facilities, 
increased capital expenditure, slightly increased the R&D ratio, and maintained a stable ratio in 
marketing and administration expenditure up until 1982, as shown in figures 4-7 and 4-8. Even 
though they extended or entered into non-manufacturing business, both relied on their industrial 
business until early into the 1980s. 
GE 1977 1978 1979 1980
Revenue
(%)
Operating
Profit (%)
Revenue
(%)
Operating
Profit (%)
Revenue
(%)
Operating
Profit (%)
Revenue
(%)
Operating
Profit (%)
Consumer Products and Services 22.1% 22.4% 22.8% 23.5% 22.3% 21.3% 21.0% 19.3%
Power Systems 17.1% 7.6% 16.6% 8.1% 14.8% 6.5% 15.1% 6.7%
Industrial Products and Components 19.7% 17.0% 19.6% 17.5% 20.0% 18.2% 19.4% 19.6%
Technical Systems and Materials 22.0% 22.0% 22.6% 22.4% 25.2% 25.3% 26.8% 26.7%
Foreign Multi-industry Operations 13.6% 9.8% 13.2% 10.1% 12.1% 9.1% 12.1% 9.8%
GE Credit Coporation 0.4% 3.1% 0.4% 3.2% 0.4% 3.4% 0.4% 4.0%
Utah International 5.1% 18.1% 4.9% 15.3% 5.2% 16.2% 5.2% 13.9%
WH 1977 1978 1979 1980
Revenue
(%)
Operating
Profit (%)
Revenue
(%)
Operating
Profit (%)
Revenue
(%)
Operating
Profit (%)
Revenue
(%)
Operating
Profit (%)
Public Systems 22.3% 16.1% 22.5% 20.2% 23.7% 18.1% 25.4% 17.2%
Power Systems 37.2% 26.6% 35.3% 27.2% 34.0% 34.2% 33.9% 40.8%
Industry Products 36.5% 51.7% 38.0% 44.5% 38.1% 40.0% 36.5% 32.7%
Broadcasting 2.8% 12.3% 2.9% 11.4% 2.9% 12.4% 3.0% 9.6%
Other 1.2% -6.7% 1.3% -3.3% 1.3% -4.8% 1.3% -0.3%
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Figure 4-7. Correlation of capital and R&D expenditures for GE and WH, 1976-1997. 
Source: GE, Annual Report, various years, WH, Annual Report, various years, CBS Corporation, Annual 
Report, various years. 
Note: To derive the point of inflection of investment, all data take a five-year moving average. As a re-
sult, although the observed period from which the data is taken is from 1974 to 1999, the actual ana-
lyzed period is reduced to 1976-97. 
 
The differences between these two large industrial enterprises gradually become apparent 
towards the 1990s. To one degree or another, GE and WH progressed on their respective restruc-
turings through processes involving major M&A. Over the course of a decade, GE continued to 
increase investment in manufacturing, marketing and R&D, and commenced its re-growth from 
the second half of the 1980s. Alternatively, WH somewhat achieved business growth but strug-
gled with its re-growth in comparison to GE. Importantly, WH’s level of investment in manu-
facturing and R&D declined. 
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Figure 4-8. Correlation of capital and marketing & administrative expenditures for GE and WH, 1976-1997. 
Source: GE, Annual Report, various years, WH, Annual Report, various years, CBS Corporation, Annual 
Report, various years. 
Note: To derive the point of inflection of investment, all data take a five-year moving average. As a re-
sult, although the observed period from which the data is taken is from 1974 to 1999, the actual ana-
lyzed period is reduced to 1976-97. 
 
3. Impact of the 1970s on Corporate Transformation  
Although both GE and WH have similar investment trajectories in the 1970s, there were 
differences in the corporate financial positions of GE and WH, which first started to emerge in 
the 1970s. As shown on figure 4-1, figure 4-2 and Chapter 3, GE maintained or slightly 
strengthened its profitability and financial leverage under the disastrous conditions of the 
1970s. On the other hand, WH declined its current ratio and its equity ratio, albeit slightly, 
while it managed to maintain its share of profitability. The reason that GE CEO Fred Borch 
chose CFO Jones as his successor was that he was deemed to be the right person to strengthen 
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the company’s ability to generate consistent, predictable earnings after the business and organi-
zational expansion in the 1960s451. In fact CEO Jones brought GE to a financially healthy state 
with a strong balance sheet and a record of sustained earnings growth452. WH CEO Kirby also 
tried to take a similar route, and did achieve this objective to some degree, such as an improved 
business portfolio and an increase of sales and earnings while coping with its difficult and 
unique financial litigation problems453.  However, the efforts of WH did not quite arrive at the 
same conclusion as GE in terms of corporate financial standing. These divergent results af-
fected both companies during the wave of accelerated corporate transformations that occurred 
in the 1980s. 
To summarize, even though both companies took a similar investment trajectory in the 
1970s, their corporate finance positions were different to varying degrees in the 1980s. In terms 
of achievements in the 1970s, GE succeeded in establishing a virtuous and successful cycle of 
investment and growth by pursuing the “No.1 or No.2 Strategy” under CEO Welch, a process 
by which GE selected the businesses worthy of continuous investment. Meanwhile, like GE, 
WH retained and strengthened the businesses which it carried over from the 1970s. A distin-
guishing factor was some part of this business portfolio was less high-tech in nature, such as of-
fice furniture, beverage bottling and land/community development. In addition, unlike GE, WH 
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was unable to carry out huge investments in existing businesses or M&A due to profitability 
challenges and other troubles that took place in the 1970s. With increasing competition, this led 
to a decline in investments for WH in both R&D and capital, as seen in figures 4-8 and 4-9, 
both of which are crucial for the sustainability of an industrial corporation. The WH and GE 
cycles were evidently on opposite tracks. 
 
III. Restructuring and Traditional Core Business 
1. New Developments in the Steam Turbine Business 
Fueled by new technology, fierce global competition struck the traditional core business 
of GE and WH, namely steam turbines. Since coal-fired boilers had researched their limits of 
thermal efficiency, and growth in nuclear power did not meet expectations due to public re-
sistance and the Three Mile Island accident of 1979, a new advanced steam turbine, called a 
combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT), rapidly grew to become the main product in the industry454. 
Increasing its share of annual installed capacity from just over 10% in 1987 to 35% in 1993, 
CCGT remained at around 30% of annual installations from the mid-1990s, during a period of 
rapid expansion in total power generation455. The reason was that electric utilities began to order 
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gas and combined turbines when improved gas turbine system emerged in the market in the late 
1980s and 1990456. As shown in figure 4-9, the orders of CCGT had been expanding since the 
late 1980s, although the concept of CCGT was already established during the 1950s457.  
 
Figure 4- 9. CCGT market development, 1970-2002 (total market orders in MW). 
Source: Anna Bergek, Fredrik Tell, Christian Berggren and Jim Watson, “Technological Capabilities and 
Late Shakeouts: Industrial Dynamics in the Advanced Gas Turbine Industry, 1987-2002,” Industrial and 
Corporate Change 17, no. 2 (2008): figure 1, 337. 
 
GE and WH were the first manufacturers to receive CCGT orders and, unlike foreign 
competitors, were capable of developing the technological capabilities458. In response to the great 
Blackout of 1965, gas turbine installations had experienced rapid growth by 1978459. Between 
1966 and 1976, U.S. electric utilities installed 1,429 gas turbine units with outputs over 3500 kW, 
with GE and WH providing a number of them460. In 1978, in response to the first oil crisis in 
1973, the National Energy Act was legislated by the U.S. Congress, comprised of five Acts (En-
ergy Tax Act, Natural Gas Policy Act, National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Power Plant 
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and Industrial Fuel Use Act, and Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act). This had both negative 
and positive effects on the turbine business. While the rapid increase in the cost of natural gas 
discouraged electric utilities from installing gas turbines through the Natural Gas Policy Act and 
the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act encour-
aged the use of gas turbines with efficient combined cycle configurations, particularly in indus-
trial applications461. Compared to WH, which was confronted with a number of troubles in gas 
turbines462, GE could deliver the necessary technological capabilities in gas turbine and CCGT 
because GE was able to transfer knowledge from aircraft engines, maintain R&D and shift its 
focus to the European market while the U.S. market was faced with difficulties463. 
When CCGT, due to its comparative cost advantages, began to gradually become the al-
ternative, and preferred, option for power generating plants in the 1980s,464, GE became a lead 
firm among global competitors while WH accounted for far less market share even though it was 
also a first mover for the product (see figure 4-10). By 1986, just before a period of rapid tech-
nological development, GE, with its cumulative market share of 41%, already had a larger stock 
of installations and more experience in CCGT technology than any other company, while WH’s 
14% share ranked it as the third competitor, behind ABB’s 16% and ahead of Siemens’s 11%465. 
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Figure 4- 10. Global market share in CCGT cumulative orders, 1970-1986. 
Source: Anna Bergek, Fredrik Tell, Christian Berggren and Jim Watson, “Technological Capabilities and 
Late Shakeouts: Industrial Dynamics in the Advanced Gas Turbine Industry, 1987-2002,” Industrial and 
Corporate Change 17, no. 2 (2008): figure 3, 351. 
 
In 1987, when GE introduced the CCGT Frame 7F, which achieved higher efficiency and 
significant advances in performance, CCGT entered an intense technology race during a period 
of market expansion466. During the technology race, both firms were able to launch successive 
generations of turbines at about the same rate and with similar performance in terms of effi-
ciency467, but GE could afford to internally develop and produce the CCGT while WH increas-
ingly relied on partnerships with other firms, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Rolls 
Royce, for development and production of the product468. By 1998, when WH sold its power 
plant business to Siemens, WH could no longer be major player in the global CCGT market 
while GE managed to retain leadership in the business, as shown in table 4-2. 
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Table 4- 2. Global market share in CCGT, 1987-2002. 
 
a) GE licensee in the first three phases. In the fourth phase, Alstom acquired ABB’s Power Generation 
Business. In 1989, the energy and transport businesses of Alstom merged with General Electric Com-
pany (GEC) of UK, forming GEC-Alsthom. 
b) Westinghouse licensee in the first phases. 
Source: Adapted from Anna Bergek, Fredrik Tell, Christian Berggren and Jim Watson, “Technological 
Capabilities and Late Shakeouts: Industrial Dynamics in the Advanced Gas Turbine Industry, 1987-
2002,” Industrial and Corporate Change 17, no. 2 (2008): table 4, 357. 
 
This was, at least partially, the result of WH’s corporate strategy during the 1980s. WH 
was still the second-largest domestic player in the U.S. steam turbine industry, behind GE which 
accounted for a 35-40% share of domestic installations in 1988469. However, WH almost entirely 
left the gas turbine business in 1987, when it almost sold it to MHI470. In fact, according to the 
First Boston Corporation’s analysis, WH was attempting to decrease its exposure to utility mar-
kets and operate its turbine business through joint ventures, due to a forecast of low growth in 
steam turbines that was expected to last until the middle of 1990s, made on the basis of present 
and projected market conditions471. Subsequently, in the face of renewed demand in 1989, WH 
charged its way back to CCGT business with its major new development programs472 but still 
remained a follower throughout the 1990s in terms of global competition.  
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV
1987-1991 1992-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002
GE 28% 26% 22% 54%
GEC-Alsthom / Alstoma 9% 14% 6%
ABB 18% 12% 17%
Siemens 19% 24% 21%
Westinghouse 5% 7% 13%
Mitsubishib 13% 8% 12% 8%
Other 8% 9% 9% 1%
15%
22%
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2. Power System Business over Transformation of Business Structure 
The corporate strategy of the 1980s was to restructure existing business through M&A. 
The top managements of WH and GE both shared a similar criterion for restructuring, they se-
lected and focused resources on businesses growing faster than the slow growth in the econ-
omy473. However, the actual restructuring that took place was different due to the different busi-
ness portfolios that had been built up by previous top management teams.  
Table 4-3 and table 4-4 show the number of completed cases of mergers and acquisitions 
and divestitures for GE and WH during the 1980s. According to GE, they acquired 118 busi-
nesses during 1981 and 1982 alone, through acquisitions, joint ventures and formations of new 
companies, while there were only 82 M&A in the 1980s, as shown in table 4-3474. Similar to GE, 
although WH made 55 acquisitions and 70 divestitures between 1985 and 1987, only 27 M&A 
and 28 divestitures appear in the table for the 1980s475. Hence, both GE and WH undertook a 
much larger scale of M&A&D in the 1980s than the number shown in the tables. Even though 
the data in the table does not cover all cases, it still reflects certain tendencies in M&A&D be-
tween GE and WH.  
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Table 4- 3. M&A&D of GE in the 1980s. 
 
Source: Thomson One Banker’s Mergers and Acquisitions database. 
 
Table 4- 4. M&A&D of WH in the 1980s. 
 
Source: Thomson One Banker’s Mergers and Acquisitions database. 
 
Comparing both firms over the decade, GE clearly had a much larger scale of M&A&D 
than WH, which suggests that GE was able to more drastically restructure its diversified business 
portfolio. The large size and healthy financial standing of GE in the 1970s enabled it to transfer 
into a high-growth business. The corporate strategies of each firm influenced the directions of 
Macro Category Mid Category Macro Category Mid Category
Professional Services 3 Professional Services 1
Other Consumer Products 1 Other Consumer Products 1
Consumer Staples 1 1.2% Household & Personal Products 1 Consumer Staples 2 3.4% Textiles & Apparel 2
Oil & Gas 4 Oil & Gas 1
Power 2 Power 1
Other Energy & Power 2 Other Energy & Power 1
Water and Waste Management 1
Credit Institutions 9 Insurance 2
Insurance 7 Asset Management 1
Diversified Financials 2 Alternative Financial Investments 1
Brokerage 1 Brokerage 1
Other Financials 1 Other Financials 1
Healthcare 4 4.9% Healthcare Equipment & Supplies 4 Healthcare - 0
Computers & Peripherals 5 Semiconductors 5
Software 3 Electronics 3
Semiconductors 2 Software 3
Electronics 1 Computers & Peripherals 1
IT Consulting & Services 1 IT Consulting & Services 1
Transportation & Infrastructure 7 Machinery 5
Machinery 3 Building/Construction & Engineering 4
Automobiles & Components 2 Aerospace & Defense 1
Other Industrials 2 Transportation & Infrastructure 1
Aerospace & Defense 1
Construction Materials 1 Metals & Mining 2
Chemicals 2 Other Materials 1
Metals & Mining 1
Publishing 3 Broadcasting 7
Broadcasting 1 Cable 2
Hotels and Lodging 1 Motion Pictures / Audio Visual 2
Motion Pictures / Audio Visual 1 Hotels and Lodging 1
Recreation & Leisure 1
Discount and Department Store Retailing 1 2 3.4% Other Retailing 2
Food & Beverage Retailing 1
Internet and Catalog Retailing 1
Other Retailing 1
Telecommunications Equipment 2 Telecommunications Equipment 2
Other Telecom 1 Telecommunications Services 1
Total 82 Total 58
Consumer Products
and Services
Energy and Power 4
2Consumer Productsand Services
8
4
Financials 20 Financials 6
High TechnologyHigh Technology 12 13
3
4.9%
Industrials 15 11
Materials 4 3
12
Telecommunications 3
4.9%
9.8%
24.4%
14.6%
18.3%
4.9%
8.5%
4
Media and Entertainment
3.7%
3.4%
6.9%
10.3%
22.4%
19.0%
5.2%
20.7%
5.2%Telecommunications
Mergers and Acquisitions Divestitures
Retail
Media and Entertainment
Materials
Industrials
Energy and Power
7
Retail
Macro Category Mid Category Macro Category Mid Category
Professional Services 1 Professional Services 3
Home Furnishings 2 Home Furnishings 1
Other Consumer Products 1 Other Consumer Products 1
Water and Waste Management 3 Other Energy & Power 3
Power 1 Oil & Gas 1
Other Energy & Power 1 Power 1
0 Diversified Financials 2
Credit Institutions 1
Computers & Peripherals 2 Computers & Peripherals 1
Electronics 2 Electronics 1
Semiconductors 1 Semiconductors 1
Building/Construction & Engineering 4 Machinery 3
Machinery 2 Aerospace & Defense 1
Aerospace & Defense 1 Automobiles & Components 1
Building/Construction & Engineering 1
Other Industrials 1
Materials 1 3.7% Metals & Mining 1 Materials 0 - 0
Broadcasting 3 Broadcasting 1
Cable 1
Motion Pictures / Audio Visual 1
Real Estate 1 3.7% Real Estate Management & Development 1 Real Estate 0 0
Telecommunications 1 3.7% Other Telecom 1 Telecommunications 2 7.1% Telecommunications Equipment 2
Total 27 Total 28
Media and Entertainment 3
High Technology 5 18.5% High Technology 3
10.7%
Industrials 7 25.9% Industrials 7 25.0%
Media and Entertainment 3 11.1%
10.7%
Financials 0 Financials 3 10.7%-
Energy and Power 5 18.5% Energy and Power 5 17.9%
Mergers and Acquisitions Divestitures
Consumer Products
and Services 4 14.8%
Consumer Products
and Services 5 17.9%
171 
 
their respective M&A pursuits. GE acquired a number of financial service and healthcare busi-
nesses. Both firms owned financial service subsidiaries, yet GE chose to diversify its business 
and used M&A to expand externally to achieve growth while WH chose to focus on fewer busi-
nesses and to expand internally476. Regarding healthcare, WH withdrew from the business in the 
1960s while, on the other hand, GE continued to operate in healthcare even during a difficult 
period in the early 1970s477. It then evolved into one of GE’s high-growth businesses by the end 
of the 1990s. Meanwhile, WH selected businesses such as home furnishing and broadcasting to 
be its key business lines. Although GE also entered into broadcasting through its merger with 
RCA, WH’s acquisition accounted for a large part of WH as a business. In addition, WH decided 
to retrench from home furnishing through M&A rather than selling it, while GE never entered 
into the sector478.  
Within this variety of numerous M&A’s, however, the turbine-related business was not a 
target. Rather, GE’s top management considered the business to be squeezed due a lack of market 
and simply reduced its employment from 35,000 to 17,000479. In addition, both WH and GE 
placed an emphasis on services, by offering a refurbishment program that would bring a turbine 
back to original specifications, and extend its life by 10-15 years, for about 40% of the cost of 
installing a new turbine480. The shift to services business was most notable in nuclear power, 
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particularly for WH. During the 1980s WH continuously strengthened related services, such as 
waste management, by acquiring a subsidiary of Hittman Corp in 1982, Numanco and PCI En-
ergy in 1984, Fauske & Associates in 1986, and LN Technologies and Scientific Ecology Group 
in 1989481. Meanwhile GE also shifted to services but downsized the size of its business. While 
building profitable fuel and services businesses, which grew from $14 million in 1981 to $78 
million in 1982 and to $116 million in 1986, GE reduced the number of salaried employees in 
the reactor business from 2,410 in 1980 to 160 by 1985482. Aside from this downsizing in the 
nuclear business, in the 1980s GE still continued to “research for advanced reactors in the event 
the day would come when the world’s view of nuclear changed”483. 
These differences came from the WH’s superior competitiveness in the nuclear power 
industry, as shown in table 4-5. WH was the manufacturer of record for 25% of all nuclear reac-
tors built or on order, and accounted for 44% of the U.S. market share484. In addition, WH’s U.S. 
market share for nuclear fuel exceeded 50%, this against competitors such as Exxon Nuclear, 
GE, Combustion Engineering, and Babcock & Wilcox485. In 1988, WH’s nuclear-related busi-
ness earned approximately 50% of its revenue from maintenance services & training, 30% from 
nuclear fuel, and 10% each from spare parts and equipment486.  
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Table 4- 5. Market share of nuclear reactors in the Free World by 1988. 
 
a) Includes Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan) and Framatome (France). 
b) Includes Hitachi and Toshiba (Japan). 
Original Source: Westinghouse Electric, Nuclear Market Acceptance and Comparative Experience. 
Source: First Boston, Equity Research: Westinghouse Electric Corporation, in “Financial Article (1989-
1993)” box 6, Folder 3, Records of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Historical Society of Western 
Pennsylvania Senator John Heinz History Center. 
 
The shift to services as a complement to the power system business had the objective of 
“growing faster than the slow growth economy,” a corporate strategy objective that was shared 
by the top managements of both GE and WH. But the manner by which they shifted to services 
differed. In shifting to services, GE chose to downsize and allocate resources for research while 
WH expanded its service-related business through M&A, especially in the field of nuclear power. 
Technology
Market Share
All Reactors
WH 89 24.9% 16.8%
WH Licensees
a 83 23.2% 15.7%
Total WH 172 48.0% 32.5%
PWR
Combustion Engineering 18 5.0% 3.4%
Babcock & Wilcox 11 3.1% 2.1%
BBR 1 0.3% 0.2%
Kraftwerk Union 17 4.7% 3.2%
PWR Totals 219 61.2% 41.3%
GE 62 17.3% 11.7%
GE Licensees
b 17 4.7% 3.2%
Total GE 79 22.1% 14.9%
BWR
Kraftwerk Union 7 2.0% 1.3%
ASEA-Atom 11 3.1% 2.1%
BWR Totals 97 27.1% 18.3%
AECL/Canadian Group 34 9.5% 6.4%
Kraftwerk Union 3 0.8% 0.6%
PHWR Larsen and Toubro 0.0%
Walchandnager Industries 0.0%
Richardson& Cruddas 5 1.4% 0.9%
PHWR Totals 42 11.7% 7.9%
Totals 358 100.0% 67.5%
Number of UnitsVendor
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3. Path Dependence from Past Diversification  
These different approaches between GE and WH, as applied to their traditional core busi-
ness of turbine and power systems, were the result of diversification and investments in previous 
decades. During the restructuring period, GE sustained a full line of products in power systems, 
consisting mainly of nuclear power, conventional and gas turbines. During the 1950s-70s period, 
GE firmly established competitiveness for large conventional steam turbines and gas turbines, 
which shared technological knowledge with its jet engines business (see chapter 2). This com-
petitiveness left GE in a position to lead on CCGT during the 1980s and 1990s. Unlike WH and 
other competitors, GE was able to build an innovative CCGT product through internal 
knowledge and capacities, and maintained its number one ranking in global market share while 
reducing the size of its workforce. In nuclear power, which also came as a result of past diversi-
fication, GE fell behind WH by 1988 but still held the number two position and provided alter-
native technology. GE chose not to divest but, instead, strategically allocated its resources only 
to services and research.  
On the other hand, WH reinforced its nuclear power business through M&A, while ex-
ploiting external resources through joint ventures and alliances in CCGT. Although WH also 
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provided a full line of products, starting in the late 1960s it was faced with problems in conven-
tional steam and gas turbines (see chapter 2). Consequently, WH could not build enough com-
petitiveness to allow it to obtain a major share of the global CCGT market. WH provided the 
product and continued its research though alliances with other firms, such as Mitsubishi. Mean-
while, WH expanded its nuclear power service business by acquiring related businesses, such as 
waste management. This was the logic behind their decision-making. While stepping down from 
providing a full product line on its own, WH focused its resources on businesses that had a strong 
position and cooperated with other firms in businesses that were weak.  
Under the business restructuring of the 1980s, both GE and WH refocused their power 
system business, outside of the wave of M&A, to meet the restructuring criterion of growing 
faster than the slow growth economy. It was the primary target for shifting from a manufacturing 
to a service business. GE chose to downsize the size of its business, maintain focus where they 
put their resources, but still provide a full line of power system products independently. WH 
chose to select the product for which they had a strong position, expand related businesses though 
M&A, and resigned itself to providing other products by itself but through external resources. 
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IV. Same Mind, Different Options  
This chapter examines the influence that actions of the past top managements of GE and 
WH had on the different corporate transformations and on business competitiveness in their tra-
ditional business during the last two decades of twentieth century. Although many aspects of 
the divergence of both firms have been revealed by previous studies, additional aspects are 
raised in this chapter.  
The first aspect is that the divergence between the two in terms of corporate investment 
behavior started gradually in the early 1980s, then much accelerated in the early 1990s when 
WH had to cope with its failing financial service subsidiary. The financial standings of the 
1970s partly determined what top management could do in the 1980s in terms of investments 
and M&A. 
Another aspect is the “path dependence” set by the 1960s. During the 1980s both top 
managements of GE and WH shared a similar perspective: what both firms aimed at through 
restructuring: selecting businesses and focusing resources on businesses growing faster than the 
slow growth economy. Their business portfolios had been varied since the 1960s, but the 1980s 
presented new opportunities. In its industrial business, GE could expand relatively easily into 
high-tech business because previous top managers at GE had left the firm with more financial 
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capacity than WH. The latter conducted its restructuring with a target of relatively lower-tech 
businesses, an inheritance from the great vision of the 1960s. Although, WH tried to shift its 
power system business into a more service-based business, this to mitigate what was otherwise 
a stagnant market, the divergence in restructuring also surfaced in its traditional core business, 
one shared with GE. In responding to new product demands for steam turbines, GE took the 
lead in global competition by integrating internal knowledge and capacities, built by continuous 
investments in steam and gas turbines and in jet engines, but strictly focused its resources on 
services and in nuclear power research. On the other hand, WH dominated the global nuclear 
power market, firmly established competitiveness had been built by continuous investments 
going back to the 1950s, while stepping back from global competition in sales of new steam 
turbines and exploiting external resources through cooperation with other firms. 
As a result of the restructuring that took place in the 1980s, both came out as highly di-
versified firms. But GE succeeded in integrating unrelated businesses through its strong top 
level coordination, as Fleck analyzed, or through its strategic control, as Chandler pointed 
out487. The exercising of strong coordination was conducted under a new headquarters-based 
governance structure, as William Ocasio and John Joseph reveal488. By realizing the “integrated 
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diversified company,” GE achieved much higher growth than WH. When both firms were con-
fronted with troubles in their financial service businesses, WH could not stand against the mas-
sive losses without selling off a number of businesses while GE managed the challenge and 
then saw its business eventually become the most profitable within the firm. In November 
1996, when WH CEO Michael Jordan announced that WH would be split into an industrial 
company, named Westinghouse Electric Corporation, and a media-related company, named 
CBS Corporation489, it suggests that WH was unable to construct a means to integrate unrelated 
businesses. Jordan’s plan to split into two companies failed, perhaps because WH had lost its 
integration as one firm. 
The divergence in the corporate transformations between GE and WH might be best 
captured under the need to find new modes of integration, as one firm, in the face of new global 
competition. 
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Chapter 5 
Alternative Perspectives on Corporate Transformation 
"Now that certain things have become clear to you,                                                                         
it may have had the opposite effect—making the missing pieces even more significant."  
Haruki Murakami, Colorless Tsukuru Tazaki and His Years of Pilgrimage 
 
This thesis has been written with a focus on the second half of twentieth century of GE 
and WH, two American first movers in the electrical machinery industry, with the aim of gain-
ing an understanding of the historical aspects of corporate transformation. The first chapter pro-
vides the research framework, into which an understanding of managerial perceptions is incor-
porated, through an examination of arguments between Chandler and critics over the decline of 
the U.S. industrial enterprise in the second half of the twentieth century. Chapter two reveals 
the interrelation between diversification strategies and business competitiveness during the 
1946 to 1970 period, which is sometimes referred to as the Golden Age of the United States. 
Chapter three verifies the different responses taken to address difficult economic conditions 
during the 1970s, with emphasis placed on the oil crisis, a period when the American economy 
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was stagnant and often referred to as the Great U-Turn. Finally, chapter four examines the dif-
ferences in restructuring that accompanied their corporate transformations that took place from 
1980 to 2000. 
As described in the introduction to this thesis, although each chapter independently aims 
to find similarities and differences regarding top management actions and the business compet-
itiveness of GE and WH, findings that provide a historically connection to the consequences of 
their respective corporate transformations in the late twentieth century. This current chapter in-
tends to integrate each finding within the context of their respective corporate transformations, 
and provide the theoretical implications. The next section positions the main findings of the 
thesis into the historical streams of GE and WH. Later, these historical processes, those that in-
fluenced the resulting corporate transformations, are reflected within a theoretical framework. 
Finally the chapter concludes by indicating the limitations of this research and proposes areas 
for future study. 
1. Business History of GE and WH in the Second Half of Twentieth Century 
(1) The Historical Path to Corporate Transformation 
GE and WH had been gradually extending their gap in differences since the end of 
WWII (see figure 5-1). Although GE, on average, was already twice the size of WH in terms of 
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sales and market share, both firms dominated the conventional steam turbine market in the U.S. 
during the postwar period. However, while they increasingly progressed their expansions and 
diversification of businesses, such as embedding in the military and social industrial complex, 
their relative business competitiveness began to diversify in their traditional core business, con-
ventional steam turbines, although their profitability converged in the late 1960s when faced 
with foreign competitors.  
 
Figure 5-1. Nature of GE and WH divergence for each period. 
Source: Author. 
 
The next decade, the 1960s, saw a divergence between the two firms in terms of their re-
spective financial standings. Both firms relied on strategic planning to try to maximize corpo-
rate performance in a stagnant economy. While divesting unprofitable businesses, GE acquired 
Utah International, at the time the largest merger in U.S. corporate history. Although it was a 
diversification into an unrelated business line, the natural resource business, GE proceeded on 
the basis that it would improve profitability. WH, on the other hand, had to face unforeseen ex-
penditures that emerged from its core businesses of steam turbines and nuclear power. The 
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problem related to the supply price for uranium, in particular, worsened its financial standing, 
extending the gap between them by the end of the 1970s. 
Entering 1980, GE and WH had more dissimilarities than what they had in common. 
Even though they both competed in the power system business, their portfolio of other busi-
nesses resulted in extending the gap in financial standings even more than was the case prior to 
1970. Nevertheless, what the top managements of GE and WH sought for corporate growth 
was somewhat similar. While there were a number of differences in manufacturing, both firms 
had financial and other service businesses in common. Subsequently, they both began achiev-
ing growth, although GE grew at a much greater pace than WH. Due to the gap in capital 
strengths, however, the two firms were into rather contrasting corporate transformations when 
they were both faced with huge losses in their financial business. While GE, with its strong fi-
nancial standing, was capable of absorbing the loss and then went onto rapidly expand the busi-
ness for significant profit, WH not only had to sell a number of business to cover the loss, in the 
end it also transformed itself into a media company, and was renamed CBS Corporation. Thus 
GE was able to successfully combine its traditional industrial business with services and high 
technology businesses, while WH metamorphosed into a new media conglomerate enterprise 
that was based on a traditional business of WH490. 
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The result of this expanding gap between the two firms led to rather contrasting corpo-
rate transformations in the late 1990s. Then gap, itself, was the consequence of an accumula-
tion of top management actions taken over five decades. More precisely, it was determined by 
the interrelation between path dependency, as an accumulation of past top management actions, 
and corporate strategy, as a reflection of top management actions taken in each period. The di-
versification/divesting strategies had particular influence on the corporate performance and 
business competitiveness of both firms. While the growth in sales and profit was attributed to 
diversification, existing business competitiveness in steam turbines, for example, was also af-
fected by the distribution of management resources.  
A diversification strategy can be regarded as the product of a set of top management ac-
tions. It has been broadly associated with top management actions in a number of manners, 
such as integrated sequence of decisions, managerial services, perceptions of decision-makers, 
course of action, keiei-koso-ryoku, business conceptions, managerial capabilities, entrepreneur-
ial perceptions, dynamic capabilities and so on491. From these literatures, at least three basic ac-
tions of top management can be identified, perceiving the external environment, conceiving the 
future and taking action. To facilitate explanation, these three top management actions are 
called, as a set, managerial visaction492. It can be said that the different diversification strategies 
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were a result of differences in managerial visaction, and this led to an expanded gap between 
GE and WH. 
From 1946 to 1958, GE and WH pursued mostly the same visaction (see figure 5-2). 
They were more or less obligated to diversify into military products, partly because it was per-
ceived to be a public responsibility at the time. This led both firms to become embedded into 
parts of the military-industrial complex. In the expansion of military business, GE took the lead 
converting the steam turbine business to produce large custom-designed products, which re-
quired more human resources to build. Consequently, under a similar diversification strategy, 
the size of firm and its availability of business resources became factors of competition in the 
conventional steam turbine industry. While GE had access to sufficient human resources for 
both its military and turbine businesses, WH was challenged by a shortage of engineers be-
cause more engineers were required than they were able to secure. Subsequently WH experi-
enced a decline in profitability in the turbine business and, by 1960, had also left the jet engine 
business. While they enlarged the gap in their military and turbine businesses, they still shared a 
number of similarities. 
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Figure 5-2. Managerial visaction and the turbine business, 1946-1999. 
Source: Author. 
Note: “P” indicates perceiving the external environment, “C” indicates conceiving the future, and “A” 
indicates taking action. 
 
After appeasing a huge demand for steam turbines, the top managements of both firms 
shared perceptions of the external environment and had similar conceptions of the future, but 
each took their own actions on diversification between 1959 and 1970 (see figure 2). Both 
firms found potential business in education, health and community development, which ap-
peared to have the support of the government’s new social welfare program. Although they 
both entered into these markets, WH demonstrated a stronger commitment through the pur-
chase of new businesses, while GE also established these businesses it was expanding its inter-
national business. When they started to become embedded in the social- industrial complex, in 
addition to the military-industrial complex, the turbine business had entry into a new industrial 
environment. The U.S. electric utilities gradually began awarding contracts to foreign firms and 
also sought new products, such as gas turbine and nuclear power in addition to much larger 
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steam turbines. GE was able to respond to the demand and maintain competitiveness for these 
products. Being successful in attaining almost the same market share in nuclear power as GE, 
WH was unable to manage massive orders of other turbines. Furthermore, its product quality 
and customer reputation was in decline in the late 1960s due to product technological issues. As 
a result, foreign competitors started to displace WH on new orders. A major reason of this 
problem was an inadequate investment in the turbine business, other than for nuclear power. 
Even though WH saw its competitiveness decline in its traditional business, WH still managed 
to improve corporate performance through diversification while GE, by 1970, was seeing its 
profitability decline through diversification. Entered the 1970s, the gap between them was ex-
tended more in their business structures as well as in the traditional turbine business. 
The top managements of GE and WH eventually took different managerial visaction in 
the 1970s (see figure 2). Particularly after the first oil crisis in 1973, the respective top manage-
ments took different approaches to get through the national economic decline while also being 
concerned with double-digit inflation. GE top management, under CEO Reginald Jones, saw 
the most significant influence of the first oil crisis on the economic system to be galloping infla-
tion, and began seeking a cure for inflation. For that reason, GE merged with Utah International 
in 1976, the largest acquisition at the time, as a valuable hedge against worldwide inflation. In 
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addition, their internal studies on countermeasure to inflation resulted in the launch of a man-
agement education program in 1979, called COIN (Effectively Coping with Inflation)493. While 
reinforcing its financial standing, GE embarked on multiple responses to cope with the energy 
crisis. GE did not focus on a particular technology, such as nuclear energy, but instead provided 
full-line power equipment and infrastructures. GE, in particular, received numerous orders for 
gas turbine after electric utilities became concerned over nuclear regulations, technological de-
velopments and uncertainty over the supply of uranium and plutonium treatment.  
WH, on the other hand, attempted to cope with the energy crisis and rampant inflation by 
focusing on nuclear power and transforming back into an electrical equipment firm. Their logic 
was that the main long-term solution to the energy problem was more installations of nuclear 
power, which would use uranium as a possible candidate to substitute oil. In addition, nuclear 
energy would lead to a decline in the cost of electric energy, contributing to a slowdown in the 
rate of inflation because electricity was a basic driver for economic growth. The reason for em-
phasizing nuclear power was actually due to the decline of WH competitiveness in other tur-
bine products, such as conventional steam turbines and gas turbines. WH faced a lawsuit from 
utilities due to problems with steam turbines and responded by repairing a number of its steam 
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and gas turbines that had been installed since the late 1960s. To make matters worse, WH en-
countered a huge problem in the nuclear power business in the middle of the 1970s. From 1975 
to 1979, WH had to defend against 17 lawsuits launched by 27 public utility customers, this be-
cause WH was unable to supply uranium at the guaranteed price stated in its contracts, due to a 
rapid rise in the price of uranium that was caused by the formation of an international cartel of 
uranium production companies. As a consequence, the settlements from the legal actions gen-
erated $493 million in losses. WH was, undoubtedly, facing a much harder financial position in 
the late 1970s than GE. By 1980, the gap had grown in financial standing as well as in lines of 
business and competitiveness in turbine products. 
Contrary to the 1970s, GE and WH had perceived and conceived in a similar manner, 
but the actions taken were dissimilar, mainly because they were significantly different firms 
(see figure 2). Entering the 1980s, GE and WH commenced the process of restructuring their 
business portfolios in the face of fierce competition with foreign firms. Even though both en-
tered the factory automation business and sold off electrical appliances, there were increasingly 
more differences due to their divergence in business operations. GE took a “No.1 or No.2” 
strategy under new CEO Jack Welch and executed its restructuring through a series of large 
scale M&A. GE obtained software services, insurance companies and disposed of its natural 
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resources businesses. Meanwhile, WH was also acquiring and divesting businesses though 
with a far less volume of M&A. WH acquired nuclear service, beverage bottling, broadcasting, 
and divested some of its broadcasting and businesses in the educational division.  
The last half of 1980s was a business growth period for both GE and WH, centered on 
M&A and boosted by an international relaxation of monetary restrictions that resulted in the 
development and expansion of the global financial market. Both companies rode this wave. GE 
expanded their financial service subsidiaries through M&A, and merged RCA and other busi-
nesses to strengthen its holdings in lines such as medical equipment, plastics and locomotives. 
GE parted with parts of its RCA business, NBC being the exception, and business related to 
factory automation and TV manufacturing. WH mergers, on the other hand, focused mainly on 
broadcasting, furniture, nuclear service, real estate, and business related to residential construc-
tion, while it divested elevator, transmission and distribution equipment businesses. Perceiving 
financial services as vital source of profit, WH took an internal growth strategy for its financial 
business whereas GE pursued an external growth strategy. The more global competition in-
creased in the 1980s, the more the existing business portfolio, a reflection of past decisions, be-
came the basis for corporate growth. Under this restructuring, the common business for GE and 
WH, steam turbines, contributed to an expansion of the gap in business competitiveness. GE 
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maintained its competitiveness and leading firm position, including for the new CCGT product, 
while WH joined foreign firms as one of followers. Although WH was still a leading firm in 
nuclear power, the demand for nuclear power in the 1970s was lower than anticipated and 
worsened after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. The low competitiveness eventually led 
WH to split its power system business.  
When both had to pay for huge losses of their financial business, WH could not cover 
the loss while GE was able to weather the effects due to an abundance of internal funds attained 
through higher corporate growth. And the gap in operated businesses and financial standings 
resulted in different corporate transformations by the end of the century. GE was successful in 
combining manufacturing, services and financial businesses while WH focused on one of its 
traditional businesses, broadcasting, and turned itself into a large media company, known as the 
CBS Corporation. Hence, the divergence in corporate transformation can be seen as a result of 
a long road of managerial visaction influences and to changes in the socioeconomic environ-
ment surrounding their business enterprises. 
(2) Interpreting the History in a Management Studies Context 
In terms of a management research perspective, the history of these two corporate trans-
formations can be summarized as “the transition from one type of organization into another” in 
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order to adapt to changes in the business environment. For instance, Raymond Miles and 
Charles Snow have proposed four ideal forms of organizational responses to adapt to the envi-
ronment: Defenders, Prospectors, Analyzers, and Reactors494. GE and WH were situated in the 
rather complex environments, such as aerospace business, as described by Miles and Snow495. 
Thus it is difficult to draw a clear lines for GE and WH when considering the four types. How-
ever, even though their histories reveal a number of shared general characteristics of the four 
types, there can be classified by time-period on the basis of the characteristics of their prevail-
ing CEOs and corporate strategies. GE changed from Prospector, to Defender, to Analyzer be-
tween 1946 and 2000496. During the 1950s and 1960s, CEOs of GE were primarily engaged in 
sales and marketing before becoming CEO, characteristic of Prospectors and Analyzers. As de-
scribed above, GE was exploring the new business opportunities at the time. This is reflective 
of the Prospector type. In the 1970s, because of the strong finance background of the CEO, GE 
became a Defense type. During the last two decades of the century, the CEO came from a 
chemical engineering background, linked to the field of applied research. In addition, at the 
time GE looked to both concurrently reinforce its traditional core business and capture opportu-
nities for new business. Based on Miles and Snow’s classification, GE was transformed into an 
Analyzer. 
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 On the other hand, WH changed from Defender, to Analyzer-Reactor, to Defender over 
the same period. Since the CEOs of WH came from banking, management consulting, and 
manufacturing engineering, WH can be classified as a Defender type organization during the 
1950s and 1960s. From the 1970s to the early 1990s, WH became an Analyzer type because all 
the CEOs were previously engaged in applied engineering and came from the same business 
group, Industry and Defense. As result of their management, WH turned into a Reactor type, 
unable to respond effectively to environmental change and uncertainty. Later, under a CEO 
who’s past came from business consulting and investment firms, WH became a Defender type. 
From Miles and Snow’s framework on managerial succession, GE and WH, while oper-
ating in the same business environment, exhibit different organizational types between 1946 
and 2000. 
2. Beyond Empirical Evidence: Implications for Management Research 
(1) Corporate Transformation and the Search for New Structure and New Strategy 
What does the history of these two corporate transformations tell us? What insight does 
this historical case study provide in terms of management research? Taking up GE and WH as 
a representative case of contrasts in the evolution of modern industrial firms, or Chandlerian 
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firms, in the postwar period, this thesis provides a comparative examination by focusing on the 
transition in terms of diversification and managerial perceptions. 
The history of the two firms leads one to separate diversification into two categories, re-
lated diversification and unrelated diversification. One can assume it would be management 
perceptions that would lead to decisions on which category to pursue or divest.  
As these diversifications are based on top management perceptions of the socio-eco-
nomic environment, it is managerial perception that gives legitimacy to any proposed diversifi-
cation. There are two possible reasons that may have influenced top management decisions on 
diversification. The first one would be internal reasons, such as the need to weigh available re-
sources across the business portfolio. When top management perceived that they could utilize 
their existing resources, they entered new business. The second reason is external, such as con-
necting to complementary markets. The decision to launch a new business is made when they 
see a link can be made to its existing business, as complementary products. 
Charting the GE and WH diversification paths between 1946 and 1999, the intersection 
of the axes can be depicted on the basis of four factors, as shown in figure 5-3. The horizontal 
axis indicates the diversification, which is divided into related and unrelated diversifications. 
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The vertical axis considers managerial perception, reflecting which factor top management 
more emphasizes to legitimate its diversification into new business.  
 
Figure 5-3. Characteristics of diversification for postwar GE and WH. 
Source: Author. 
 
In the 1940s, the top managements of GE and WH legitimized the need for related diver-
sification by stressing the linkage to markets with existing business under the benign circle of 
electric power, although they were still diversified into national defense business, as an afteref-
fect to the war.  Partly in response to demands from the government, they both expanded their 
defense business over the next decade so that it led them to steer away from related diversifica-
tion, but not to return to the unrelated business seen in the 1960s. At the end of the decade, alt-
hough GE expanded its existing and international businesses, both firms are situated at the 
lower right on the figure 5-3, when they began highly diversifying their business by expanding 
the logic of the benign circle. 
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Their manner of diversification diverged after the 1960s. WH top management recog-
nized a disintegration of the benign circle in the early 1970s. Facing a severe cash crisis, WH 
began disposing a number of unprofitable businesses, both related and unrelated businesses, 
such as major appliances, auto rental, and desalination497. WH continued to operate both related 
and unrelated businesses as long as they were profitable, although the logic that legitimated the 
diversification was already gone. When WH began restructuring its business structure in the 
1980s though M&A, the same profitability of business policy used in the 1970s continued, so 
they expanded to low-technology businesses such as furniture. Hence, WH’s diversification of 
the 1970s and 1980s is plotted on the center of the grid due to its unsuitability to any category 
on the matrix. In the 1990s, however, WH took the path of becoming a media company 
through M&A&D, drawing from one of its traditional business lines, broadcasting. Because 
WH could not afford to hold onto its variety of business lines after the failure of its financial 
business, top management concentrated its resources on the most profitable businesses in the 
portfolio. By the end of the century, WH proceeded on related diversification in media and dis-
posed of other manufacturing and services businesses. WH seemed to follow the logic of man-
agerial enterprise, as emphasized by Chandler, but was implementing in a non-industrial busi-
ness 498. 
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GE, on the other hand, took a different path. Although they sold a number of businesses 
acquired in the 1960s, GE top management diversified into the natural resource business 
through its merger with Utah International. This unrelated diversification was motivated by 
other factors, such as profitability and inflation. Therefore the GE of the 1970s is plotted in the 
unrelated diversification category, but neither internal nor external categories on managerial 
perception. Over next two decades, GE advanced on a new unrelated diversification phase. 
Like WH, GE dismissed the logic of the benign circle by divesting the related businesses to 
their power system business, such as large transformer, air-conditioning, small appliances, con-
sumer electronics and so on. Concurrently, GE top management began disposing of whatever 
business that did not follow the criteria: No. 1 or No. 2 in growth market, higher-margin and 
higher-growth, high pricing power, and consistent income growth499. Subsequently, they left 
businesses such as natural resources, semiconductors, and even profitable defense business. 
The result of restructuring left GE remaining to be an unrelated diversified firm, which oper-
ated from power system, medical equipment, to broadcasting and financial service businesses. 
However, despite this unrelated diversification, the GE of the 1980s, in terms of managerial 
perception, differed from the previous GE.  
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GE top management not only selected the business on the basis of the above criteria, at-
tention was also paid to the integration of the business through sharing value and information. 
Instead of a highly hierarchical organization, according to Joseph and Ocasio’s insightful stud-
ies on GE500, GE top management controlled the businesses and coordinated its organization by 
modifying its governance system in headquarters. For instance GE reduced the hierarchy in the 
1980s and changed the role of the Corporate Executive Council, or CEC, to a meeting where 
Welch informed the executive members, all directly accountable to the CEO, of corporate stra-
tegic initiatives while serving as a central information exchange between the members501. 
Through the revised CEC, GE set sights to becoming an “integrated diversified company”, as 
expressed by CEO Jack Welch502. In addition, GE shared best ideas and practices among its 
businesses through the CEC and a later program called Work-Out, which was the program to 
share ideas among other employees beyond top-level503.  To integrate unrelated businesses, GE 
developed another governance system called the Operating System, which centralized the cor-
porate reporting structure through the development of new governance channels and infor-
mation sharing systems for employees 504. Thus GE top management selected businesses that 
had something in common, in terms of speed of growth, competitive environment, and the 
sharing ideas or values. GE consequently took a different path from that of WH, and is placed 
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at the lower right in the figure 5-3. In a sense, GE did not follow the logic of managerial enter-
prise but developed another logic for corporate growth. 
Figure 5-3 can be refined and restated as in figure 5-4. The left side of figure 5-4 is the 
world of logic that Alfred Chandler emphasized for the achievement of corporate growth. A 
firm located on the upper left in figure 4 is able to realize corporate growth through diversifying 
into the forward or backward businesses that are related to its existing business, well known as 
vertical integration505. Top management took on diversification to control materials and outlets 
for its product506. Thus, the fundamental determination to enter a business was based on inter-
nal factors, such as resources and core business. Since vertical integration usually responded to 
narrow opportunities, top management pursued further growth by moving into related product 
markets or by moving abroad507. The lower left on figure 4 reflects such a world of logic for 
corporate growth, through diversifying into related product markets508. It is true that diversifica-
tion is based on the cost advantages arising from economies of scope, but firms begin diversify-
ing when top management perceives an opportunity in the market509. The emphasis on this 
managerial perception in diversification is different from the one in vertical integration because 
it focuses more on external factor, such as markets. In any case, the left side of figure 4 is what 
Chandler insisted to be the logic for corporate growth, especially as a managerial enterprise. As 
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a consequence of diversification, managerial enterprises, which are “large industrial concerns in 
which operating and investment decisions are made by a hierarchy of salaried managers gov-
erned by a board of directors510,” adopted a multidivisional structure to solve administrative 
overload511. In other words, it can be said that the overload of top management is reduced by a 
multidivisional structure to release “managerial services,” to use Edith Penrose’s terminology, 
for another growth512. 
 
Figure 5-4. Characteristics of diversification. 
Source: Author. 
 
The right side of the figure is the world where Chandler had negative comments for cor-
porate growth, as the tangled logic of diversification513. A firm located in the lower right on the 
figure 4 is unable to sustain its growth because unrelated diversification leads to a separation of 
top management in the corporate office from the middle management responsible for running 
200 
 
the operating divisions and battling for market share and profits514. In addition, top managers 
would begin to lose the capabilities needed to maintain a unified enterprise where the whole is 
more than the sum of its parts515. In the case of GE and WH, a valid reason for the over-diversi-
fication would be an expansion of the logic of related diversification, such as the benign cycle. 
They identified new ways of providing their products, a system product, and saw the opportuni-
ties. WH more committed to this approach and accordingly expanded their business. Manage-
rial perception in this segment of the grid, therefore, also emphasizes external factors, like di-
versification. I call this lower right segment unification to distinguish it from diversification, 
where GE and WH tried to provide a system of products by unifying a number of products. 
The foundation of the unification strategy is based on the economies of selling a system with 
combined products, which I call economies of combination516. However, GE and WH were un-
able, during the 1960s and 1970s, to develop a new organizational structure to achieve corpo-
rate growth under this new strategy. As a result, they both declined in profitability. Chandler 
points out that it was this separation of top and middle management that was the fundamental 
problem in the strategy. 
By solving the problem GE was able to advance to the upper right segment on the figure 
4 and enjoy another round of corporate growth, a situation not deeply examined by Chandler. 
201 
 
As previously described, GE was able to achieve high growth by selecting its business under 
common criteria and integrating the businesses though the sharing of ideas, best practices, in-
formation and values. In other words, GE’s top management perception was more concentrated 
on internal factors when they selected businesses. As a consequence, GE’s business portfolio 
was still an unrelated diversification but with high growth. Behind this high growth, GE real-
ized another form of economies of combination. GE did not go for the demand side of econo-
mies of combination, which is accomplished in the 1960s by combining each product de-
manded into one system of product demand, but instead focused on the supply side of econo-
mies of combination, by sharing information and looking to complement each other as a part of 
a unified product (e.g. financial services and plastic business517). In addition, rather than devel-
oping a new hierarchical organization, GE developed a new governance system to resolve the 
separation of top and middle management and still achieve the economies of combination. 
Thus GE regrowth was accomplished through a new type of integration, which I call shared in-
tegration for convenience. 
The right side of the figure is the world of post-Chandler, where a firm does not follow 
Chandler’s logic of corporate growth. When firms aim at unification to achieve growth, they 
can fail because of the lack of new organization to achieve the economies of combination. But 
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firms can be able to grow and demonstrate the economies of combination when they integrate 
unrelated businesses through a sharing of business resources and by reducing the overload on 
the top management of the new organization. While on the left side, the key factors for corpo-
rate growth are related diversification, economies of scope (and scale), and organizational 
structure (e.g. multidivisional structure), the right side of looks to unrelated diversification, 
economies of combination (and scale), and governance system / channel as keys for corporate 
growth. 
In the case of GE and WH after the war and toward the end of the century, it can be said 
that it was a process of developing new organizations to match a new strategy, namely unre-
lated diversification. Chandler states that strategy follows structure, GE and WH have followed 
his principle. But it took over four decades to find the structure (i.e. governance system) which 
matched the new strategy for corporate growth. Until finding the structure, as Penrose de-
scribes, managerial resources became the limitation to corporate growth518. When GE began to 
find ways of releasing managerial services to pursue renewed growth, GE did grow under a dif-
ferent logic of the managerial enterprise. 
(2) Nature of Managerial Capabilities 
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One of the research questions left by Chandler is an understanding of the evolution of di-
versification. More precisely, although he divided diversification into related and unrelated, he 
has not advanced an analysis of diversification, such as distinctions between concentric and 
conglomerate diversification strategies519. He knows that GE, an unrelated diversified Chan-
dlerian firm, achieved a successful corporate growth during the 1980s by introducing strategic 
control and changing the role of headquarters520. After publishing Scale and Scope: The Dy-
namics of Industrial Capitalism, however, he started to examine the different characteristics be-
tween industries that reflect different technological features, such as between high-tech or low-
tech, rather than focusing on why some unrelated diversified enterprises have been growing 
and maintained their business competitiveness521.  
This thesis proposes that it does not matter whether a firm selects related or unrelated di-
versification for corporate growth but it is a vital factor that top management is capable of inte-
grating a number of businesses into a unified enterprise. In addition, although it is recognized 
that an overload of top management limits corporate growth, as Chandler (and Penrose) veri-
fied, the hierarchical organization is not the only approach to reducing this overload. After 
widespread diversification strategies and multidivisional structuring amongst big business en-
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terprises, it became rather difficult to differentiate strictly on the basis of adapting a new strat-
egy and structure. As Joseph and Ocasio reveal, given the limits of structural differentiation be-
tween strategy and operations for strategic adaption, diversified business enterprises required 
specialized structures for integration across levels and function522. Although it is difficult to 
manage a unification of unrelated businesses, as WH experienced, GE succeeded in developing 
a new governance system / channel and released managerial services for the next growth, as 
pointed out by Penrose.  
The reason GE was able to develop the new organization was the fact that GE’s top and 
middle managers had learned great managerial capabilities, as a result of continuous investment 
in management after the war and what Chandler indicates as a one of three most important in-
vestments to building competitive advantage523. Managerial capabilities, which Chandler 
avoids examining due to difficulties of generalization524, may be the vital role to not only creat-
ing new organizations but also realizing new approaches for corporate growth. Furthermore, 
based on a number of insights from previous studies of GE and its history of corporate transfor-
mation gained from this empirical study, it is the top managerial capabilities to integrate a busi-
ness enterprise that counts, it is not just holding the old and new businesses but combining the 
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old and new businesses through new approaches for further corporate growth. When respond-
ing to a new business environment, alternate integration approaches can emerge for the “prod-
uct”, such as integration by technology (e.g. standardized interface) or integration by long-term 
relationships (e.g. keiretsu)525. Top management teams also develop new ways of integrating 
the “organization”, as an integrated highly diversified firm (i.e. GE) that is able to achieve re-
growth, while other top management teams struggle and cannot find the way (i.e. WH), so the 
recourse is back to the related diversified firm. In this sense, a critical aspect of managerial ca-
pabilities is to be able to develop approaches to integrate the firm. Managerial visaction is one 
of way of using historical background to capture managerial capabilities. 
Through comparative studies of GE and WH, it can be said that firms will continuously 
grow as long as they keep evolving their “visible hand”, even during periods of rapid change on 
the socio-economic environment. Massive post-war changes in the business environment 
forced changes and corporate transformations amongst U.S. industrial enterprises, the historical 
development of the “visible hand” may also determine way for corporate transformation. Fail-
ure to develop the hand requires a return to a basic logic for corporate growth. By the end of the 
twentieth century, GE had found the new path for corporate growth. But the approach might be 
already out-of-date. A second wave of globalization is highly advanced526, and different forms 
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of unrelated diversification have already emerged. Apple, Google, and Amazon, all high 
growth firms, have been conducting unrelated diversification. There should be economies of 
scale, scope, combination, or even new types of economies to support their corporate growth. 
As discussed in this thesis, approaches to corporate growth involve on evolution. These firms 
developed ways to integrate and reduce the overload on top management. Furthermore the de-
velopment of IT technology may lead to the development of a new hierarchical organization 
that further releases managerial services, yet to be developed at any degree of significance. In 
any case, the supposition is the firm will break out a state-of-the-art approach for sustained cor-
porate growth that also continues to invest in management and build high managerial capabili-
ties. 
3. Topics for Further Research 
This thesis is based on a comparative study of only two American electrical manufactur-
ing firms in the second half of twentieth century. Therefore there remains a number of unan-
swered aspects. For instance, the two firms are examined in terms of the role of management in 
utilizing productive resources, as per the “early Chandler’s” perspective527. It does not consider 
the “later Chandler” perspective that emphasized the role of management in developing pro-
ductive resources528. Thus future research should also examine the building of capabilities, such 
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as the coordinating capabilities that Fleck insists on and the dynamic capabilities that Teece et 
al. state529. Focusing on this specific point may contribute to a more generalized view of mana-
gerial capabilities and top management, which Chandler avoids due to difficulties in generaliz-
ing530. In addition, this study is limited to the U.S. Further study in terms of international com-
parisons is needed to better understand organizational capabilities of electrical manufacturing 
firms, as in Tell’s study between U.S. and Europe firms531. 
Joseph and Ocasio’s governance channel structure is another way to understand why 
some highly diversified enterprises are able to sustain corporate growth. There is a need for fu-
ture study to compare GE’s governance system with that of other firms. In terms of managerial 
perceptions, as Kahneman’s works demonstrate532, insight can be provided by historically ex-
ploring managers’ cognitive habits, such as heuristics and biases. The intent is to reveal another 
aspect of corporate transformation by new research on capabilities, the governance system of 
the firms, and managerial perceptions. 
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Addendum A 
Model for Investment Trajectory Analysis:  
A Case Study of American and Japanese Electronics Enterprises 
 
I. Visualizing Corporate Investments 
Corporate investment is a key indicator providing evidence of top management directions and 
influence, and is often a result of management “perceptions” and “conceptions”. Since the 
1980s it has become difficult to obtain in-house corporate documents that reveal these manage-
ment perceptions. In response, a unique investment data processing model is introduced, to 
compensate for this lack of historical documentation, namely the Investment Trajectories Anal-
ysis (ITA). Addendum A describes the original model on which ITA was based, and then how 
it was influenced and modified by the outcomes of business history discussions, particularly the 
works of Alfred D. Chandler. Finally, a case study is introduced to draw out behavioral differ-
ence between enterprises, by analyzing American and Japanese electronics enterprises in the 
late 20th century to the early 21st century. 
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II. Kodaira and Kodama Model 
Kodaira and Kodama (2005, 2007) propose two analytical models, called “Business Model 
Analysis Chart (BMAC)” and “Expenses on Sales-related Activities Trajectory Analysis Chart 
(ESAC).” These models aim to identify the relationship between a CEO’s investments and re-
lated decisions by visualizing the corporate strategy. Also discussed is the link between R&D 
investments and capital spending.  
1. Background of the Model 
Kodama (1991) was the first to make the argument533. In his research results, Kodama 
interpreted that the trend of R&D expenses surpassing capital investment, as experienced by 
many Japanese manufacturing firms in the late 1980s, reflected a shift from the producing or-
ganization to the thinking organization534, which he considered not to be a decline of R&D 
investment efficiency but more the secret of strength of Japanese manufacturing competitive-
ness535. Although his view was widely accepted under the bubble economy in Japan, an oppo-
site interpretation then emerged.  The phenomenon of R&D exceeding capital investment was 
then considered to reflect poor performance and inefficiency of R&D investment and led to a 
return to capital investment. This under the backdrop of a sluggish Japanese economy, called 
“the lost decades”, and a declining competitiveness of Japanese manufacturers536.  
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Araoka (2004) raises doubt about this emerging interpretation when pointing out a fun-
damental defect in data analysis, and then affirms Kodama’s view through a data analysis cov-
ering 1980 to 2002. He indicates that the “commercializing investment,” i.e. R&D plus capital 
investment, remained stable as a percentage of sales from the 1980s to the 1990s, but the R&D 
investment ratio increased and was offset by decreases in capital investment. This supports Ko-
dama’s interpretation that manufacturing enterprises seek to increase capital productivity 
through employing a substitution of capital investment with R&D537. 
While Kodaira and Kodama (2005) are supported by Araoka’s argument, they consider 
commercializing investment to be an essential factor in assessing corporate structural change.  
Based on these arguments, Kodaira and Kodama (2005, 2007) build models to analyze corpo-
rate changes at the micro level, under the hypothesis that Kodama’s interpretation is correct. 
2. KK Model 
Kodaira and Kodama (2005, 2007) develop a simple analytical model (hereafter the KK 
model) that attempts to visualize and determine the point and time of corporate strategic change 
(and business model change) of Japanese manufacturing firms, through the use of a scatter dia-
gram on spreadsheet software538.  
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(1) The Assumption behind the KK model 
This model is developed from the assumption that setting the parameters of decision-
making for a manufacturing enterprise CEO should involve consideration of the relationships 
between three important factors: R&D expense, capital investment and expenses on sales-re-
lated activities. Figure A-1 breaks down sales, as a comprehensive indicator of corporate per-
formance, into its underlying factors: (1) operating profit, (2) expenses on sales-related activi-
ties and R&D expense, and (3) depreciation expense and production cost. Among these factors, 
operating profit stands out as an outcome variable that reflects the result of decisions rather than 
a true variable of decision-making, whereas depreciation expense is a dependent variable aris-
ing from capital investment decisions that result in an accumulation of capital. Production cost, 
on the other hand, fundamentally depends on the technology at use at the time. As it is neces-
sary to introduce new materials and manufacturing technology for competitive production, the 
Chief Technical Officer or manufacturing manager are given responsibility for such decision-
making. The CEO makes decisions on the general allocation of resources and, as a result, has 
an impact on decisions taken by others. In effect, R&D expense, capital investment and ex-
penses on sales-related activities are the parameters under which a CEO’s decisions are made, 
within the variables in Figure A-1. 
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Figure A- 1 Relation between R&D expense, capital investment, and expenses on sales-related activities.  
Source: Kazuichiro Kodaira and Fumio Kodama.ama, “Saiko-keiei-sekininsha (CEO) no senryaku tenkan no 
kashika,” Technology and Economy, no.483, (2007): p.45. 
 
(2) Three Parameters of the KK model 
Under the above assumption, Kodaira and Kodama (2005, 2007) focus on the three vari-
ables as a means to quantitatively visualize corporate strategy. In Figure A-1, R&D expenses 
are reflected under the “distribution cost and general expense”. Characteristics of this expense 
category include: (1) has a direct effect on operating profits, (2) once decided, it is not easy to 
reduce the scale of investment as a good half of the expenses are derived from personnel ex-
penses, an essential investment for running a continuous business, and (3) it can still be cut as 
an effective means to improve short-term profitability, although this would accelerate the pace 
at which a firm matures.  
As capital investment is reflected under assets, it is captured in the KK as depreciation 
expense. Evaluating the scale of long-term investment requires a gaining of understanding of 
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how the ratio of capital investment to sales influenced the sales revenue. Although senior man-
agement can occasionally defer the timing of capital investments, this would not immediately 
improve profitability because capital investment is off the income statement, business earnings 
are affected by changes in depreciation expense539. Thus, capital investment can serve as an ap-
propriate parameter in understanding corporate strategy and business model changes as well as 
R&D expense.  
Expenses on sales-related activities are calculated by subtracting R&D expense from the 
distribution cost and general expense. Even though the data includes other costs, it is still valid 
to apply this methodology to determine the level of sales-related expense if verified to be re-
flective540. If the product sales target is the objective, the CEO can increase expenses on sales-
related activities in order to promote the product in the marketplace, such as employing a mar-
keting strategy. Thus, expenses on sales-related activities serve as an appropriate third parame-
ter for analyzing corporate strategy.  
In summary, the KK model aims to capture the manufacturing enterprise strategy by 
means of these three variables, R&D expense, capital investment and expenses on sales-related 
activities. 
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(3) Method of Data Processing 
The corporate data employed under the KK model are sales and the three parameters dis-
cussed above. The data is taken from unconsolidated financial data sourced from Yukashoken 
Hokokusho (Annual Securities Report), which is the Japanese equivalent to SEC filing require-
ments, such as Form 10-K in the U.S.541. As for capital investment, the level of investment in 
plant and equipment is derived by subtracting land investment from capital investment. In order 
to more clearly capture the point of strategic change, data for all three parameters take a five-
year moving average542. In addition, all data is not considered on a deflator. Rather, the data is 
used as a ratio of sales to the three other data on KK model and offsets the deflator effect, alt-
hough it still exists the impact is considered to be sufficiently minor that it can be ignored543. 
(4) Analysis and Interpretation 
The KK model consists of two parts, BMAC and ESAC. The first draws a scatter dia-
gram on a graph, where the horizontal axis (x) shows capital investment / sales and the vertical 
axis (y) shows R&D expense / sales, and serves as the primary model to verify the tendency of 
corporate strategy and the point of strategic change. The second introduces expenses on sales-
related activities / sales on the x-axis, while retaining R&D expense / sales on the y-axis, which 
is complementary to the results of the first model.  
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BMAC covers two aspects of the manufacturing enterprise, promoting a knowledge cre-
ation company (here after knowledge creation) 544 and commercializing investment, with this 
captured in an analytical model that is able to concurrently evaluate knowledge creation and 
commercializing investment545. The criterion for knowledge creation relies on the ratio of R&D 
expense divided by capital investment, and that of commercializing investment looks at the to-
tal value of R&D expense and capital investment as a ratio of sales. 5% is the median for both 
the R&D expense ratio and the capital investment ratio as applied to sales, this derived from the 
top-100 R&D expense leaders amongst Japanese manufacturing enterprises listed on the stock 
change, so 5% is set as the base-line for both ratios. On this basis, the path to knowledge crea-
tion slopes upward from left to right while the path to commercializing investment slopes 
downward from left to right, as on Figure A-2546. 
Also detailed is a business model for Japanese manufacturing enterprises547. As shown 
on Figure A-3, the chart is divided into four zones on the basis of 5% thresholds. Each zone in-
dicate a specific attribute of the business model, whereby A-Zone is knowledge creation, B-
Zone is either high-tech or new business, C-Zone is manufacturing and D-Zone is either service 
or mature business. For example, if the investment line transfers from C-Zone to A-Zone, this 
reflects a change in the enterprise business model from manufacturing to knowledge creation. 
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On the basis of the framework above, BMAC plots a scatter diagram on the graph to rec-
ord the tendencies of corporate strategy and the point of strategic change. In drawing the scatter 
diagram, it visualizes the trajectory of a corporate investment strategy. There are eight interpre-
tations for each direction by which the trajectory can take route, as per figure A-4. 
Figure A- 3 Positioning Business Model   
Source: Kazuichiro Kodaira and Fumio Kodama, “Erec-
toronikusu sangyo no keiei modelu bunseki: 80-nendai 
kara 2000-nen made no choki kozo henka,” Business 
Model Association Proceeding, (2005): p.29.             
Note: The Figure translated and modified by the au-
thor on the basis of the source 
Figure A- 2 Business Model Analysis Chart  
Source: Kazuichiro Kodaira and Fumio Kodama, “Erec-
toronikusu sangyo no keiei modelu bunseki: 80-nendai 
kara 2000-nen made no choki kozo henka,” Business 
Model Association Proceeding, (2005): p.29.             
Note: The Figure translated and modified by the au-
thor on the basis of the source. 
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Figure A- 4 Correlation of criteria for commercializing investment and knowledge creation.  
Source: Fumio Kodama, Gijutsu keiei senryaku (Tokyo, Japan: Ohm-sha, 2007): p.9.  
Note: The Figure translated and modified by the author on the basis of the source. 
 
Trajectory A - Strengthen R&D: Trajectory A reflects an increase in the R&D expense 
ratio while the capital investment ratio remains fixed. It affirms the manufacturer has favored 
to strengthen R&D.548 
Trajectory B – Improve R&D Efficiency: Conversely, if the R&D ratio (only) is de-
creased, it indicates a cut in R&D spending549. 
Trajectory C - Commercializing: When capital investment increases with the R&D ra-
tio unchanged, it reflects the stage of product manufacture that occurs after completion of 
product development550. 
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Trajectory D - Restrain Manufacturing Cost: After completing capital investment, man-
ufacturing costs are restrained to assure profits551. 
Trajectory E - Switch to Knowledge Creating Company: If the commercializing invest-
ment (R&D expense + capital investment) is fixed, the trajectory then moves the line of com-
mercializing investment (see figure A-3)552. When a decrease in capital investment is allocated 
to R&D, the trajectory reflects a conversion to a knowledge creation company, in other words, 
a thinking organization553. 
Trajectory F - Switch to Solution Service or Maturing Business: Trajectory F indicates 
two possibilities, either switching to a solution service, such as a system integrator business, or 
to a maturing business. It is not essential for a system and software development to invest as a 
large amount of capital investment and R&D expense when compared to manufacturing554. In 
the case of a maturing business, the spending on both R&D and capital investment can be re-
duced in order to generate profits, as a countermeasure to the maturing business and prod-
ucts555. 
Trajectory G - Commercialize New Products or Create Corporate Value: Trajectory G 
reflects both ratios as increased, suggesting two possible situations. One could reflect the com-
mercialization of a new product or business. In starting up a business, both ratios are likely to 
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increase relative to the size of investment, as sales are relatively low at the early stages. The 
other possibility is one of creating corporate value. This is evidenced when a manufacturer 
takes an offensive strategy, such as the addition of commercializing investment or maintaining 
the same amount of commercializing investment during a phase of decreasing sales556. 
Trajectory H - Return to Manufacturing: The opposite direction of Trajectory E demon-
strates a return to manufacturing, observed when manufacturers take on capital investment 
with an aim to expanding its product market share557. 
While BMAC analyzes manufacturing enterprises to interpret trajectories, ESAC is em-
ployed as a complement to BMAC, to more correctly understand the interpretation of trajecto-
ries such as G and F558. For example, when a firm takes trajectory F on BMAC and also takes 
an ESAC trajectory, demonstrated by an increase in the expenses on sales-related activities ra-
tio, this reveals the firm has switched to a solution service business, mainly because the ex-
penses on sales-related activities ratio is higher with service businesses. Through BMAC, with 
ESAC as a complement, the KK model analyzes manufacturing enterprises in order to deter-
mine tendencies in corporate strategies and points of change. 
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III. Investment Trajectory Analysis Model559 
The Investment Trajectory Analysis Model (ITA) is developed from the KK model and 
is designed to introduce the analysis of corporate changes and business history. The model pro-
vides quantitative evidence of top management’s decision-making and of financial perfor-
mance, through an historical examination on the basis of business history arguments. 
1. Background of the Model 
In business history, the “decision” has been one of the central themes from the early560 
days to the present561. One result of decision-making is corporate strategy562.  The concept of 
strategy was first introduced to the management research field by Alfred D. Chandler563. In pur-
suing his studies on the factors for an emerging modern industrial enterprise and on competitive 
advantage, his focus shifted from a vertical / horizontal integration strategy and hierarchical or-
ganization, to one with a three-pronged-investment and organizational capability. Chandler 
(1990) reaches the proposition that investments in production, distribution and management are 
the defining factors for the emerging modern industrial enterprise564. Although it changed the 
description attached to investment, investment was subsequently considered as one of the key 
factors in his framework565. In other words, how a firm takes on investment is a reflection of 
decision-making through corporate strategy.  
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Mowery (2010), however, points out that Chandler’s analysis rarely penetrated far more 
deeply than the investment itself566. And this applies, to some extent, to other works in business 
history. Although numerous insightful works in business history use investment data for empir-
ical evidence, Mowery may be true that investment is not fully analyzed. Also, it potentially 
raises other aspects of the enterprise when analyzing the investment itself, since investment is 
reflected in top management’s knowledge information for corporate growth and profitability567. 
Under the above context, ITA is developed to provide quantitate evidence of corporate 
divergence and strategic change resulting from investments and decision-making of top man-
agement. 
2. Methods of Data Processing and Analysis 
ITA consists of two components. The first part is very similar to the KK model and ex-
plores the point of investment change through three sets of data, capital expenditures / sales (x-
axis); R&D expenditures / sales (y- axis); and expenses on sales-related activities / sales (z-
axis). It draws a scatter diagram in three dimensions or, more accurately, two diagrams in two 
dimensions: (1) capital expenditures / sales (x-axis) and R&D expenditures / sales (y- axis); and 
(2) capital expenditures / sales (x-axis) and expenses on sales-related activities / sales (y-axis). 
The data introduced in the second diagram, the additional dimension, differs from the KK 
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model because the focus is not on “manufacturing (capital expenditures) as related to innova-
tion (R&D expenditures)” but is placed on “manufacturing (capital expenditures) in relation to 
service (expenses on sales-related activities)568”.  
     The other part is a scatter diagram providing three sets of data, the net income / reve-
nue ratio, the total investment / revenue ratio and the rate of increasing (or decreasing) revenue 
growth569. This diagram describes the correlation between the tendency of investment and out-
come of performance, and verifies the periods of corporate change in terms of both aspects. 
All data used in both diagrams take a five-year moving average, to readily understand 
the tendency of objects and differences between objects570. As a result, the actual analyzed pe-
riod is reduced to two years in the beginning and same for the end for the observed data. The 
data of revenue growth on the latter diagram, the correlation of input and output, are processed 
through (1) calculating the ratio to the previous year, and (2) taking an average for every five-
years (e.g. 1972-76, 1977-81). Net income and total investment as a percent of revenue is aver-
aged over five-years (e.g. 1972-76, 1977-81)571. 
In examining financial performance data, ITA indicates both the point of change of the 
corporate growth and of the strategic change, or divergence. It also provides useful evidence for 
an international comparison of manufacturing enterprises. Large amounts of investment do not 
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always lead to higher profitability. As numerous previous researches reveal, differences exist 
between US and Japanese firms and profitability, for one, reflects underlying fundamental and 
national differences572. ITA is also able to analyze periods when R&D expense data is unavail-
able573. On the other hand, ITA interprets only the direction of trajectory and not the business 
model, which is analyzed on the basis of the 5% line. Given the 5% line of the KK model is 
based on Japanese manufacturing enterprises, it is not appropriate to use it in analyzing foreign 
(non-Japanese) enterprises. In fact, when Kodama, Kodaira, and Okada (2009) comparatively 
analyze Japanese and U.S. manufacturers, the positioning business model is not evaluated. It 
requires an examination of historical context and other data to arrive at an interpretation. ITA 
introduces quantitative evidence of corporate decisions and change. 
 
IV. Case Study: A Comparative Analysis of GE, WH, Toshiba, and Hitachi 
To demonstrate the application of ITA as a means of grasping corporate change, the fol-
lowing analyzes four large electric/electronics enterprises, two are American companies (GE 
and WH), and two are Japanese companies (Toshiba and Hitachi: hereafter TC and HL)574. 
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1. Data 
All data is gathered from General Electric Company,  Annual Report, 1972-2010, West-
inghouse Electric Corporation,  Annual Report, 1972-1996, CBS Corporation,  Annual Report, 
1997-1999, Toshiba Corporation, Yuka-shoken-hokokusho, 1986-2010, Hitachi, Limited, Yuka-
shoken-hokokusho, 1986-2010. To employ consolidated financial data and compare equally as 
possible, Japanese company data terms are shorter because of the lack of availability of consoli-
dated financial data in public data sources. 
All data takes a five-year moving average. The revenue data of GE and WH does not in-
clude those of the financial service divisions, although the net income is does. This is because 
the accounting methods employed in financial business is different from that of manufacturing, 
and it is inappropriate to simply sum up both data for use in analysis. This also allows one to 
analyze the degree to which a manufacturing firm is contingent on its core business, outside of 
financial services575. Similarly, the three other data are consolidated with exclusion of the finan-
cial unit. The data for R&D expenses uses only company-sponsored data. In GE and WH, 
R&D expenses consist of three expenditures, company-sponsored, customer-sponsored, and 
government-sponsored. For ITA, company-sponsored R&D is regarded as being representative 
of top management’s decision-making, therefore only company-sponsored data is used as 
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R&D expenditures. Taken from the consolidated statement of cash flows, additions to property, 
plant and equipment 576 is used to represent capital expenditures. Unlike the KK model, the 
ITA looks to maintain consistency of data by not subtract land investment from capital invest-
ment. “Expense of sales-related activities” uses “selling, general and administrative expense” 
data found on the consolidated statement of earnings, which subtracts R&D expense577.  
2. Result of Analysis and Interpretation578 
The results of analysis are reflected in Figures A-5, 6 and 7. All figures reveal differ-
ences between the four enterprises. Firstly, they clearly indicate differences between nationali-
ties. GE and WH, American enterprises, favor higher profitability over investments while TC 
and HL of Japanese enterprise take an opposite tendency. These different tendencies between 
American and Japanese enterprises derive from fundamental differences in individual corporate 
behaviors, such as the corporate system579, and corporate, market and profit views580.  
ITA, a case study in support of previous research conclusions on differences between the 
nationalities of enterprises, captures each different tendency in corporate behavior and the point 
of strategic change or divergence. GE and WH have taken relatively similar investment behav-
iors and performances toward the end of 1980s.  
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Figure A- 5 Correlation of investment to peformance for four electrical manufacturing firms. 
Source: General Electric Company, Annual Report, 1972-2010, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, An-
nual Report, 1972-1996, CBS Corporation, Annual Report, 1997-1999, Toshiba Corporation, Yuka-
shoken-hokokusho, 1987-2010, Hitachi, Limited, Yuka-shoken-hokokusho, 1987-2010. 
There are two divergent point between them, around the early 1980s and the early 1990s. 
The early 1980s was the time for both enterprises to transition to new top management. GE and 
WH commenced the process of restructuring their business portfolios. GE took a “No.1 or 
No.2” strategy under Jack Welch and executed a series of large scale M&A to restructure itself 
while WH was also acquiring and divesting businesses under an alternate management tool, 
Vabastram (the Value Based Strategic Management System), though with far less volume of 
M&A when compared to GE581.  
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The second point of divergence results from the management of 1980s. GE increased its 
profitability and revenue growth while WH was running a loss and was downsizing its business 
scale as a result of struggles with the financial service business. Toward the end of 1990s, GE 
maintained business growth, profitability, and R&D investment while decreasing capital ex-
penditures and expenses on sales-related activities. This reflects the fact that GE remained as an 
industrial corporation with high growth and new profitable business lines. Meanwhile WH, by 
the close of the decade, was rapidly transformed into a media service company, which drasti-
cally decreased R&D expenses and increased expenses on sales-related activities, as on figure 
A-6 and 7. 
TC and HL have similar investment behaviors and performances toward the end of 
1990s. The point of divergence emerged in the early 2000s. TC started to increase capital in-
vestment and recovered a positive net income margin, while HL continued to decrease all in-
vestments and was unable to obtain a positive average net income in the 2000s582. 
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Figure A- 6 Correlation of capital and R&D expenditures for four electrical manufacturing firms. 
Source: General Electric Company, Annual Report, 1972-2010, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, An-
nual Report, 1972-1996, CBS Corporation, Annual Report, 1997-1999, Toshiba Corporation, Yuka-
shoken-hokokusho, 1987-2010, Hitachi, Limited, Yuka-shoken-hokokusho, 1987-2010. 
 
Figure A- 7 Capital and sales-related activities expenditures for four electrical manufacturing firms. 
Source: General Electric Company, Annual Report, 1972-2010, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, An-
nual Report, 1972-1996, CBS Corporation, Annual Report, 1997-1999, Toshiba Corporation, Yuka-
shoken-hokokusho, 1987-2010, Hitachi, Limited, Yuka-shoken-hokokusho, 1987-2010. 
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When comparing the industrial enterprises less WH, GE and HL pursue a similar invest-
ment ratio, higher than TC, even though there is a major gap in profitability and growth be-
tween the two. GE and TC are considered to be similar enterprises and historically, since the 
early 20th century, have had a close cooperative relationship. However, different approaches 
started to appear in the 1980s and these accelerated in the 2000s583. 
An ITA approach reveals (1) different characteristics between Japanese and American 
enterprises in terms of investment and profitability, (2) the point of divergent between enter-
prises, more clearly demonstrated in the GE and WH analysis of the early 1990s, (3) the points 
of strategic change within each firm.  
 
V. Quantitative Story for Business History 
This Addendum A describes the ITA approach and demonstrates its validity through a 
case study of Japanese and American electric / electronics enterprises, as represented on the 
scatter diagrams presented. The dots on the diagrams are telling us a story. The story of how the 
decision-making of enterprise was changing in response to changes in the world environment.  
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Only half of the story is told. There is something that the trajectory isn’t showing us. 
What has not been revealed are the underlying reasons that led to the decisions that were taken 
(i.e. what was the discussion?). When interpreting the results of ITA, full and due consideration 
should be placed on the prevailing historical macro-economic context and the organizational 
context for each of the enterprises. While acknowledging limitations of the ITA approach, it 
can still be considered to be a useful tool for the provision of quantitative evidence and an addi-
tion to business history research. 
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